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MASS COMMUNICATIONS AND POLITICAL CULTURE:
AUTHORITARIANISM AND PRESS REPRESENTATIONS OF POLITICAL
DEVIANCE IN GREECE
Roza Tsagarousianou
Thesis submitted for examination for the Degree
of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in Sociology
Abstract
This study focuses on the role of the politics of
signification, and in particular, on the role of the press
in the reproduction and transformation of political
culture.
It is suggested that the systemic/behaviourist
approach to political culture initiated by the "Civic
Culture Thesis" proposed by Almond and Verba limits the
scope of the study of political culture. It is therefore
argued that a reformulation of the concept of political
culture premised upon post-Parsonian critical social
science traditions (such as the work of R. Williams, the
Birmingham Centre for Contemporar y Cultural Studies and P.
Bourdieu, provides a new interdisciplinary framework that
permits the consideration of hitherto little explored
aspects of political culture formation, reproduction and
change such as the role of mass communications in these
processes. In this, alternative theoretical context, a
provisional attempt is made to examine the possible links
between mass communications and the reproduction/change of
political culture.
The empirical part of this work explores the process
of formation and reproduction of authoritarian elements of
Greek political culture through the political press and is
divided in two sections. The first examines the
social/historical processes which led to the formation and
reproduction of contemporary Greek p olitical culture and
the development of the Greek political press. In the second
part, I	 examine the	 Athens press	 performance with
particular reference to press representations of the
confrontation between the state and a social/political
minority which has become known as "the marginals". The
press "text" then is interpreted on the basis of the
social/ historical context, in which it is produced and
interpreted, and its relationship with Greek political
culture is examined.
The argument is concluded with a provisional
consideration of the relationship of political culture and
the press, based on the theoretical and empirical evidence,
thus preparing the ground for further study of political
culture and mass communications.
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The system of transliteration used in this dissertation
represents an attempt to retain some balance between the
orthography and phonology of modern Greek. Thus
pronunciation following conventions of standard English
will reasonably approximate the sound of modern Greek.
Exception has been made in the case of well-known names
of persons and areas for which anglicized forms are more































ai (as in "paid")
ei (as in "receipt")
ou (as in "soup")
oi (pronounced El] as in "machine")
af, ef (before unvoiced consonants)
av, eN) (before voiced phonemes)
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The key questions that permeate this study might be
summarized as follows: "What is political culture?", "what
precisel y is political about it?" and "how could we study
it?". These questions are particularly important in the light
of the relatively recent experiences of "decolonization" and
"democratization" throughout the world as the debates on
"democratic consolidation" in the European South, or
"democratization" in the third world and, currently, in
Central/Eastern European societies would indicate.
The late 1950s witnessed a process of introspection and
transformation of mainstream political science which up to
then had concentrated mainly on formal aspects of the
political process, thus ignoring other less formal aspects of
the "political". The first theoretical framework for the
study of political culture emerged through attempts to
develop adequate tools for comparative analysis of different
Political systems and to deal	 with the	 problems of
decolonization and democratization of young states and
societies. However, during the seventies, post-Parsonian
theories transformed radically the theoretical landscape
through their critique of mainstream political and social
sciences and, as	 far	 as the theory of political
-2-
culture is concerned, through the rejection of the latter's
behavioursm, psychologism and	 westernism. Post-Parsonian
social science, recognizing the interrelation between
culture, action and structure provided the framework for the
development of a dynamic concept of political culture which
shapes structures and is shaped by them.
The transition to "democracy" in Greece, and more
generally in the European South, since the 1970s makes quite
evident that the process of democratization could not be
restricted only to the transformation of constitutional and
other legal structures or of governmental institutions; it
should involve the transformation of cultural relationships
which affect the definition of the boundaries of the
"political". Indeed, in the case of Greece, the fall of the
dictatorship in July 1974, triggered a slow process of
dismantling the post-civil war system of legal exclusion and
discrimination against a substantial part of the population
and raised hopes for the establishment of a democratic
polity.
However the emerging political actors of the time
through their political practices reproduced or introduced
authoritarian elements in the organization of political and
social life. Thus the political sphere was defined in rather
restrictive terms, as a partocratic regime (including only
mainstream social and political forces) monopolized the
political arena and controlled the universe of political
discourse at the expense of existing or emerging social or
-3-
p olitical diversity. This was not a result of imposition of
the political will of political parties through force and
coercion, but rather	 as I hope to demonstrate	 it
constituted the outcome of the attainment of hegemony of the
mainstream political parties over a substantial part of
Greek society, that is, of the successful articulation of
elements of popular culture into their political project(s).
The formation of an authoritarian political culture has
therefore been the outcome of a complex and often
contradictor y - process of hegemonic incorporation. This
thesis will focus on the role of the politics of
signification, and in particular, on the role of the mass
media, in the reproduction and transformation of political
culture, as mass communication constitutes one of the social
processes which plays a crucial role in such an endeavour.
This study seeks to explore the processes of formation
or reproduction of authoritarian elements of Greek political
culture through the mass media. For this, I shall attempt a
hermeneutic analysis of Greek media performance in selected
situations in which the official discourse was challenged by
sub-cultural groups which have been widely known in Greece
as "marginals".
In Part I of this thesis I outline the theoretical shift
that the concept of political culture has undergone from its
ori ginal context of structural functionalist social science
to Post-Parsonian sociology and political science. Chapter 1
focuses on the emergence and development of the civic culture
-4-
theory and examines the theoretical, ideological and
political background of its career. In Chapter 2, drawing
upon post-Parsonian contributions in the study of culture
such as those of R. Williams, P. Bourdieu, Z. Bauman, or the
Birmingham School, I shall try to examine their contribution
to the development of alternative conceptualizations of
political culture, and assess the latter. In Chapter 3, I
shall attempt to elaborate on the links between political
culture and mass communication through a brief discussion of
the relationship of basic theories of mass communication and
political culture and their theoretical implications in the
study of the latter.
In Part II, I explore the formation and the contours of
contemporary Greek political culture and the contribution of
the mass media - and in particular, the press - in shaping
and reproducing the former. In Chapter 4, through a
historical analysis of social developments in modern Greece,
I examine the structural and institutional framework in which
contemporary political practices unfold, while in Chapter 5,
I concentrate on the institution of the press and examine the
social, political and economic context in which it has
developed, and explore its role in the production, or
dissemination of definitions of the situation in contemporary
Greece.
In Part III, I shall attempt to study the press
representations of the confrontation between the state and
social/political minorities which have become known as the
-6-
"marginals". I have selected four main "events" which
attracted considerable coverage by the Athens press (the
equivalent of national press). These "events" could be
considered to be situations in which the official discourse
was challenged by these sub-cultural groups, and therefore
represent instances in which press performance might be
crucial for the reproduction of the official discourse. In
Chapter 6, I attempt to situate the selected the case studies
in their social-historical context, while in Chapter 7, I
analyse the texts which comprize the press coverage of these
events. Finally, Chapter 8 constitutes an attempt to throw
light to the ways in which the particular languages and
inventories employed in the press coverage of these "events"
are related to the reproduction of the hegemonic political
culture in Greek society. In this way this interpretation of
the press performance during these "events", serves as the
"link" between the	 "text" of news coverage and the
Particular social-historical conditions in which it is
produced.
Finally, drawing upon this analysis of press
representations.of political deviance in contemporary Greece
and their relationship with the Greek political culture, I
argue for the importance of further research on the
interrelationship between mass communications and political
culture.
PART I
POLITICAL CULTURE AND MASS
COMMUNICATION
-7-
PART I: POLITICAL CULTURE AND MASS COMMUNICATION:
INTRODUCTION
The concept of political culture was first introduced in
the 1960's as an integral part of the then mainstream
political theory. The civic culture theory with which the
concept was closely linked, occupied a prominent position in
mainstream political science throughout the 1960's and into
the 1970's, and slowly declined towards the 1980's. After a
period of stagnation, the concept reemerged in a quite
different context as attempts were made to reconstruct it
within different theoretical traditions.
In Part I, I shall attempt to outline the theoretical
shift that the concept of political culture has undergone
since its	 introduction, from the context	 of systemic
political science to critical traditions of the social
sciences. I shall also argue that the processes of
reevaluation and reconstruction of the concept led to the
emergence of a more interdisciplinary outlook in the study of
political culture as they were informed by developments in
the fields	 of cultural studies, linguistics and mass
communication studies.
Chapter I traces the formative moments of the concept
and attempts to provide a link with the political,
-8-
theoretical and ideological background of the civic culture
theory. Although the civic culture theory constituted an
original way of providing a link between micro and macro
analysis, and the introduction of the concept itself appeared
to resolve problems faced by developmental and comparative
studies, the civic culture thesis was sharing the
intellectual and political bias of the broader theoretical
paradigm of which it was integral part. The "cultural"-
consensual normative definitions of society and polity it
sustained and reproduced were in fact reflecting the
essentially conservative outlook of the theory, while the
linear-evolutionist schema of political-cultural development
and its cultural bias attracted considerable criticism, while
a series of changes in the political sphere that took place
in the three decades following the introduction of the
concept of political culture challenged the model of politics
upon which the concept was based. It is these changes in the
political sphere that I shall try to identify as a movement
towards the "authoritarian transformation of democracy" and
as the "emergence of the new social movements". It should be
pointed out that both "the authoritarian transformation of
democracy" and "the emergence of the new social movements"
should be viewed as processes which have been taking place
over a substantial period of time, sometimes following
parallel courses and sometimes not. What is more, I should
emphasize that the order in which these developments are
Presented and discussed is not a chronological one; it is
-9-
rather a "thematic" one.
The second chapter focuses on alternative
conceptualizations of political culture. Its first part
constitutes an attempt to trace the theoretical premises of
efforts to "rehabilitate" the concept of political culture
and integrate it in critical traditions of the social
sciences. Particular emphasis is given to developments in the
field of cultural studies, and especially the work of Raymond
Williams, as they have been influential in the development of
alternative conceptualizations of political culture (cf.
Gransow and Offe 1982; Demertzis 1985, 1989). In the second
part, I attempt to draw an outline of these alternative
conceptualizations, to discuss their theoretical implications
and to propose a typology of political cultures that is
premised on	 Gransow and	 Offe's notion	 of	 political
"emancipation".
The final chapter explores and elaborates on the links
between political culture and mass communication by
discussing the basic tenets of theories of mass communication
on the social eind political significance of the mass media
and examining how the latter affect political interaction,
and especially, their role in the social determination,
production and mobilization, of meanin g , and its political
ramifications.
CHAPTER 1
THE CIVIC CULTURE THESIS: AN OVERVIEW
During the 1950s, the processes of "de-colonisation" led
to the creation of numerous new states which confronted
quite different problems from those faced by their western
counterparts. As the majority of them were artificial,
ethnically or culturally fragmented entities, products of the
colonial administrative legacy, virtually unable to sustain
themselves as they had to overcome acute problems of
political	 instability and economic	 and technological
underdevelopment, they developed - or were forced to
develop - different political systems from those of the
Western societies. Even in cases where western prototypes and
institutions were adopted, the different 	 cultural and
historical backgrounds and the sizeable obstacles they had to
overcome, led to outcomes which did not resemble to their
prototype in western democracy.
On the other hand,	 Western democracies seemed to
experience a high degree of political stability and to enjoy
a period of economic growth, in contrast with the "fragile
democracies" and the economic stagnancy of the "developing"
and "underdeveloped" countries.
It is in the context of this comparison between
underdeveloped and developed countries that assumptions of
economic, political and cultural superiority of the latter
emerged; alongside it also emerging an "end of ideology
thesis" (D. Bell, 1960) based on a strong optimism and faith
in western democracy which came to be considered as the
"telos" of historical evolution.
It is this atmosphere of enthusiastic and optimistic
acceptance of the superiority of western democracy as a form
of political organisation that provided the framework for
comparative analysis of different patterns of development by
initially - American social scientists and, for the
eventual establishment and influence of developmental studies
and comparative politics within the social sciences. (cf.
Almond, 1956; Apter, 1958; 1965; Pye, 1966; Lapalombara and
Weiner, 1966).
Despite D. Apter's assurances to the contrary (Apter,
1965: 56-7), there is strong evidence suggesting that a
conceptual convergence between modernization and
westernization was underlying this newly developed trend in
the social sciences as the concept of political modernization
elaborated by most theorists of political development
indicates.
It soon became evident however that the adoption of
western democratic 	 institutions by	 developing and
-12-
underdeveloped states could not	 itself guarantee the
formation of what	 was considered to be a "genuinely
democratic political system".
In their book "The Civic Culture TM , Almond and Verba
(1963) elaborated on the reasons which, in their opinion,
were rendering an y attempt of modernization through the
introduction of "western" institutions alone, ineffective.
More precisely they argued that:.
"If the democratic model of the participatory state
is to develop in these new nations, it will require
more than the formal institutions of democracy
-universal suffrage, the political party, the
elective legislature. ... A democratic form of
Participatory political system requires as well a
political culture consistent with it." (p. 5)
Almond and Verba viewed the concept of "political
culture" as the missing element in attempts to understand why
institutional transformations alone were failing to initiate
democratization of the political systems of "underdeveloped"
societies, or, more generally, why political systems with
similar structural-functional characteristics did not appear
to attain the same degrees of democratization. Therefore,
the introduction of the concept was intended to overcome
these shortcomings which confronted the work of political
system theorists. This, they attempted to achieve by
relating the macro-political level of analysis which had been
developed through the work of systemic social and political
theorists (cf. Parsons, Easton and Lipset) with the
micro-political level of analysis that had been established
-13-
through the work of American behavioural scientists and
psychologists in the field of individual political psychology
(cf. Lasswell and Lazarsfeld).
Their	 notion	 of political	 culture	 which was
considerably influenced by the developments in the fields of
anthropology and psychology in the United States (cf.
Benedict, 1934; Lasswell, 1930; 1948; Mead, 1951), referred
to the internalization of the political system in the
cognitions, feelings and evaluations of the population of a
nation, or "the particular distribution of patterns of
orientation towards political objects among the members of
the nation" (Almond and Verbs: 14). The writers conceived as
political objects the political system as a whole, its
inputs and outputs in particular, structures and roles
involved in the input and output processes, as well as the
individuals in their capacity as political actors (p. 15).
Table 1: Dimensions of political orientation 
1.	 2.	 3.	 4.
System as
general	 Input	 Output	 Self as




Source: Almond, G., and S. Verba (1963), p. 16.
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Influenced by the theoretical framework introduced by
Parsons and Shils (Parsons and Shils, 1951), Almond and Verba
adopted and applied to the political level, their distinction
of three types of orientations, that is, cognitive,
affective and evaluational (Table 1). According to the
distribution of different types of orientations towards
different types of political objects, they distinguished
three ideal-types of political culture (Table 2).
The first - the parochial type of culture is
characterised by lack of differentiation among political, on
the one hand, and religious, economic and social roles on the
other. Thus, a "parochial culture" is characterised by lack
of any kind of active orientation towards the political
system. As Almond and Verba claim, in a parochial culture
individuals do not have any expectations from the political
system, and, generally, remain politically indifferent (p.
17:19). A more "advanced" type of political culture is that
of the "subject political culture", in which the individuals
recognise the existence of a differentiated political -
governmental - power, but are not predisposed to act towards
participating in or transforming this power. In other words,
individuals evaluate - positivel y or negatively - the outputs
and the political system itself, but are not positively
oriented towards expressing demands, .therefore remaining
essentially passive (p. 19). Finally, the "participant type
of political culture" (P. 19) Presupposes the recognition of
-15-
political roles and institutions by individuals who are
oriented towards a more active role and participation in
both the input and the output processes of the political
system. In other words, individuals are predisposed towards
expressing demands and manifesting their favourable or
unfavourable orientations towards the system as a whole.
As the threefold distinction of parochial, subject and
participant political cultures is a classification of
ideal-types, and cannot in practice reflect the dimension of
political development and cultural change, Almond and Verba
introduced the notion of congruence between political culture
and the structures of the political system. More precisely,
they argued that they considered a type of political culture
to be congruent with the political structure when the
individual's cognitive orientations towards the appropriate
political objects are, or tend to be, accurate, and his/her
affective and evaluative orientations are positive (Table
3).
On the other hand, they claimed that incongruence occurs
when cognitive orientations towards the appropriate political
subjects are more or less accurate, but affective and
evaluative orientations are not positive (Table 3). In order
to reflect this incongruence between political culture and
the political system in its historical dimension, Almond and
Verba pointed out that in fact, the political culture of a
nation does not correspond to the three ideal-types they
-16--
introduced, but rather to "systemically mixed political
TABLE 2
TYpes of political culture 
System as
general	 Input	 Output	 Self as
object	 objects	 objects	 object
Parochial 0 0 0 0
Subject 1 0 1 0
Participant 1 1 1 1
Source: Almond, G., and S. Verba, The Civic Culture, p. 17.
TABLE 3
Congruence/incongruence between political 





(+): high frequency of awareness, or of positive feeling, or
of evaluation towards political objects.
(-): high frequency of negative evaluations or feelings.
(0): high frequency of indifference
Source: Almond, G., and S. Verba, The Civic Culture, p. 22.
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cultures" or sub-tyPes of political cultures, that could be
classified as " parochial-subject", "subject-participant" and
"parochial- participant".
According to Almond and Verbs, political cultures are
heterogenous not only in terms of the above classification,
but also in terms of the existence of different political
subcultures within a political culture, which correspond to
differences in political orientation, or to the political
object the orientation is directed towards.
Although Almond and Verba considered participant culture
to be essential for the establishment and maintenance of a
Participatory democracy, they nevertheless claimed that for
the sake of congruence between participant political culture
and the political structure of a democratic polity,
potentially uncontrollable participant orientations which
might destabilize and eventually put in danger the very
existence of the political system should be "managed", and
therefore, ideall y, commitment to politics should be
moderated. This, they argued, can be achieved when the
political culture is an essentially participant one, but
subject and parochial political orientations are blended in
it in such a way that participatory "excesses", which they
considered harmful to democratic politics, would be
counterbalanced by values and orientations congruent with
Parochial and subject cultures.
Therefore, the type of	 political culture which,
-18-
according to the writers, would be con gruent	 with a
"participator y democratic" polity is the civic culture, a
combination of parochial and subject attitudes with
participant political orientations within the context of an
allegiant participant culture. They argued that a fusion
between participant orientations and subject and parochial
attitudes could lead to a culture in which political
involvement would be "balanced" by a degree of passivity and
an attachment to traditional values which would therefore
guarantee citizens subject to law and authority who respect
the "power and leadership" of the government" (pp. 473-76).
As Kavanagh observed, the civic culture is
"a dualistic orientation to political authority ...
is a mixed political culture in which the subject
orientations allow the elites the necessary
initiative and freedom to take decisions and are
countered by the participant orientations which
make the elites sensitive to popular preferences"
(Kavanagh, 1972: 14).
Working within the context of systemic theory, Almond
and Verba, conceived political culture as distinct from, and
external to political structure. Whereas political culture is
effectively reduced to psychological orientations towards
political objects, structure is conceived of in terms of
roles or patterns of roles, independent of their incumbents
and external to human action. As Demertzis has observed
(Demertzis, 1985: 142-3), this relation of externality
between what the authors regard as a "meaningful" culture on
the one hand, and a "neutral" and "meaningless" structure
-19-
obscures the fact that both "culture" and "structure" are
meaningful normative orders which both structure and are
structured by human activity. If this premise is accepted,
then the notion of incongruence between culture and structure
should not be interpreted, as it is suggested, as a
manifestation of the dysfunction of the political system,
that is, its inability to satisfy demands informed by the
political culture;	 rather it should be viewed as a
manifestation of the contradictory reality of the societal
order, or of "the conflict between two different and
antagonistic historical temporalities within and over the
same field of historicity" (Demertzis, 1989: 271).
The introduction of the concept of political culture by
Almond and Verba has been a very significant attempt to
introduce a linkage between the macro and micro-political
level of analysis, and to theorize a relationship between the
political system and its functions, and the political
behaviour of individuals. However, Almond and Verba adopt a
psychological view (Almond and Verba 1963: 12-16) which
effectively reduces political culture to fragmented
individual attitudes towards the political system, its inputs
and outputs. Having adopted a "psychologistic" approach, by
isolating individuals from their social-historical milieu,
and ignoring the framework of sociopolitical relations and
social interaction that shapes and influences their
"psychological orientations towards political objects", the
authors introduce an a-historical conception of culture. What
-20-
is more, as the authors conceive political culture as merely
a set of attitudes and orientations formed through political
socialization, they regard the individual as a passive
receiver of transmitted attitudes, predispositions and
political orientations. This presumed passivity of the
individual is by no means affected by the authors' attempt to
"expand" their theory of political socialization by arguing
that socialization is not a necessarily "unidirectional"
process, (p. 326) as their rejection of "unidirectionality"
in fact refers to recognition of the mutual influence among
different authority patterns and does not suggest any
possibility of interaction between the individual and social
institutions or authority patterns. Hence, the position of
the individuals remains unaltered as they continue being
"bombarded" by different sources of influence, without being
recognized as knowledgeable agents, possessing the capacity
to negotiate and internalize in a creative way their own life
experiences and externalize these very experiences through
their action.
It should also be pointed out that although Almond and
Verba maintain throughout their analysis that a key concept
in their "civic culture" thesis is that of "participatory
democracy", their conception of "participatory democracy"
appears to be a rather limited one, as it appears to be
premised upon.the assumption that "balanced disparities",
that is, balanced contradictions between two sets of goals -
governmental power and	 authority,	 and governmental
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responsiveness to citizens' demands - are a necessary element
for the effective function of the political system (Almond
and Verba, p. 476; also Eckstein 1966). The implication of
such an argument is the adoption of an "elitist" definition
of democracy based upon a fundamental distinction between
governmental elites, which are invested with governmental
power and monopolize the decision making process, and
non-elites, whose only political role is narrowed down to
"Participation in government" within the institutional
constraints of the political system, that is, through the
electoral process, or expression of demands through pressure
groups, but in fact never attempting to participate in the
decision making process, or to confront, reject or alter the
s ystem as a whole.
What is more, the elitist implications of the premises
of the theory of political culture reduce the interaction
between elites and non-elites to the "sensitivity" of the
former to the needs of the latter (Almond and Verba: 477). In
this context, as it has been argued, the "civic culture"
thesis amounts to the "celebration of the role of political
apathy and disinterest" (Pateman, 1980). As Almond and Verba
maintain that the active citizen is in fact a utopian
creature, they recognize a fundamental distinction between
governing and governed, by accepting the existence of an
"external" relationship between them, and in this way
virtually reducing citizens to the role of rather a-political
"subjects".
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Related to these elitist-technocratic premises of the
"civic culture thesis" is the fact that the underlying theme
in Almond and Verba's analysis is not that of democracy but
the maintenance of the stability of the political system,
(Ch. 15) as the main concern of the writers shifts from
citizens' participation to consensus on the political
process, a consensus based on a shared set of values
(political culture) that would prevent any disruption of
Political stability.
It should be pointed out that this essentially
Schumpeterian conceptualization of democracy in terms of a
competition among elites for electoral approval by relatively
apolitical and privatized citizens, with particular emphasis
on the existence of strong leadership and effective
governmental authority, was conceived by the authors as best
realized in the sociopolitical reality of the United States
and the United Kingdom. ! The whole study conducted by Almond
and Verbs was based on the acceptance that the anglo-saxon
democracies (or more precisely the United States and the
United Kingdom) have been "succesful experiments in
democratic government" (p. 37). This, combined with the
closeness of "civic culture" to the "set of values" that the
writers associated to the participatory ideal of
anglo-saxon democracy is indicating that the "civic culture".
thesis is biased in the sense that it privileges and reifies
the type of democracy that has developed in anglo-saxon
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societies. In this way, Almond and Verba's theory of
political culture reduces cultural and political diversity
into a linear-evolutionist schema with civic culture, and
therefore anglo-saxon democracy, acquiring a universal and
prescriptive value within the context of the authors' "end of
history" thesis which underlies the civic culture paradigm.
To take this argument even further, it could be pointed out
that their theory of political culture is "formalist", in the
sense that it is preoccupied with the maintenance of the
"form" through discovering the appropriate "content". It
therefore does not address the issue of the "content" of
democratic institutions, or, in other words, is unable to
grasp the possibility of a "structural" change while the
"structures" of the system remain apparently unaltered. In
this way it remains committed to a "model" of liberal
democracy, while it is unable to take into account the
changes that liberal democracies have been, and are still
undergoing, without substantial "formal" changes in their
institutional framework. Taking this into account, we could
argue that the "Civic Culture thesis" is not adequately
equipped, in methodological and conceptual terms, to address
the phenomenon of the "transformation of democracy" which I
shall discuss later 2 and, therefore, remains an essentially
apologetic and non-critical theory.
Although the "civic culture thesis" was a significant-
attempt to expand the study of politics be yond the study of
governmental institutions by focusing attitudes towards
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political, objects and their effects, it however developed
within a functionalist-systemic context is premised on a view
of politics as a subsystem, functioning for the maintenance
of the equilibrium of the social system. This, in turn,
implies that the sphere of the "political" is treated as
distinct from other social spheres, as fixed boundaries
between what is considered to be political and non political
are being set and reified. This view of politics is based on
the denial	 of the social-historical character of the
"political", and ignores the possibility of the
politicization of apparently non-political social spheres
and/or the depoliticization of what would, at a different
time or space be considered as political.
Beyond the Liberal-democratic Model of Politics: the 
Changing Political Sphere of Western Democracies. 
However, the changes which most of the advanced western
societies have been witnessing since the mid-sixties, and
which have frequently been interpreted from different points
of view as aspects of a wider transformation of these
societies into what some thinkers named one-dimensional
societies (Marcuse 1991) 1 or towards what others saw as
post-materialist societies (Inglehart 1977b) have challenged,
in different ways, the very premises of the theory of
"liberal democracy" as it had been formulated by American
political science.
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The socio-economic and political trends in western
societies, since the sixties, have undermined the
Plausibility and the theoretical and political credibility of
the theories which had developed within the context of
mainstream systemic comparative politics. As it has been
Pointed out in the previous pages, the theoretical paradigm
of	 "liberal democrac y ",	 had been premised upon the
characterization 	 of	 western,	 or,	 more	 specifically,
anglo-saxon societies as exemplary participatory
democracies. The success of these polities, it was held, was
to a significant extent due to their capacity to maintain
social and political stability. The liberal-democratic model
of politics presupposed the existence of a shared set of
positive orientations and a consensus towards, at least the
means, and possibly the ends of the democratic process. This
consensus was of crucial importance as it was through the
political forms of the liberal-democratic political process
that demands and conflicting interests arisin g in civil
society could be accommodated or limited, and conflict could
be "absorbed".
What is more, underlying these considerations there
seemed to be a certainty as far as the future of western
democracies was concerned, as, it was thought, the
continuation of the trends of economic growth of the sixties
would decrease social tensions, strengthen the conflict-
resolving capacity of the liberal-democratic polity and
therefore sustain political stability.
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However, it could be argued that the proponents of the
liberal-democratic model of politics proved to be lacking a
sense of historicity and to be based upon an inflexible and
rather narrow understanding of the political. Althou gh it
should be aknowledged that their theory of democrac y was
informed by a deep concern about the conditions which might
lead to the (re)emergence of totalitarian regimes, it was
nevertheless unable to account for the changes which most of
the advanced western societies were already undergoing.
Since the inter-war period the state had been abandoning
its "watchdog" role and had been increasingl y assuming a
range of new tasks that were eventually to affect not only
the economic sphere but also almost every aspect of social
life. The post-war years in particular, have been
characterized by a pattern of intensification of the
expansion of the state: this expansion was necessitated by
the objective of achieving long-term social stability and
legitimation, which was linked, initially with the
imperatives of the enterprize of economic reconstruction and,
eventually, with the institutionalized undertaking of new
complex tasks by the state, in the form of welfare (Offe,
1984c: 147) or other distributive and regulating
interventions that would guarantee the physical and social
reproduction of their populations, safeguarding , at the same
time the internal dynamics of the economic system upon which
the state itself depends.3
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These new tasks aiming towards the prevention or the
management of potential economic and political crises led to
increased internal complexity of the state as well as to its
engagement in a process of increasing involvement in economic
and social life. As it has been suggested, this tendency of
state expansion towards areas hitherto "uninhabited" by it,
and the density that characterizes it, has led to the
blurring of the boundaries between state and civil society 4
as the former has permeated the latter to such an extent that
the political sphere, as it is understood in the context of
the theory of liberal democracy, appears to be too limited
to encompass the phenomena of multiplication and diffusion of
political instances which characterize advanced, complex
societies (Melucci 1989: 165, also 172-4).
The increased complexity of the state, characterized by
the multiplication of its decision-making centres for a
variety of differentiated tasks, has led to a complex
relationship between it and civil society as almost every
aspect of the production and reproduction of physical and
social life has become the object of public policy, and at
the same time a potential conflict generating issue.
These developments have led to the politicization of areas
of social activity that had hitherto been situated outside
the traditional political sphere of liberal democracy as new
issues became open to public discussion and negotiation and
could potentiall y generate confrontation. At the same time, a
movement towards the restoration of the "authority" of the
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state, constituted a parallel process of depoliticization of •
domains of social activity by restricting the scope of the
legitimate participants	 in them,	 and by substituting
invisible, non-political forms of negotiation and
decision-making for political, and more or less publicly
visible processes.
In view of this complex transformation of the political
sphere, the traditional institutions and processes of liberal
democracy appeared unable to fulfil the role which they had
been accorded by liberal-democratic theory: the ability of
traditional channels of the democratic political process to
transform social conflict into what Lipset has called
"democratic class struggle" has been considerably reduced -
as the debate on the crisis of the democratic political
institutions would suggest 6 - while new institutions have
been formed in order to cover the conflict-articulation
deficit of liberal democracy - the literature on the
emergence of the new social movements is indicative of this.
The 13 ame appears to be true as far as the
conflict-regulating capacity of the 	 liberal-democratic
institutions is concerned. As the ability of these
institutions to regulate conflict has become less certain, a
shift of the location of the decision-making centres from the
conventional, parliamentary institutions to new settings
located outside the liberal democratic political sphere
seems to have been taking place. What is more, as it has been
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pointed	 out,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 "relocation"	 of
decision-making centres, the policy-formation process has
also been undergoing considerable change as governments
appear to "rel y increasingly upon criteria and standards of
performance derived from other sources than the democratic
political process" (Offe, 1984a: 166).
Thus, while it is evident	 that, contrary to the
postulations of liberal-democratic political theory, the
democratic political process and institutions are no longer
performing a significant role in the political process of
western advanced societies, they nevertheless continue to
formally retain a central position in it (Offe, 1984a:
166-76; Melucci, 1989: 172).
As a consequence of this new state of affairs, behind
the apparent "durability" of the democratic political
process, the state, governing elites and citizens have been
engaged in a radical redefinition of politics through
by-passing the hitherto conventional democratic political
forms and transcending the limits of the political sphere of
liberal democracy.
The interpretations of these changes in the political
sphere of advanced western societies appear to point towards
the emergence of two interrelated phenomena, notably the
shift towards instances of conflict regulation or even
repression by the state through inaccessible, invisible and
poorly legitimized processes and institutions, on the one
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hand, and the formation of new channels 	 of conflict
articulation and political action, on the other.
The "Authoritarian Transformation of Democracy". 
The shift towards increasing conflict regulation through
the relocation of the decision making process to settings
outside the conventional political sphere of liberal
democracy, and towards new methods of conflict regulation and
repression in western democracies provided the starting point
for a series of critical interpretations s of the
developments in advanced capitalist societies, as particular
attention was drawn to the existence and further development
of an authoritarian dimension in the liberal democratic
Political process and the political culture of advanced
western societies.
The critiques of the authoritarian transformation of
western polities drew considerably upon European anti-liberal
traditions, and especially Carl Schmitt's critique of
liberalism. To a large extent, they constituted a renewal of
Schmitt's argument - and of its elaborations within the
context of marxian theoretical traditions - against liberal
democracy, with particular emphasis on the distinction
between "true" or "substantive" and "formal" democracy and on
the totalitarian elements of liberalist social theory (Agnoli
1972; Ferrajoli 1985; Marcuse 1968).7
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At the same time, they anticipated, and reflected, the
experiences of the Western European extra-parliamentar y Left
and the political radicalism -and anti-liberalism- of the
sixties, a period of social and political turmoil when the
limitations and inflexibility of the liberal democratic
political process were seriously challenged by unprecedented
waves of political protest, when the first experiments for
the formation of a "fundamental opposition", developing
outside the conventional political institutions of the
liberal democratic polity were greeted with enthusiasm and
optimism (Agnoli 1972; Ferrajoli 1985; Marcuse 1991).
Despite the differing emphases in the works of
exponents of the critique of the authoritarian tendencies
within modern democratic polities, there appear to be some
common underl ying elements in most interpretations of the
shift towards authoritarianism, as far as the developments in
modern western democracies are concerned; emphasis is placed
on the fact that western industrial societies are
characterized by the emergence of an authoritarian technical
rationality that is reflected in the development of modes of
social organization premised on the centrality of regulation
and disciplining, important aspects of which are the
oligopolistic planning of production and distribution of
commodities, the formation of massive private and public
organizations which threaten to engulf social life (Marcuse
1991;	 also Habermas 1987) and the shift towards the
establishment	 of increasingly authoritarian political
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structures at the political level.
As it has been pointed out by the proponents of the
authoritarian democracy critique, under these conditions of
increased complexity of modern societies and polities, a
necessary condition for the continuation of effective
exercise of state power, and therefore of the ability of the
state to neutralize social conflict and support the economic
dynamics of advanced capitalist societies, is its extensive
transformation through the recourse to new institutional,
ideological and technical means of conflict regulation and
social control that bypass the political forms of liberal
democracy.
As Johannes Agnoli, one of the exponents of the
"authoritarian transformation" thesis, has pointed out, in
the post-war years parliamentary democracy has had the
complex task of regulating and neutralizin g social and
political contradictions through the uncoupling of
citizenship from the decision making process (Agnoli,
1972).
This task entailed the fundamental transformation of the
political sphere and of the institutional framework of modern
liberal democracies, which encompassed an extensive
redefinition of the "political" through the displacement of
traditional representative processes and institutions, by
new, extraparliamentary, rather informal, and less visible
forms of negotiation and decision making, such as the
increasing involvement	 of administrators and "experts"
(Gransow and Offe 1982; Offe	 1964a) the existence of
"subterranean governments" or "cr yptogovernment" (Bobbio,
1987), or often arrangements of a corporatist or
neocorporatist character (cf. Schmitter, 1974; Panitch, 1976)
that, contrary to the postulations of pluralist theories,
establish and maintain unequal access of interests to the
decision making centres of advanced western democracies and
limit considerably the scope and the extent of popular
political participation.
This transformation however, has been taking place while
the institutional framework of liberal democracy has remained
intact, at least at first sight. In fact, what has really
taken place is the "modernization" of the state, in the sense
of its adaptation to the new forms of collective life (mass
society), and the improvement and updating of the means by
which domination is secured behind the facade of the
unaltered institutional framework of liberal democracy which,
it is argued, has been providing the citizens with the
illusion of self-governement and popular power, and at the
same time, has been concealing their "deactivation", as the
loci of the decision-making process have remained
inaccessible to them. Ferrajoli illustrated this illusion of
self-government by pointing out the fact that the emphasis
on, and the praise of liberal and democratic values is in
fact concealing a shift, common to all western democracies,
from the democratic ideal of "popular power" to the reality
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of "popular consent" pointing out in this way the fact that -
the basis of democracy in western capitalist societies is not
popular power, but consent, "not active participation, but
passive acceptance" (Ferrajoli, 1985: 31-40). Furthermore, he
argued that
"the popular participation in power is exercised as
activation of authority through consent, that is,
as canalisation (and manipulation) of popular
consent towards an authority which is invested to
the state." (ibid. : 36)
What is more, it could be argued that "the democracy of
consent" could become in the long run, and, to an extent it
has been, "democracy of indifference", a virtually
"apolitical democracy" as the scope of political activity
becomes drastically reduced. As Marcuse has pointed out, the
spread of instrumental reason has significantl y affected
politics in modern "advanced" societies. The distortion of
the universe of communication of modern societies by
instrumental reason has brought about a "closed" culture, in
the sense of the exclusion of dissent, opposition and
critique from the universe of discourse, and has reified the
"present" by eliminating historical consciousness (Marcuse,
1991: 84-120). In this context, as politics have effectively
been reduced to a simple procedure of choice among different
means to reach a given end, the political agenda in modern
democracies has been considerably limited.
Consequently, the political forms of liberal democracY
are being displaced and transformed in order to adapt to a
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mass society characterized by the expansion of instrumental
rationality. As pare-parliamentary ways of negotiation,
decision-making and consensus building have been developing
at the expense of the parliamentary political process, the
institutional framework of liberal democracy has been
undergoing a significant transformation in line with the
general trend of depoliticization. Thus a process of
de-coupling of the decision-making from the democratic
process could be detected in the tendency of governments to
loosen their ties and accountability to parliamentary bodies
or to the political parties upon which they formally depend
(Agnoli 1972: 69-72; Offe 1984a: 171), or even in the
convergence and transformation of political parties into
"catch-all" parties with no clear identity and ideology,
unwilling to represent sections of the electorate that might
alienate them from the majority of the electorate and cost
them a wide electoral support (Kirchheimer 1966; Agnoli 1972:
90-94; Ferrajoli 1985: 32-34; Offe 1984a: 169-70).
The argument concerning the changing nature of the
political institutions of liberal democracy has been
developed further by Agnoli who, in a way anticipating Offe's
thesis on the separation of form and content in liberal
democracy (Offe, 1984a), has pointed out that, in this
context, the concept of representation which used to be
central in early liberal discourse (in the sense of the
representation of the bourgeois interests as a counterbalance
to the power of an absolutist state) becomes inverted: in
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western democracies the institutions and processes of
democratic representation of the "liberal-democratic" state
no longer retain their "popular representation" function.
They rather function as means of legitimation of relations
of power in society, offering "democratic" legitimation to
decisions taken in centres outside the conventional political
sphere of liberal democracy, that is, in organizational
settings that are less visible and open to public scrutiny.
In this way, Agnoli argues, power virtually represents
itself to the people (Agnoli 1972: 64-84). Thus, while the
political forms of liberal democracy remain virtually
unchanged, their content is radically transformed; instead of
forms of political representation of the enfranchized
population, they legitimize decisions taken outside the
traditional political sphere.
Another important aspect of the shift towards an
authoritarian state that has been emphasized in analyses of
"authoritarian democracy", has been the systematic
undermining of rights and liberties with which the liberal
state has often been associated, as the social status-quo,
which is based on the consent of the majority of the citizens
assumes the appearance of a supreme value which must be
Protected and sustained. Here, a second inversion concerning
the rights and liberties that have been historically
protected by conventional liberal democratic institutions
takes place: the institutional guarantees of civil, political
and social rights which protect citizens from the power of
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the state and allow for choice and diversit y within society,
are being progressively displaced by institutionalized
guarantees of "governability", "public order and security"
(Ferrajoli, 1985: 60; Belsey, 1986) which in fact, safeguard
the state from dissent and the potential resistance of its
citizens.
The shift towards strengthening the authority of the
state, by reducing its accountability to the electorate, or
even their representatives, and by compromising those
democratic principles which could potentially undermine the
consensus in western democracies, as well as its intellectual
.backing by the development of conservative theories of
ungovernability by neo-conservative theorists (cf. Crozier et
al. 1975; also Steinfels 1979; Habermas 1983; Offe 1984a,
1984b; Bobbio 1990) indicate that "governabilit y". "social
peace" and "public security" have become the ideals of modern
democracies to the extent that civil, political and social
rights or the protection of dissenting minorities have become
luxuries which "democracy" is thought unable to afford. In
this way, pluralism which, according to pluralist theorists,
is held to be inextricably linked with modern western
democracies proves in fact limited in scope, and applicable
only in the case of those groups and organizations which
accept the rules of the game:
"All the parties which have become "parliamentary"
present themselves as "democratic" and as parties
which have the ability to rule in the context of a
"pluralism" the limits of which are rigidly
determined by the established social and economic
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order and •the relevant political system. And the
."democratic" or "constitutional" sphere,. which is
increasingly identified with the sphere of
"governing" or "potentially governing" parties,
determines the limits of political tolerance, as it
is based on the democratic distinction, that is,
the political de-legitimation of the forces of
radical opposition on the basis of their being
defined as "anti-democratic" or "subversive"
(Ferrajoli 1985: 37).
Social pacification and de-legitimation and exclusion of
any "fundamental" opposition seem to be complementary
strategies for the consolidation of authoritarianism (Agnoli:
21) as the imposition of state authority becomes an absolute
priority, not to be endangered by the action of dissenting
and resisting marginal opponents: opposition and dissent are
perceived as "irrational" and in some cases illegitimate
refusal and are consequently neutralized through processes of
delegitimation and exclusion.
The division between legitimate, "democratic" and
"anti-social", subversive groups, values and behaviour is
essential in the process of de-legitimation of alternative
and oppositional social forces and the institutionalization
of their exclusion from the political sphere provides the
basis for the adoption of disciplinary, often repressive
policies against them. This exclusion of undesirable social
and political forces from the political process might even
take the form of their criminalization at the ideological
level, or even of de-legalization, or legal restriction
(Ferrajoli, 1985: 37).
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is Gransow and Offe have pointed out in their analysis
of the political culture of West German Social democracy
(Gransow and Offe 1982), there is a clear relationship
between the "openness" of western democracies and their
repressive character. More precisel y, refering to the SPD,
they argued that there is a threshold, beyond which its
"normative unclarity", and consequently its "openness",
intended to appeal to as many social groups as possible,
reverts to "highly illiberal forms of repression (PP. 78-8);
whenever the processes of "positive" integration of party
members, voters and dependants cannot be achieved, then the
problem of integration is solved in a negative way. Social
minorities which can become critical of the party or the
government, which refuse to cooperate with them, or which
develop alternative values or practices and therefore become
a potential threat to the processes of political integration
are repressively excluded and subjected to discrimination.e
This "democratic distinction" facilitates the
consolidation of support for forms of authoritarian rule, as,
in accordance to it, social forces, or new domains and forms
of non-conventional political action, are not only denied
their political "qualities", but also are represented as
illegitimate, illegal, or criminal, and are subjected to
practices of symbolic and repressive discrimination, thus
becoming easily identified as anti-social and subversive.
It	 is	 quite obvious that	 the authoritarian
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transformation of western democracies extends beyond a mere
transformation of the "political" institutions of liberal
democracy; EIS the majority of the analyses of the
authoritarian tendencies in contemporar y western democracies
appear to suggest, it rather involves changes in the ways
politics is perceived and understood by citizens, as well as
"defined" through their practice. In other words it involves
processes of displacing and restructuring consensus, of
depoliticization or delegitimation of domains and forms of-
political action, of changing attitudes towards politics, and
of political behaviour. Despite however this widely shared
awareness of the cultural character of this process, among
the exponents of the critique of the authoritarian
transformation of democracy, the concept of authoritarian
political culture has not been adequately elaborated.9
A more systematic study of the authoritarian
transformation of the political culture of western
democracies has been offered by Hall's analysis of the
emergence of "authoritarian populism" in Britain (Hall
1980a; 1980b; 1988a). Although his analysis focuses on the
emergence of "Thatcherism" in Britain, it nevertheless offers
useful	 insights for	 the Study of the authoritarian
transformation of western democracies in general. More
precisely, one of Hall's most significant contributions in
the debate on the authoritarian transformation of democracy
has been the application of and elaboration on the Gramscian
concept of hegemony, a key notion in the field of cultural
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studies (see for example Williams 1980b; Bennett et al.
1886). As Hall suggested, the consolidation of authoritarian
democracy could be best analyzed as a hegemonic strategy, as
it entails not only processes of transforming the state but
also of restructuring society.
This emphasis on hegemony first appeared in a systematic
way in Policing the Crisis (1978), where Hall et al.,
emphasizing the	 link between hegemony, the 	 state and
processes of creation of moral panics through the
mobilization of popular fears and anxieties, introduced a
flexible and broad conception of the "political". It is this
redefinition of politics that Hall et al. have used in their
analysis of the political significance of the particular
social definition of crime in Britain in the 1970s. This,
the y did by pointing out that the creation of moral panics,
that is, the reconstruction of common sense and its
articulation within an "authoritarian" hegemonic strategy,
could be an effective means of political control, in the
sense that it could be proved crucial in the process of
consensus building and achieving hegemony.
Hall et al. went on to point out that the progressive
convergence and politicization of social anxieties, and their
eventual culmination into a moral panic about crime and law
and order in Britain in the 1970s were inextricably linked
with a decisive move towards the depoliticization or the
delegitimation of political issues and forces. Thus, they
-42-
argued, as the structural contradictions of British society
were being manifested in various forms of social conflict,
the crisis was - through the escalation of moral panics -
experienced as a crisis of law and order. As their analysis
of the British case suggests, it is at such a point that
social anxieties become politically significant, as they are
directed	 against	 "Political	 extremism",	 oppositional
organizations, or against the vague - and often exaggerated -
dangers of "anarchy and terrorism", anticipate their eventual
subjection of resistance into the sphere of jurisdiction of
the police and penal justice, as well as open the way for the
"disciplinary" intervention of the state which provides that
sense of direction which the public feels that society has
lost.
These arguments were later developed and incorporated in
Hall's critical elaboration of Poulantzas's analysis of
"authoritarian statism" (Poulantzas 1978; Hall 1980a; 1980b).
While, like Poulantzas, Hall recognized that a movement
towards an authoritarian form of politics, characterized by
intensified state control of socio-economic life and
repression of civil liberties was taking place behind the
facade of an apparently durable, liberal democratic political
process, he attempted to emphasize the complexity of such a
process by focusing his attention on the complex ways of
articulation af contradictory elements in authoritarian
discourses and practices, the ways of incorporation of
"strategic elements of popular opinion" into an authoritarian
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hegemonic project.
The term itself - authoritarian populism - is suggestive
of the coexistence of authoritarian discourses and practices
together with elements of "popular practical consciousness"
and popular discontents, of the deconstruction of the "them
vs us" distinction that had been rooted in popular
consciousness and practices (Hall 1980b: 140-144).
In this way Hall attempted to concentrate not merely on
the institutional aspects of the authoritarian transformation
of western democracies, but also to the ways of construction
of popular consent, or even active popular support, for this
transformation. According to Hall therefore, authoritarianism
is not imposed from "above"; its consolidation is rather
achieved through a complex process of interaction between
popular anxieties, discontent and aspirations from "below",
and the "restoration" of social order and authority from
"above" (Hall 1980b: 137). This focus on the struggle for
hegemony among competing hegemonic "projects" that has been
central, not exclusively in Hall's work, but also in a series
of analyses within the tradition of British cultural studies
(cf. Bennett et al. 1986; Hall et al. 1978; Williams 1980b),
offered the advantage of a flexible conception of the
"political'L, as it was based on the recognition that a
variety of ideas, themes, practices and domains of social
action can be politicized or depoliticized throu gh the
Particular wa ys they are articulated in, or excluded from
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hegemonic strategies.
It could be argued that the introduction of the
hegemonial dimension into the analysis -of the authoritarian
transformation of democracy has given to the latter
considerable flexibilit y as it not only has widened the scope
cf such an analysis, but also because it has allowed us to
take into account and make intelligible the complex and often
contradictory character	 of such a process.	 From this
perspective therefore, we can view the authoritarian
transformation of western democracies as a cultural process
that entails displacing, and reconstructing the common sense,
the values, attitudes and practices, the consciousness "of
the people who simply, in ordinary everyday life, have to
calculate how to survive, how to look after those who are
closest to them" (Hall 1988b: 163), a process that competes
with other hegemonic strategies not only at the level of
conventional politics but also_ . in apparently "trivial!' and
non-political domains of social action.
The Emergence of the New Social Movements. 
As it has been pointed out the theories of the
authoritarian transformation of democracy have been stressing
the tendency towards a new state of affairs in which the
links between the political processes of negotiation and
decision- making, and th
•
 e citizen were being severed, leading
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to a state of "autonomy of politics" (Ferrajoli, 1985: 39).
However, while the decision making process haLl been
increasingly becoming inaccessible to the citizens, the
expansion and density of state intervention have been
increasingly affecting the individual and the sphere of
everyday life to an unprecedented extent. While the
conventional political sphere of liberal democracy has become
devoid of its (political) content, a different set of
substantial, and unanticipated changes in the political
sphere overwhelmed advanced western societies as the
"political" was radically redefined: a number of concerns
such as the quality of life, gender and racial inequality,
human rights, individual self realization or minority rights
became politically relevant, and constituted the new foci of
political conflict, contributing in this way to the
broadening of the sphere of politics. What is more, new forms
of political action hitherto "inappropriate" to liberal
democratic politics emerged. The majority of advanced western
societies witnessed a wave of protest politics that deviated
from the conventional, legitimate forms of institutionalized
political action; the French May of 1968, the student
protests of	 1967, which culminated into the "Maggio
strisciante" and the "Hot autumn" that shook the major
industrial Italian cities during 1968-9, the regular
occurence of student demonstrations and clashes with the
police in major West German cities, over a variety of issues
from the mid-sixties onwards, the "Black Power" politics, the
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ghetto riots, and the rule-violation practices of the
American civil rights movement and student protest, were the
most explicitly political protest events which introduced
into the repertory of political action, "unorthodox"
practices such as civil disobedience, civil commotion and
riots. However, the range of practices of political protest
extended even further, from the undirected explosion of
disturbances by groups that would not normally be considered
as political, or the organization of alternative projects
through occupations of buildings or through the establishment
of alternative rural communities, to actions of political
violence and terrorism. What is more, the rise of new social
movements which have been based on grass-roots initiatives
and involvement, and committed to informal and "anti-
bureaucratic"	 modes	 of	 organization,	 has	 changed
significantl y the political scene by shifting its
"established" boundaries, and altering the range of forms of
political action. This broadening of the sphere of politics
and of the repertory of forms of political action provided
the impetus for a more systematic study of the changes that
western societies seemed to be undergoing.
In a series of comparative studies, Inglehart suggested
that these transformations were manifestations of the
emergence in western societies of a new phenomenon which he
called "new politics" (Inglehart 1971; 1977a; 1977b). These
"new politics", as Inglehart showed, were associated with a
shift of the values and attitudes of western publics from
-.4
 to post-material concerns. His studies detected a
change in values with increasing emphasis on needs of
"belonging", "social equality", "self-expression" and
"self-realization" which was reflected in the change of the
prevailing political issues, the declining legitimacy for
existing political	 institutions and	 a change	 in the
prevailing	 forms	 of	 political	 participation,	 as
"elite-directed" political mobilization appeared to give its
place	 to	 "elite-challenging",	 mostly	 issue	 specific
practices. Inglehart's 'new value' thesis has exerted
considerable influence among social theorists and has given
the impetus for renewed interest in the study of values and
attitudes in	 western societies in general,	 and among
participants in new social movements in particular. 10 The
detection of this shift towards "post-materialist politics",
or rather attitudes towards politics, 11 has also been
supported by the results of a survey of political attitudes
in five western countries conducted by Barnes, Kaase et al.
(Barnes, Kaase et al. 1979). The findings of their study
indicated a high level of positive disposition towards
engaging in unconventional forms of political action among
western publics, and located a disproportionately high
protest potential to relativel y affluent, better educated
middle class strata and the young, confirming in this was,
Inglehart's hypothesis of the emergence of the phenomenon of
"new politics".
Drawing upon the empirical evidence of these studies,
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Habermas attempted to develop an interpretation of the
emergence of "new politics" in the context of his social
theory (Habermas 1976; 1987). Thus, according to Habermas,
the emergence of new loci and forms of political action, and
the thematic shift from "old politics" revolving around
themes of "economic, social, domestic and military security"
to "new politics" which focus mainly on issues of "quality of
life, equal rights, individual self-realization,
participation and human rights" (Habermas 1987: 392), that
is, politics based on a (post-materialist) critique of
growth, is linked with the institutional changes that late
capitalist societies have been undergoing.
In fact, Habermas is proposing a more complex
explanatory schema that goes beyond merely the detection of
changes in values and attitudes, as he articulates the
emergence of "new politics" and, in particular of the "new
social movements" with a critique of the expansion of
functionalist rationality in late ca pitalism. The new social
movements are thus perceived as essentially defensive
movements which attempt to resist "tendencies towards a
colonization of the lifeworld", to defend or reinstate
endangered ways of life or to put reformed lifestyles to
practice. These defensive practices against the erosion of
the lifeworld by the extension of technical rationality
associated to. the growth of the economic-administrative
system arize, according to Habermas, in areas of cultural
reproduction, social integration and socialization, and are
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manifested in mainly sub-institutional, extraparliamentary
forms of protest (Habermas 1987: 392-3).
As these forms of protest are not "political" in the
conventional sense of the term,	 Habermas appears to be
suggesting that they have a "politicizing" effect, or, in
other words, that they introduce political conflict, and
therefore politics, in social domains outside the political
sphere of liberal democracy. In this way Habermas seems to
affirm, alongside other social theorists such as Melucci,
Offe and Gorz (Melucci 1989; Offe 1984a; Gorz 1982) that the
boundaries between what could be considered as "political",
and what could not, are not pre-defined and could vary in
time and space.
What is more, as the recent revival of the debate on
civil society has indicated, 12 the formation of new social
movements has generated pressures for the democratization of
both civil society and the state. As it has been argued the
new social movements possess a creative potential and a
participatory-democratic orientation which might lead to the
re-invigoration and democratization of civil society, by
increasing "the scope for autonomous public initiatives
developing outside and independently of the state apparata"
(Pakulski 1991: 165 and 211) as well as by asserting the
principles of plurality, openness and visibility in civil
society (J. Cohen 1982; Keane 1988a, 1988b; Melucci 1989).13
It is this increased awareness of and interest in the
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processes of redefinition of the "political" and of the
transformation of the political sphere through the emergence
of 'social movements, that has undermined the basic
assumptions upon which the civic culture theorY as well as
the theories of liberal democracy in general, had been
based, notabl y, their rigid definition of the political, the
limited repertory of legitimate political action, and the
separation of human action from culture.
These observations had important implications as far as
the concept of political culture was concerned. It soon
became evident that if these limitations and deficiencies of
the theory of political culture were to be overcome, an
alternative and more holistic conceptualization of "political
culture" had to re p lace the "civic culture" model.
CHAPTER 2
TOWARDS A NEW CONCEPTUALIZATION OF POLITICAL CULTURE
An Alternative Tradition: Raymond Williams and
the field of Cultural Studies.
Despite its shortcomings and deficiencies, the civic
culture paradigm continued to be dominant throughout the
1970s as it was used extensively by the majority of western
political scientists for comparative research (cf. Kavanagh
1971; 1972; 1974, Pateman 1973; Parkin 1972) and, despite
increasing criticism, it retained some of its influence in
the 1930s (cf. Almond and Verba 1980).14
Yet, as the usage of the original concepts became
increasingly problematic and the analytical framework that
developed within the "civic culture" paradigm was losing its
explanatory capacity, it became evident that, if the concept
of political culture were to retain any explanatory value at
all, it had to undergo a critical re-evaluation and a radical
reconstruction. It was in this context that attempts were
made to develop a more complex conception of Political
culture that would be capable of responding to the new social
and political developments, to account in a satisfactory way
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for political and cultural chan ge, taking into consideration
the conflictual relationships within a society. It was quite
clear that those aims could only be met by a conception of
political culture that would take into account the
social-historical conditions in which a political culture is
formed, reproduced and transformed, the sphere of politics to
which it is circumscribed, and focus its attention to the
social and political agents, whose role in the formation of
political culture had hitherto been neglected. What is more,
it was necessary for a new conception of political culture to
be able to transcend the rigid definition of the "political"
of the mainstream political theories and to be informed by a
more flexible and "dynamic" understanding of what is
"political" and what might be politicized in any given
conjuncture.
As the mainstream theoretical approaches to political
culture could not meet these criteria, the main theoretical
sources for such an attempt had to be drawn from other
"traditions". The developments in the emerging field of
cultural studies, notably the rejection of the distinction
between "high" and "popular" culture and the increasing
interest in studying aspects of the latter, the theoretical
attempts to point out the interdependence of structure and
culture, or to formulate more inclusive definitions of
culture, appeared to offer the stimulus for such an
undertaking.
One of the most profound influences in the development
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of cultural studies in general, and of the British tradition
of cultural studies in particular, has been the work of
RaYmond Williams. Although Williams did not offer a single
and clear definition of culture, his work has been
characterized by an ongoing process of change, and, at the
same time, remarkable consistency as far as the complexit y of
the concept was concerned. His work, since his first book
"Culture and Society", could be seen both as a rupture with
older traditions of thought, and as a continual dialogue
with them. Williams's conceptualization of culture developed
through a continuous process of deconstructing these
traditions, of recovering old elements of thought and
articulating them with new ones that arose in the course of
his work. What in fact shaped his work was the rejection, on
the one hand, of the distinction between high and low culture
- and its elitist implications - as it had been informed by
the "idealist" definitions of culture, in accordance to which
"culture" was seen as "a state or process of human
perfection, in terms of certain absolute or universal values"
(Williams 1961: 41), and, on the other, of the
base/superstructure schema as it had been interpreted by
variants of marxism which "treat either the general process
or the body of art and learning as a mere b y-Product, a
passive reflection of the real interests of the society" (p.
44). Apart from his critical distancing from both "idealist"
and "vulgar materialist" traditions, Williams also seems to
have been equall y critical of a "documentary" definition of
culture, which, he argued, "sees value only in the written
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and painted records, and marks this area off from the rest of
man's life in societ y" (pp. 43-44).
However this rejection of existing conceptualizations
has not been "total" as Williams argued that the complexity
of culture makes necessary for an "adequate" theory of
culture to recover elements from these traditions, as all of
them reveal aspects of that very complexity, and synthesize
them in the context of a new problematic which broadens the
scope of cultural studies: culture is understood as a social
process constitutive of the meaning of reality for the
members of a society. In this sense, Williams relates culture
to the whole range of practices, significations and values
through which societies understand and share their common
experiences. The construction and sharing of meaning amongst
the members of a society is the outcome of a process that
encompasses the whole range of creative human activity that
extends beyond art and intellectual work or "the best that
has been thought and said", to institutions and forms of
social behaviour:
... but society ... is a specious whole. If the
art is part of the societ y, there is no solid
whole, outside it, to which, by the form of our
question, we concede priority. The art is there, as
an activity, with the production, the trading, the
politics, the raising of families. To study the
relations adequately we must stud y them actively,
seeing all the activities as particular and
contemporary forms of human energy." (p. 45)
However this definition of culture did not address
satisfactorily the issue of cultural change, and of the
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conflictual and contradictory character of culture aa
Williams placed particular emphasis on the notion of common
culture, that is, of a common stock of meanings shared by the
members of a society. Since his early works, while he
recognized the possibility that the interests of the dominant
class might be reflected in the production, transmission and
distribution of the culture of a society, precisely because
of the dominant social position of this class, he however
maintained that culture should not be seen as the "product"
of a class; instead he viewed culture as a common stock of
meanings shared by the members of a society, to the
production of which members of all social classes have
contributed:
"the area of culture, it would seem, is usually
proportionate to the area of a language than to the
area of a class" (Williams 1987: 320)
An attempt to address the issues of cultural conflict
and change, while at the same time maintaining this
conception of culture, was the introduction of the rather
vague notion of the "structure of feeling" which, in a way
similar to Goldmann's notion of "mental structures"
(Goldmann 1975: 156-166), it could be argued, refers to "a
sense of life", "a particular community of experience" that
informs the ways of thinking of the members of a societ y or
a group, and of making sense of their world in a given
period, or to a common ground upon which communication can
be realized and a cultural community can be established.. ls
It would therefore appear that the notion of "structure of
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feeling" has been introduced by Williams in order to account
for cultural variation, change and conflict among different
generations and social groups. However, the lack of clarity
of the notion has caused difficulties in attempts to
understand the complexity of relations of domination and
resistance within society, especially as the notion of
culture as a "whole way of life" and the emphasis on a
"common culture" continued to occupy a central position in
Williams's thought.
It is this insistence on a "common culture" without any
systematic consideration of processes of conflict that E. P.
Thompson's critique of "The Long Revolution" attempted to
address (Thompson 1961a; 1961b) by arguing for a conception
of culture which would encompass a dimension of contradiction
and conflict. Wiiliams's response to these criticisms came
with a reworking of his conception of culture based on the
introduction of Gramsci's concept of hegemony into his work
(Williams 1980b).
The main advantage the concept of hegemony presented to
the analysis of culture, was the fact that it allowed for the
combination of the concept of totality - a concept that had
already been present in Williams's own conceptualization of
society and culture - with a notion of cultural struggle and
change. Williams argued that the concept of hegemony iA
Gramsci's thought was not situated within the confines of the
"superstructure"; rejecting interpretations which equated the
concept with that of ideology as a merel y superstructural
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category, he pointed out that "hegemony" should be understood
in the context of its relationship with the Gramscian notion
of totality.16
"Hegemony", according to Williams, is a process that
permeates society,
"which ... even constitutes the substance and limit
of common sense for most people under its sway,
that it corresponds to the reality of social
experience very much more clearly than any notions
derived from the formula of base and
superstructure" (Williams 1980b: 37).
Thus hegemony is seen as a complex process that goes
beyond a strict distinction between base and superstructure,
that penetrates the whole range of social practices and
integrates and organizes them into a meaningful whole.
What Williams considers of paramount importance in Gramsci's
conceptualization of hegemony is the fact that it takes on
board the notion of "social intention", through which the
dimension of domination becomes incorporated in the concept
of totality. Domination here should not be conceived of as a
"state" or as total domination, but as a process; it is not
imposed, it is rather continuously negotiated. Williams
therefore claimed that the Gramscian "hegemony" does not
refer to a totality devoid of a dynamic and contradictory
content; it is exactly that dynamic and contradictory
character that gives hegemony its essence. Hegemony does not
correspond to "static" notions of "domination", it rather
refers to a complex process of incorporation and resistance,
as counteracting hegemonic projects are continuously
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interacting, constructed and deconstructed, challenging and •
challenged, renewed and modified.
Pointing out that the power of Gramsci's conceptual
construction lay in his double emphasis on the notion of
totality and on social-cultural variation and change, and
arguing that this "hegemonial" dimension, should become a
central concern in cultural analysis. Williams proposed a
theoretical model that would take into account the dynamic
character of domination.
The model proposed by Williams has been premised upon
viewing "hegemony" as a goal for competing hegemonic
projects, which however, is never totally achieved. In this
context, it has been argued (Williams 1880b: 38-41) that in
every society a set of practices, meanings and values
constitutes the sense of reality for the majority of its
members, and, in that sense, it constitutes the dominant
culture of this society. This dominant, or hegemonic culture,
Williams argued, depends on a process of incorporation that
is based on cultural selectivity and reinterpretation. In
every society meanings, values and practices are selected
from the past and the present and, through processes of
reinterpretation, become "neutralized" -that is, lose their
antagonistic character to the dominant set of meanings and
practices by supporting or at least not opposing it- and
"relevant" while other meanings and practices are supressed,
displaced and excluded. 17
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However cultural practices are not exhausted within the
domain of dominant culture as non-incorporated cultures
compete with the former, either disregarding it or
representing a threat to it. It is this potential threat to
the dominant culture, or the lack of it, that Williams
considers to be the criterion of a further distinction, of
non-incorporated cultures into alternative and oppositional
although, in some cases it is quite difficult to draw the
line between them. "Alternative" roughly refers to those sets
of	 meanings, values and practices that are simply
"non-incorporated" and do not challenge the dominant culture,
while "oppositional" refers to "non-incorporated",
articulations of meanings, values and practices that threaten
the dominant culture.
Finally, Williams	 introduced a temporal-historical
dimension in the study of culture by distinguishing between
"residual"	 and	 "emergent"	 cultures	 with	 "residual"
corresponding to experiences, meanings and values derived
from the past, which continue to exist in the context of the
dominant or	 non-incorporated cultures and, conversely,
"emergent" refering to new meanings, values and practices
that are being created, and therefore not	 yet fully
developed.
Thus the conception of culture as a set of meanings,
values and practices through which thp members of a grou p or
a society make ' sense of their world, is linked with the
Gramscian theory of hegemony, allowing in this wa y, the
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inclusion of a continuous process of	 curtural differenses
and contradictions in the process for the formation of
cultural domination, of the culture of a society carrying in
its unity existing and potential difference. The social
historical character of culture is recognized, through the
recognition of the potentiality of difference in its unity,
without however the ' adoption of strict class reductionist
arguments. Culture therefore could be seen as a process of
articulation of diverse meanings and practices, and not as
the unique "property" of a class, or as the mere reflection
of social relations of production. Here, the usage of the
notion of articulation means that human agency is emphasized,
providing mediation between determined conditions of a
cultural practice and its outcome. Thus, more emphasis is
placed on the process of the making of culture than on its
determined conditions. is
The work of Raymond Williams has had a profourd
influence in the development of the British tradition of
cultural studies. His emphasis on the ordinary character of
culture, his interest on the role of social actors in its
formation and the introduction of the Gramscian concept of
hegemony in a central position in cultural studies provided a
stimulus for the development of the field.
Influenced by Williams, and drawing upon the same
theoretical traditions, emerged a body of theoretical work
and research on culture, which was mainly concerned with the
political significance of culture, the state and civil
society, or institutional policies and practices,/
Although there has not been any systematic attempt to
construct a theory of political culture in the British
tradition of cultural studies, a significant number of
app lied studies, and, to a lesser extent, theoretical work,
have concentrated at the political relevance of even
"trivial" cultural processes, and have made significant
contributions in the study of class cultures and subcultures
as loci of coexistence of elements of resistance and
domination (see for example Hall and Jefferson 1975; Hall
1977; Gilroy et al. 1982, Willis 1977) or have pointed out
the importance of various institutions, such as the mass
media in the cultural process and their political impact.20
Thus, they have been advocating a rather broad and
historically informed conception of the political and
attempted to illuminate the ways in which diverse, even
contradictory, cultural elements are continuously selected,
interpreted and articulated in the course	 of complex
processes of hegemonic political and cultural struggle.
Towards an alternative conception of political culture. 
Williams's proposals for the analysis of culture, were
also influential in efforts to "rehabilitate" the concept of
political culture (cf. Gransow and Offe 1982; Demertzis
1985). Moro precisely, in an attempt to elaborate and develop
further the concept, Gransow and Offe, in their article on
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the politics of the West German Social Democracy (Gransow and
Offe 1982) proposed the application of Williams's analytical
framework in the study of political culture. Criticizing the
empiricall y oriented approaches to political culture that
equated it with values, psychological predis positions and
attitudes, as well as those approaches which had been
informed by the traditional German conceptualization of
culture and refered to political ethos and morality, - they
argued that it was important to retain the concept of
political culture despite the shortcomings of the dominant
contexts in which it had been employed. Despite the diverse
sources and the variety of applications, they claimed that
there are advantages not only in retaining, but also in
elaborating further the concept:
We do not want to yield to this temptation (to let
the political culture to lie fallow) simply because
the study of political culture, first makes it
possible to overcome the exclusive focus on
political institutions and organizations, and,
second, is more helpful in describing processes of
political change. (p. 68)
Gransow and Offe argued that the concept of political
culture is far more complex and definitely broader than a
simple pattern of individual attitudes and psychological
orientations, or political ethics and morality. By drawing
upon Williams's conception of culture, they proposed an
alternative conceptualization of political culture in a
manner that would transcend the limits of these "traditional"
views, and offer the advantage of taking into account
material life-conditions and political action which had been
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hitherto neglected (p. 69).
While such an approach would recognize the existence of
a political community with a dominant, hegemonic political
culture, at the same time, it would not entail that a
political culture should be viewed as a homogeneous totality
but as a contradictory one. Their approach emphasized the
internal contradictions and the dynamics of change within a
political community and political	 culture, through the
recognition of alternative and oppositional forms of
political action which challenge the dominant political
culture and seek to take control of, or to change the life
conditions of the members of the society. 21 It is the degree
of taking control, or changing the life conditions of the
members of a society through their own political action, or
"the extent of self-consciousness and self-determination of
the social individuals" ( p . 69) that Gransow and Offe propose
as the criterion for evaluating the progress or regression of
political culture, in contrast to the criterion of
"compatibility" or "congruence" of political culture to the
political system of "liberal democracy" upon which the "civic
culture thesis", and mainstream theoretical and empirical
studies on political culture were based.
Although the proposals put forward in "Political
Culture and the Politics of the Social Democratic
Government" by Gransow and Offe have not been developed
further, 23 they have nevertheless provided the basis for the
redefinition and the rehabilitation of "political culture".
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c "reconstruction" of the concept along the lines
suggested by Gransow and Offe seems to offer several
advantages. More precisely, the application of a cultural
analysis of the "complexity of hegemony" makes it possible to
develop a concept of political culture that would be dynamic
and complex and to conceive of it in terms of a contradictory
process in which a variety of hegemonic projects compete.
What is more, by putting the emphasis on political
action, such a concept of political culture extends beyond
the sphere of orientations and predispositions, and includes
meaningful social activity. This shift, in turn, has
important implications, as far as the demarcation of the
"political" is concerned. For it is political action that
determines what is, or could be, political at a given time
and - given the contradictory character of political culture
- definitions of the "political" could vary considerably
among members of a society at a given time. We are therefore
in the position to adopt a broad and "open" conception of
the political sphere, one that would not be equated to that
of the "political system" and that would be adaptable to
shifts in the boundaries of the "political" that political
action would bring about.
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Authoritarian and Democratic Political 
Culture: a typology. 
As it has been pointed out, the "civic culture" thesis,
inspired by functionalist and systemic political theories
has played an "apologetic" role in relation to established
power and political structures because it is premised on the
primacy of social and political stability and governability
in modern western societies. It was developed in order to
point out the "necessary" cultural, or psychological
conditions that might guarantee the governability of western
democracies, stressed the importance of cultural conformity,
and took for granted the moral superiority of civic culture
and of western democracies, albeit by rendering democracy
devoid of its emancipatory elements.
In fact, democracy was conceived in predominantly
"procedural" terms with particular emphasis on its ability to
secure social	 and political	 stability.	 Accordingly,
functionalists and systems' theorists, viewed political
culture as essentially external to politics, as a part of the
Political environment of the society clearl y separated from
political structure and simply legitimating it and informing
political behaviour. Moreover, in the context of the civic
culture thesis, it is quite clear that the "political" has
been understood as a pre-defined sphere of social activity,
as a set of structures, and presumed independent of social
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action.
However, the complex social and political developments
in western - as well as in non-western - societies created a
series of practical and theoretical problems which undermined
the premises of the "civic culture" theory. On the one hand,
the formation of inaccessible extra-parliamentary,
administrative/bureaucratic settings which have virtually
been monopolizing processes of government and decision making
behind the facade of a durable liberal democratic political
process,	 and,	 on the	 other,	 the	 emergence	 of
"non-conventional" citizens' initiatives at local and
national level, the formation of new social movements and
concomitant decline of "old", especially labour movements,
or, in other words, the development of new processes of
conflict regulation and articulation and of political action
have been suggesting that the political sphere of western
societies has been undergoing considerable transformations.
These developments have proved that a notion of
political culture that would be premised upon citizens'
allegiance and deference to certain institutions and to
political "procedure" alone would have significant
limitations, as it would essentially be unable to account for
changes in the "content" of the political process of a
society; as the critiques of the authoritarian transformation
of western democracies and the analyses of the emergence of
"new politics" have made clear, it is not the liberal
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democratic political forms that provide us with a safe
criterion for evaluating the democratic character of a
polity; rather, it is the extent of the social individuals'
self-consciousness and self- determination that appears to be
a more relevant criterion for assessing the "democratic"
character of a polity, and, therefore - as Gransow and Offe
proposed (1982) - for evaluating the progress or regression
of a political culture.
What is more, analyses based on such a notion of
political culture appear to be reifying the "political", to
represent as natural what is considered to be political in
liberal democratic political theory, as they are premised
upon an a-historical, pre-defined and inflexible conception
of politics and therefore are unable to address the issue of
the social institution of the political, that is, of the
politicization or depoliticization of domains of social
action through the political action of social actors.
In the previous pages I attempted to present an outline
of the alternative notion of political culture proposed by
Gransow and Off e, and based on Williams's analysis of
culture, and to point out the advantages such a notion
presents. As it has already been pointed out. a
"reconstruction" of the concept of political culture along
these lines would bring to the centre of political-cultural
analysis the hegemonial dimension and therefore make possible
the development of a concept of political culture that would
-68-
be understood in terms of a contradictory process in which
counteracting hegemonic projects are in continuous
competition with each other. As it has been suggested, such a
concept of political culture does not refer merely to
orientations and predispositions of isolated individuals, but
also extends to the domain of social interaction, to the
political practices of social actors. In this way the rather
artificial distinction between values and social action which
the psychologism of the civic culture paradigm had
established, can be overcome, while the emphasis on political
action and its creative potential would allow for a different
conception of the "political", as the wa y people define it
through their political action, would become central in the
analysis of political culture.
If we draw upon the theoretical model for the analysis
of culture that has been proposed by Williams, the
suggestions made by Gransow and Offe concerning the
distinction of types of political culture, and their more
systematic elaboration (Demertzis 1985: 159-72) we could
employ a variety of criteria in order to analyze political
culture.
While a principal distinction can be made between
hegemonic and counter-hegemonic political cultures, more
detailed distinctions can also be drawn in accordance to the.
temporal-historical dimension of cultural elements, or to the
oppositional or "resistance" potential of counter-hegemonic
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cultures or elements.
Thus, if we apply the "temporal-historical" criterion,
along the lines of Williams's proposals for the analysis of
culture (Williams 1980b; also Demertzis 1985: 167), we could
distinguish	 between	 "residual"	 and	 "emergent"
political-cultural elements. By "residual"	 we refer to
practices, meanings and experiences which selectively
"retrieved" from the past, and articulated in the "tradition"
of a society or group. On the other hand, "emergent"
political-cultural elements refer to those sets of new
practices, experiences and meanings which are being formed in
the course of the hegemonic struggle.
However it is the second criterion, of resistance or
opposition potential of a political culture that seems to be
more important, as it expresses the complexity of the
struggle between alternative hegemonic projects for the
attainment of hegemon y. If we apply this criterion, we can
distinguish between "oppositional" and "alternative"
political cultures and cultural elements. This distinction is
essential as	 it	 allows us to differentiate among
counter-hegemonic political cultures and elements in
accordance to the potential of a set of meanings, practices
and experiences to challenge the hegemonic culture and
transform the relations of power. Thus, an oppositional
political culture challenges and seeks to transform the
existing relations of power in a society, while alternative
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cultures are merely emphasizing their distinctiveness, their
difference and do not have an "offensive" character (Table
4).22







At this point I should emphasize that these distinctions
between "hegemonic" and "counter-hegemonic", "residual" and
"emergent",	 "alternative" and	 "oppositional"	 political
cultures do not offer any measure of the extent of progress
or regression, as in fact there can be both regressive and
progressive residual, emergent, oppositional or alternative
political cultures and cultural elements.
As I have emphasized above, the most important advantage
of the proposed conce ption of political culture is the
introduction of a new normative criterion for the evaluation
of the progressive or regressive character of a political
culture, notably the extent of the attainment of
self-consciousness and self-determination by social actors
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through their political action. It is precisely a
differentiation on the basis of this criterion that appears
to be the most significant in the analysis of political
culture, as this, alternative notion of political culture
becomes disengaged from an apologetic role of the model and
ideal of "formal" democracy and acquires a critical edge.
Thus, by being based on the degree of political emancipation
of the members of a society, the proposed conception of
political culture remains open to the possibility of
development of forms of democratic politics that might differ
from liberal democracy.23
However, it should be pointed out that despite the
increasing interest in an alternative conception of political
culture, no comprehensive analytical framework has developed
for the study of political culture, and therefore on the ways
the emancipatory or regressive character of political
culture, or the extent of the citizens' self-consciousness
and self-determination should be evaluated and measured.
Yet, Gransow and Offe, in their essay on the political
culture of the West German social democracy (1982) provide us
with some valuable insights regarding such an analysis.
According to these writers, the social democratic political
culture, an essentially "authoritarian" culture, bears within
it the traces of the German historical past as well as the
marks of the social democratic governmental, and more
generall y political, praxis. In order to analyze the social
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democratic political culture, the y attempted a brief
historical and social-structural analysis of West German
society. Thus they distinguished the presence of long-lasting
traditions of authoritarianism, statism and "political
naturalism" originating in the centralist and authoritarian
nation and state building methods of the nineteenth century,
which were more recently reinforced bY the traumatic
experience of national socialism.
However, despite the importance of this authoritarian
and statist tradition, Gransow and Offe point out that it
would be a mistake to underestimate the importance of the
objectives, policies and strategies of the SPD in shaping the
social democratic political culture, as its emergent statist
reformist policies have contributed considerably to limiting
the autonomy of the citizens and increased their political
alienation. Thus,	 although they recognize that social
democratic reformist politics have to some extent
"corrective" and emancipatory outcomes (for example in the
case of welfare policies towards the unemployed and
"disadvantaged" groups), they stress that the statist
character of social democratic reformism reverses any
positive effect these policies mi ght have; the citizens'
initiative and ability to bring about change through their
own, autonomous political action diminishes considerably.
Gransow and Offe emphasize the "normative unclarity" or
lack of political commitment of the West German social
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democracy and the related existence of a limited universe of
discourse within the social democratic political culture,
which is translated into the "restriction of all alternatives
in reformist politics to statist forms and procedures" (p.
74). As they point out, this limited scope of acceptable
political action makes social democracy hostile to any
alternative	 and oppositional	 forces	 and has, to a
considerable	 degree,	 been	 responsible	 for	 the
institutionalization of processes of • exclusion,	 and for
their	 culmination	 into	 symbolic	 and	 repressive
discrimination.
Thus, the West German social democratic political
culture is seen as a specific articulation of pre-modern or
early-modern authoritarian political traditions with more
recent, or current statist reformist political practices
which are supported by a "mindless imperative of
modernization without perspective" (p. 78). As Gransow and
Offe claim, despite the incorporation of limited emancipatory
cultural elements (e. g. reformist commitment and practices),
the predominance of a particular combination of authoritarian
and statist elements limits considerably the scope of
autonomous popular political action and the opportunities for
the attainment of the citizens' self-consciousness and
self-determination through it, as 	 it increases their
dependence and heteronomy.
On the other hand, Gransow and Offe point to the
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development of new forms of "class struggle" in the context
of which one can detect the emergence of protest movements
premised on new values and issues related to peace, ecology,
and quality of life, the development of citizens' initiatives
and alternative forme of life, and argue that they have been
manifestations of the development of a counter-hegemonic
"political culture"	 based on communal households, nursery
schools,	 street	 festivals,	 economic	 self-help	 and
self-organization" (p. 70) and characterized by the
centrality of radical democratic, ecological and socialist
goals. Insofar as this articulation of alternative and
oppositional elements constitutes a challenge to the
authoritarian and statist structures of West German politics,
and because of its special emphasis on self-expression,
community, solidarity, self-organization and democracy, this
counter-hegemonic culture appears to have an emancipatory,
democratic potential.
However, as Gransow and Offe seem to suggest, this
emergent alternative and oppositional sphere is characterized
by fluidity, ambivalence and fragmentation, which appears to
be	 precisely	 a consequence	 of	 its	 "emergent"
non-institutionalized character. Therefore, they argue,
political culture in West Germany should "be seen as a
complex hegemonic structure of incorporation and exclusion of
alternative and oppositional political cultures" (p. 71) and
not in terms of the Leninist dualism, that is of an
opposition between one dominant	 (bourgeois) and one
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oppositional (socialist) political culture.
Although, as it has been stressed, this analysis of the
West German social democratic political culture by no means
constitutes a fully comprehensive study, it nevertheless
complements the outline of the theoretical framework which
has been proposed for such an analysis and could form the
basis for a further discussion.
It appears that Gransow and Offe do not consider
quantitative techniques, such as attitude questionnaires,
sufficient for the study of political culture. Instead they
seem to favour social-historical anal ysis which would not
reduce political culture to "attitudes", but would enable
them to take into account structural and institutional
aspects, as well as attitudes and practices, in their
analysis of political culture.24
What is more, it would seem to me that one important
issue raised in their essay, is that of democracy, and even
the possibility of a democratic political culture. More
precisely, Gransow and Offe attempt to disengage the concept
of democracy from the decisionist context of functionalist
and systemic theories of politics, and to articulate it with
notions of self-determination, self-organization and
solidarity, which have been brought to the political universe
of discourse by the new social movements that have emerged in
the last three decades. This, enriched notion of democracy is
then conceptually set in o pposition to authoritarian forms of
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political organization and action which, as I have already
pointed out, are often present in liberal democratic and
welfare-reformist politics, and which tend to deactivate and
control citizens and to increase their political alienation.
It seems to me that this oppositional schema between
democracy and authoritarianism is the point towards which
different approaches to the stud y of political culture could
converge, and form the basis for the development of a
typification of political culture along the lines of its
progressive or regressive character, provided however that we
disengage the concept of democracy from the decisionist
context of the liberal theory of democracy and the civic
culture paradigm.
It would therefore be possible to synthesize the
approach outlined by Gransow and Offe with other attempts to
reevaluate the concept of political culture (cf. Mainwaring
and Viola 1984) and, accordingly, to propose a typology that
would be informed by the normative-emancipatory dimension in
the analysis of political culture.
For example, Mainwaring and Viola's proposed
classification of types of political culture 26 on the basis
of the distinction between democratic and authoritarian
ideologies, and their treatment of the traditional Left-Right
distinctions as secondary, seems to be not far from the
conceptualization of	 democracy and authoritarianism by
Oransow and Offe. More precisely, Mainwaring and Viola
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suggested a classification of political cultures accordin g to
two main parameters: the first and principal parameter refers
to Political values which could range from authoritarian to
democratic, while the second refers to social values ranging
from elitist to egalitarian. Thus, four main types of
political	 culture	 are	 derived	 from the	 particular
combinations	 of	 these parameters: 	 right	 and	 left
authoritarian, liberal and radical democratic (see Table 5).
Table 5. Types of Political Culture according to Mainwaring 


















Although this typification is predominantly concerned
with cleavages in the conventional political sphere of
liberal democracy, it is clear that it constitutes an attempt
to overcome some of its limitations by not focusing on the
significance of the Left vs Right divide and introducing a
normative dimension in the analysis of political culture. If
we attempt to synthesize this typification with the
emancipatory criterion proposed by -Gransow and Offe, we could
argue for	 an	 ideal-typical	 differentiation	 between
"democratic" and "authoritarian" political culture.
As stated earlier, such a notion of	 "democratic"
Political culture, would be based on a revised conception of
democracy, clearly disengaged from its conventional
decisionist context. Although Gransow and Offe do not
explicitly propose such a conception, their emphasis on the
centrality of self-expression, autonomy and self-
determination are •quite suggestive. Melucci (1989) seems to
argue along the same lines, although more extensively, by
emphasizing the need for the creation of public spaces for
representation and 	 negotiation, independent	 from state
institutions or the party system, in which conflicts and
demands emerging in civil 	 society could be expressed.
According to Melucci, the existence of such spaces is crucial
for the democratization of modern societies, as the
expression of collective action through them renders power
visible and negotiable, and therefore demystifies power
relations. Access to these public spaces would be open to
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social actors while their individual or collective identities
would not be compromised by their participation in processes
of self expression and collective action.
Political	 democracy,	 Melucci	 argues,	 should	 be
characterized by its ability to "hear", to guarantee the
autonomy of such public spaces as universities, welfare
agencies or the mass media in which social actors could
express demands, and achieve the politicization of the
questions raised by collective	 action, without however
becoming institutionalized. What is more, according to
Melucci such a conception of democracy entails the continuous
redefinition of these spaces as new forms of difference
emerge continuousl y, "the conflicts shift" and "new forms of
domination are constantly emerging" (p. 77).
Therefore, a democratic political culture would comprize
cultural patterns which actualize a political domain
characterized by a high degree of openness, publicity,
Plurality and solidarity, and enabling citizens to attain a
high level of autonomy and self-determination and retain
their	 identities. A democratic	 political culture	 is
characterized by openness, in the sense that it maintains an
open universe of public (and political) discourse the
boundaries of which would be continuously redefined through
collective action.
On the other hand, an authoritarian political culture
would comprise sets of meanings, and practices which tend to
maintain a closed and rigid universe of discourse in a
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society, and reproduce the deactivation of the citizens, the
depreciation of social and political contradictions, or their
resolution through symbolic and repressive exclusion of
oppositional and alternative cultures or forces.
Towards a multi-dimensional conception of political
culture: some propositions.
In concluding this part of the discussion, I should
re-emphasize the value of an analysis of political culture
along the lines of a critical reconstruction of the concept,
that would take into account not only phenomena, processes
and agents restricted in the conventional political sphere of
liberal democracy, but also be more sensitive to much wider
concerns EIS it would take into account the political
significance and ramifications of "non-political" agents and
processes,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 possibility	 of	 their
politicization.
More precisely, as recent research has shown (Gaffney
1991; Moores 1991; Townson 1991) an inclusive notion of
political culture would take into account not only "what is
political", but also "how" social domains, practices and
problems "become politicized", or "politicall y relevant".
This enlargement of the scope of the analysis of political
culture, and the inclusion of not only the "political", but
also of the potentiall y "political" or the "politically
si gnificant", as it has been pointed out is possible by
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integrating the concept in the context of the Gramscian
problematic of hegemon y, and its subsequent elaborations
within the field of cultural studies, and thus opens the way
for the enrichment of the study of the political culture with
the theoretical and empirical developments in relevant
disciplines and fields such as cultural studies, social and
political anthropology, linguistics and sociolinguistics or
mass and political communication. If an emphasis on the
hegemonic character of political culture prevails then we
should focus on phenomena that had hitherto been neglected by
Political culture research. More precisely, the recognition
of the social construction of the "political" as well as the
emphasis of an alternative analysis of political culture on
action as opposed to behaviour, would entail that research
priorities and methods that had been tailored for study of
attitudes and values towards, or behaviour in the
conventional political field would have to be modified.
Instead, research should be directed to spheres of social
activity where "common sense is constructed" as, it is there,
according to Gramsci, that the struggle for hegemony is
taking place. It is at the level of everyday practices,
practical ideas and popular values where hegemony is produced
and challenged by strategies of signification and
symbolization, as the struggle of hegemony is primarily
situated in everyday language and in communication.
What is more, such an extension of the scope of the
study of p olitical culture would also present the advantage
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of extending the range of methods of analysis beyond
quantitative methods such as attitude questionnaires, or
opinion polls, integrating alongside them qualitative methods
of analysis such as ethnomethodological research, or
discourse analysis within a framework of interpretative
analysis.
Such an expansion of both the objects of the study of
Political culture, and of its methodology and techniques is
even more necessary today, as the increased complexity of
modern societies has rendered most aspects of social life
politically salient, and as the experience of politics is
increasingly of an indirect	 character, mediated by an
increasingly complex mass media industry.
On the other hand however, the vast thematic scope a
comprehensive study of political culture would entail,
suggests that while we should look forward to the prospect
of a synthesis of the different thematic and theoretical
aspects involved, Piecemeal research on specific aspects of




POLITICAL CULTURE AND THE MASS MEDIA
The development of mass communications in modern
societies has influenced to a great extent the ways in which
we acquire knowledge, we interprete information and transform
it into a meaningful and coherent whole, into practices,
perceptions, ideas and attitudes about individuals, groups
and events of which we do not have any personal or immediate
experience. The mass media, together with other institutions,
contribute to the diffusion and availability of a common
stock of experience and knowledge, and help us to make sense
of it, thus playing a major role in the cultural process.
Culture can no longer be separated from the means by which it
is communicated.
The development of mass communications has therefore
been one of the most recent and significant changes to affect
cultural processes in modern societies. In modern societies
culture is to a considerable extent mediated by the media of
mass'bommunication as the latter, by extracting selectively
from the existing cultural stock and creatively extending it,
reproduce and produce the cultural forms of everyday life
(see for example J. B. Thompson's concept of Imediazation'
(1988); also Hall 1977: 340-44).
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The emergence of new technical media of mass
communication, or rather of mass production and diffusion of
symbolic forms has become a highly si gnificant and pervasive
feature of modern societies, as mass communication has
replaced or affected considerably other forms of
communication and social interaction. As Thompson points out,
the mass media should not be regarded simply as channels for
the circulation and diffusion of symbolic forms, but also as
mechanisms which create new kinds of action and interaction,
and contribute to the establishment of new kinds of social
relations (1990: 265). Mass communication is substantially
different from previous forms of communication that had
developed in the context of face-to-face interaction. The
development of new media, capable of multiple reproduction
and diffusion of symbolic forms appears to produce a link
mainly between collectivities rather than individuals as it
involves organized groups engaged in the production and
diffusion of symbolic forms, and collectivities - albeit not
organized, self-conscious or undifferentiated	 at its
receiving end.
lt should also be emphasized that the interaction
involved in mass communication is in fact "mediated" and
essentially constitutes a one-way process in the sense that
it primarily involves the transmission of messages from a
source to an "audience", while the "audience's" opportunities
to respond are rather limited, in a mass communication
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setting, the social conditions that would enable the audience
to respond effectively and directl y to the "sender" of the
messages are missing, and the audience is less organized,
less self-conscious, and less able to exert effective and
direct control over the communicative process. The social
relationship which is established through mass communication
between "sender and receiver" is therefore asymmetrical. What
is more, this asymmetrical relation of power is further
enhanced by the high cost and relative inaccessibility of the
technology of mass communication, which appear to restrict
the opportunities to gain access to the "transmitting" or
"communicating" end of the process, and therefore to place at
an advantage those few who have gained this access.
Moreover, the development of the new technical media of
mass communication has established new contexts and forms of
interaction that have made possible for "communicators" and
"audiences" to "interact" across spatial and temporal
distances - and in some cases "social" distance. As Thompson
(1990: 230-32) has emphasized, mass communication has enabled
individuals	 and, WA should add, collectivities - to
transmit information for, and act in response to distant
others.	 The emergence of different media of mass
communication has, then, considerably altered the ways in
which people act and interact with one another and the ways
in which they produce and mobilize meaning. However, mass
communication should not be seen as a mere supplement to
pre-existing social relations, as a simple addition to the
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repertory of social interaction. Rather, it has profoundly
affected already existing forms of social interaction as the
latter have been, or are being either displaced or modified
in order to be able to co-exist alongside new forms of
interaction which were developed as a result of the former.
The technologies of mass communication have provided the
opportunities for the development of new communicative
processes in the context of everyday social interaction and
they have modified or even undermined old forms of social
interaction. The emergence of the mass media made it possible
to bypass traditional communication channels and authority
structures in most domains of social life, and contributed to
the formation of new channels for interaction and alternative
structures and institutions (McQuail 1969: 12; Thompson 1990:
225-235) and, to a certain extent, to the establishment of
new power relations. As McQuail has pointed out, mass
communication has penetrated most domains of social life,
displaced and replaced established processes and
institutional frameworks of communication and interaction in
the spheres of kinship, religion, education, the economy and
politics, and gradually became a powerful, "direct" link
between a variety of social institutions and the "public",
emphasizing in this way thepotential of the mass media to
bring about significant changes in existing institutional
orders and authority structures (McQuail 1969: 11-12).
Although mass communication has considerabl y affected
the ways politics is defined and experienced in contemporary
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societies, it has until recentlY been neglected in the study .
of Political culture. However, during the 1970s and 1980s,
developments in the fields of media and cultural studies
(Cohen and Young 1973; Glasgow University Media Group 1976;
1980; Hall et al. 1978; Bennett 1982; Davis and Walton 1983)
have been reflecting the 	 increasing awareness among
researchers of the need to reassesss the concepts of culture
and political culture, taking into account their
"mediazation", that is, to explore the ways in which mass
communication is linked to its political context and affects
the relations	 of power at	 the political	 level. The
development of critical perspectives in the study of mass
communication has led to intense debate in the field of media
and cultural studies and provided a common ground upon which
a critical approach to mass communication, an "alternative,
critical paradigm" according to Hall (1982), has been slowly
taking shape. It would seem to me that these traditions of
cultural and media studies which emphasize the links between
the relations of political domination on the one hand, and
the mass media and their "reality defining " power on the
other, could bridge the gap between studies of political
culture and mass communication and cultural studies.
In the following pages I shall attempt to outline the
contours of the debate through which critical perspectives to
the study of mass communication emerged, and to reassess the
concept of mass communication and its relationship with
culture and political culture in the light of these new
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perspectives.
Mass Communication and Political Culture:
Theoretical Approaches 
The social and political role of the mass media has been
the focus of persistent controversy and debate since the
emergence of mass communication. Entirely dominated in the
early phases of the debate by essentially conservative
theories apprehensive of the tendencies of homogenization in
modern societies, the first approaches to mass communication
were highly negative, emphasizing its complicity in the
creation of undifferentiated, alienated, passive and
manipulable masses. Equally pessimistic, regarding the role
of the mass media, although developed within a Marxian
framework was also the work of the Frankfurt School which
emphasized the suppression of critical reason in a society
where mass communication offers ready-made definitions of
'reality', promotes the closure of the universe of discource,
and the formation of what we could call anti-democratic
Political cultures.
As a reaction to the pessimism of such approaches, a
body of empirical research focused on the "effects" of the
media of mass communication, and its findings refuted the
all-pervasiveness of the media messages upon which
mass-society theories were premised. The development of
structural-functionalist	 and	 pluralist	 theories,	 also
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emphasized the limited influence of the media of mass
communication over audiences. The central argument of these
theories was that the mass media reflected the diversity of
interests and actors within	 society and politics, and
therefore did not have any significant effect beyond
disseminating information and reinforcing pre-existing views
of the audience.
However, the prevalence of structural-functionalist
approaches to the study of mass communication was
progressively challenged by the emergence of marxist and
other critical analyses which emphasized the centrality of
the mass media in the reproduction of ideology and of
asymmetrical relations of power in society. The critique
emanating from these traditions focused on the assumed
neutrality of media messages by structural-functionalist
approaches, and on their inability to account for the role of
the media in the political and cultural struggle for the
construction of consensus This .theoretical shift entailed
the recognition of mass communication and the mass media as a
crucial factor in the construction and reconstruction of
hegemony. In the next pages I shall try to outline some of
the main arguments in the ongoing debate and to examine their
relevance to my earlier discussion about political culture.
Mass Society Theories and Mass Communication. 
Although mass society theories do not constitute a
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unified theoretical tradition, one could discern that they
share a number of common themes and similar concerns.
Although a variety of versions of mass society theory have
been developed by a large number of social, political and
cultural theorists (M. Arnold, T.S. Eliot, J. S. Mill, A. de
Toqueville) with diverse emphases, from Mill's fear of
"tyranny of the maj ority, to Arnold's emphasis on the spread
of cultural and moral disorder and, despite the diversity of
the contributions and substantial differences in conceptions
of mass society, we could attempt to outline some main
characteristics which underpin the mass society tradition.
More precisely, drawing upon the background of
conservative critiques of modernity, mass society theories
have been hi ghly critical of the processes associated with
its advent, such as industrialization, popular education, the
extension of the franchise, political democracy and mass
communication. Employing the conservative themes of loss of
organic solidarity, of the destruction of community and of
the decline of authorit y (see for example Nisbet 1967), mass
society theorists argued that the various processes of
modernization were leading to the homogenization of society,
the decline of democracy, the emergence of totalitarian forms
of government and the debasement of culture. Mass
communication was perceived as a powerful force, which was
eroding traditional institutions,	 by-passing traditional
authorities and destroying	 identities by detaching
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"individuals" from their communal collectivities and
alienating them from the traditional authorities which gave
meaning to their lives. The mass production and dissemination
of cultural forms in non-traditional contexts and the
increasing dependence of cultural production on the "market"
were interpreted as a major threat to the traditional
cultural values and as the cause of cultural and moral
disorder (Arnold 1971; also Williams 1987: 110-29).
In this pessimistic context, mass communication was
rejected as	 it was associated with the process of
modernization and was thought to undermine traditional
authority and modes of social integration (McQuail 1987:
91-2). Emphasizing the emergence of rather large-scale,
remote and inaccessible media institutions, and the tendency
towards a monopolistic organization of the media market,
mass society theorists have treated the mass media with
mistrust. According to mass society theorists the process of
mass communication would, alongside other factors such as the
extension of the franchise, or the expansion of the market
economy, or the emergence of popular education lead to the
homogenization of society, to the creation of masses of
displaced, disoriented and isolated individuals which could
be easily manipulated as audiences, electorates and
consumers. As the mass media were viewed as sources of social
power, mass society theories gave primacy to the media as
institutions for the maintainance of mass society; they were
thought to offer a view of the world in which the mass of
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anonymous individuals would dis place the community, organic
solidarity and authority.
Mass society theories have certainly pointed out the
homogenizing tendencies of modern societies, which are to
some extent linked with the emergence of mass communication.
They have correctly in my opinion identified some aspects of
the transformations that modern societies have been
undergoing, and the centrality of mass communication in the
shift to new modes of social interaction and social
relations. However, they have been criticized (see for
example Bennett 1982; Curran and Seaton 1988) for their
exaggerated emphasis on the integrated, cohesive and unified
character of modern societies and their underestimation of
the capacity of the audiences to retain some degree of
autonomy vis-a-vis the mass media as other factors such as
the integration of individuals and groups in other contexts
of social interaction, play a major role in the reception and
consumption of cultural products and therefore counteract the
powerful processes of homogenization of modern societies.
The emphasis placed by mass society theorists on the
homogenizing tendencies of the mass media does not allow any
room for alternative conceptualizations of mass
communication. Indeed, mass societ y theories do not see any
possibility of the media acquiring a representational and
expressive role and thus becoming a crucial component of a
public sphere where social diversit y would be safeguarded,
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the boundaries of the political would be negotiated and
redifined and a democratic political culture nurtured. Thus,
their essentially conservative approach supports a model of
society with an authoritarian political culture, where
deference to traditional authority would reproduce the
heteronomy of citizens and in some cases might even contest
the very concept of citizenship. Indeed, as it has been
pointed out in the first chapter, the civic culture thesis
appears to have been partly influenced by the emphasis of
mass societ y theories to the need for deference to authority
and cultural and moral consensus. Both theories seem to share
a conservative ideological background, and a fear towards
'excessive citizen participation in political and social
life. Their critique of the mass media is therefore not
merely a critique of the homogenizing tendencies promoted by
mass communication	 and therefore of their potential
contribution to the emergence or reproduction of an
authoritarian political culture - but also a rejection of the
potentially democratizing role which the mass media could
Play in modern societies.
Structural-functionalist theories. 
Informed by structural-functionalist and systemic
approaches which view society as a system comprizing linked
Parts of sub-systems, each one of them making a contribution
towards meeting the essential needs of society, namely the
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Preservation of continuit y, order, integration and of the
capability of adaptation, structural functionalist theories
of mass communication focus on the contribution of the media
towards the preservation of organized social life. This is
achieved as the mass media perform a series of functions
which provide an accurate, coherent and cosistent picture of
society in general, and of its constituent parts in
particular. Thus, by performing "essential" functions such as
providing	 information,	 linking	 the	 various	 social
sub-systems, or preserving the cultural heritage and
collective memory of the society, the mass media contribute
to societal integration, to the maintenance of continuity,
the preservation of order and of social equilibrium, and thus
ensure "[society's] capacity to respond to contigencies on
the basis of a common and reasonably accurate picture of
reality" (McQuail, 1987: 52).
Structural-functionalist theories are based upon the
assumption that the contribution of the mass media to the
preservation of the social system is achieved rather
unintentionally, as the former tend to respond to the "needs"
of individuals and collectivities, and their response - it is
argued - has unintended consequences which "satisfy" the
"needs" of the social system as a whole. Thus, in the context
of structural-functionalist theories, the media are
considered to be essentially neutral and to possess a
self-directing , self correcting, and self-regulating capacity
that is derived from their presumed tendenc y to respond to
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the competing cultural needs of members of the society.
According to structural-functionalist theorists, the content
of media messages is considered to include diverse and often
competing views, while their production is thought to be
unregulated and free of any intervention.
The autonomy and self-regulation of the means of mass
communication postulated by the functional-structuralist
theorists was further echoed in pluralist interpretations
which emphasized the importance of professional values and
practices among media workers as the ultimate safeguard of
the "neutrality" of media institutions and the objectivity of
media messages. As Curran, Gurevitch and Woollacott point
out,
"A strict pluralist interpretation would accept
that media professionals' claims to autonomy and
their commitment to the principles of objectivity
and impartiality indeed operate as guidelines for
their work practices and as regulators of their
professional conduct. It would therefore, see
ultimate control of the production process in the
media as resting in the hands of professionals
responsible for it, in spite of the variety of
pressures and influences to which they may be
subjected" (Curran, Gurevitch and Woollacott, 1982:
19).
Structural-functionalist approaches appear to be rather
apolitical in formulation as, mass media organizations are
viewed as objective, virtually self-regulated and "immune"
from external or internal pressure or influence, performing
socially "necessary" functions such as the maintainance of
social stability and the promotion of societal integration
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and continuity. Thus, the media are held to be "reflective,
or expressive of an achieved normative consensus.
Throughout the 1950s and 60s, media effects research
conducted in the framework of systemic theories provided
ample empirical evidence of this postulate: the mass media
reinforced the values and norms that were already enjoying a
widespread consensus within modern pluralist societies; they
simply reflected the social and political reality and,
therefore had merely cognitive effects, and virtually no
persuasive impact (see for example Lazarsfeld 1944; Klapper
1960; Schramm 1961; Trenaman and McQuail 1961).
As consensus and integration were uncritically accepted
by structural-functionalism as part of the "needs" of
society, the main conclusion of empirical research was that
media effects were essentially negligible, as no considerable
behavioural change could be detected. In fact, by adopting an
essentially cultural-consensual definition of society - a
definition upon which, as it has already been pointed out,
the civic culture thesis had also been based - with special
emphasis to a broadly-based normative consensus and, focusing
on the media as a means for reflecting a "natural" social
and political	 stability and	 equilibrium,	 structural-
functionalist theories of mass communication are in fact
reifying social	 and political reality as they accept
unproblematically the 	 existing social	 arrangements,
inequalities and asymmetrical relations of power.
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Thus, in the context of this apparently apolitical
outlook, the ori g ins, content and structure of this normative
consensus, remained	 unquestioned, or even 	 reified as,
according to the "end of ideology thesis" which was
underlying structural functionalism, social conflict was
reduced to debate over means within a broadly-based normative
consensus.
It could be argued that the "a-political" premises of
structural-functionalist theories in fact conceal their
essentially conservative bias as the y "normalize" and "reify"
a socially constructed consensus which as Stuart Hall pointed
out "entailed the enforcement 	 of social, economic and
political structures" (Hall, 1982: 63). Similarly, the
structural-functionalist assumption of the neutrality of the
media, and the consequent emphasis upon their presumed more
or less self-directing and self-regulating capacity also
dissimulates the involvement of power relations in cultural
production as it detaches and isolates the mass media and
their products from the social-historical contexts in which
they are situated; it overlooks the fact that while
professional ethics and practices constitute a significant
factor in mass communication, so are political and economic
relations and influence.
The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School. 
A rather influential and systematic attempt to develop a
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"marxist" analysis of the relationship between culture and
mass communication, and an important variant of marxist
critique of the emergence of mass communication and its
consequences Was developed by the members of the Frankfurt
School. In an attempt to retain the critical edge of Marxism
in the 1930s and 1940s, that is, at a time when the economic
determinism of Soviet Marxism and the political practices of
Stalinism were prevalent in marxist political and theoretical
discourse, the members of the School drew their attention to
cultural and ideological transformations which led to the
rise of national socialism to power and to its subsequent
destructive course. As the spread of national socialism
forced the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research to move to
the United States, the contact of the School members with
aspects of North American commercialized - and in many cases
manipulative - mass culture, provided a further stimulus for
the development of the the School's critique of the "culture
industry" and of its role in the one-dimensional and cohesive
character of post-war western societies.
The work of the School members on culture, ideology and
mass communication has been extensive, comprising
contributions from members and associates of the Frankfurt
Institute of Social Research - most importantly of T. Adorno,
M. Horkheimer, H. Marcuse and W. Benjamin - over several
decades. Here, I shall focus only on the contributions of
members of the Frankfurt School which bear most closely on
the themes of the "culture industry" and mass communication,
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notably on the work of Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse (cf.
Adorno and Horkheimer 1979; Horkheimer, Adorno et al. 1973;
Adorno 1975; Marcus° 1968) although the work of other
members of the Institute is by no means negligible.
The common underlying theme in these works, as well as
in the work of the members of the School in general, has been
the theme of "rationalization", or, more precisely, the theme
of the emergence of instrumental reason. Sharing Webers view
that instrumental reason originated to modes of life which
predated industrial capitalism, the Institute members argued
that the progressive submission of nature to technical
rationality, especially after the Enlightenment, led to the
undermining and elimination of traditional worldviews and to
the objectification of the natural world, including human
subjectivity. However, it is under capitalism that human
beings become further subordinated to the logic of
instrumental reason as the latter colonizes everyday life
through processes of rationalization, bureaucratization and
commodification of the modern world and undermines the
possibilities for the development of critical reason and
autonomous thinking.
It is upon this account of the domination of
instrumental reason at the expense of critical reason in
modern societies that the Frankfurt School's analysis of mass
communication and of the "culture industry" is premised.
Horkheimer and Adorno use the term "culture industry" instead
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of "mass culture" in order to emphasize the central position
of the mass media in the cultural process of modern
societies. As Adorno pointed out, the employment of the term
"culture industry" was intended to refer to the
"standardization" and " pseudo-individualization" of symbolic
forms in modern society and to the rationalization of the
process of diffusion (Adorno 1975: 14) that has taken place
through the extension of instrumental reason into the field
of cultural production. In this context, symbolic forms are
in fact cultural goods produced for profit by capitalistic
enterprises; "mass" culture is not culture produced by the
masses (p. 12), it is rather commodified and subject to the
logic of capital accumulation. According to the School
members, the ideological effects of the culture industry are
an intrinsic part of the process of consumption of "cultural
goods";	 as cultural	 goods	 reflect already	 "existing
conditions" and reify the status quo, or a specific
interpretation of reality (cf. Horkheimer, Adorno et al.
1973: 202). In this way the culture industry integrates
consumers of its products into a reified social order
dominated by instrumental reason. In this sense, as Marcuse
argues, the culture industry "sells" the social system as a
whole to its consumers, and creates
"a pattern of one-dimensional thought and behaviour
in which ideas, aspirations and objectives that by
their content, transcend the established universe
of discourse and action are either repelled or
reduced to the terms of this universe." (Marcuse
1931: 12)
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Marcuse argues that the mass media play a crucial role
in this process of containment of critical reason and
autonomous thinking as they constitute the necessary powerful
mechanisms which achieve mass uniformity and reification of
the domination of instrumental reason by excluding from the
universe of discourse of modern societies any subversive
critique of the status quo and expression of dissent . and
reducing politics to a simple procedure of choice among
techniques for the achievement of given, reified ends,
effecting in this wa y the closing of the universe of
discource.
A main point of criticism against the Frankfurt School's
critique of the culture industry and mass culture has been
the "monumental pessimism" incorporated in it (Curran,
Gurevitch and Woollacott 1982: 23, also Curran and Seaton
1988: 221-27, J. B. Thompson 1990: 101-9) while critics have
pointed out that the analyses of members of the School have
not taken into account the fact that the "reception and
appropriation of cultural products is a complex social
process which involves an ongoing activity of interpretation"
by audiences, and therefore, by disregarding the audiences'
Potential for resistance to the power of the culture
industry they have failed to examine the impact of mass
communication in a systematic way (Thompson 1982: 105).
However it should be pointed out that Frankfurt School
members did not view the culture industry as the only vehicle
for the expansion of instrumental reason; they seem to have
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been suggesting that the Possibilities of critical
app ropriation of media messages have also become limited as a
result of the expansion of instrumental reason in other
spheres of social activity and other institutions. As Marcuse
argued
"Objections are made that we greatly overrate the
indoctrinating power of the media and that by
themselves people would feel and satisfy the needs
that are now superimposed upon them. This objection
misses the point. The preconditioning does not
start with the mass production of radio or TV. The
people enter this stage as preconditioned
receptacles of long standing. In this more complex
view the public do not	 abdicate rational
consideration of their interest blindly. More
subtly, the whole basis of rational calculation is
undermined." (Marcuse, quoted by Curran and Seaton
1988: 227)
It should also be argued that, despite the aphorisms of
the "monumental pessimism" of the Frankfurt School, their
analyses of the trends in modern societies constitute a
valuable, insightful and critical contribution to the study
of modern societies in general and mass culture and
communication in particular. More precisely, the School's
emphasis on the analysis of ideology constituted a powerful
and plausible counteracting tendency to economdstic
approaches within marxist thought. What is more, their
emphasis on the domination of instrumental reason, and
consequently on the commodification of forms of social
interaction, including mass communication, or on the impact
of the culture industry on the cultural processes and the
nature of ideology in modern societies have to a considerable
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extent retained their validity, as recent debates in the
social sciences seem to indicate (cf. Habermas 1982; 1987).
Avoiding the pessimism of the Frankfurt School, they
nevertheless take up and reformulate the themes and the
problematic originally developed by the Institute members.
What is of particular importance as far as the
relationshi p of mass communication and political culture is
concerned, is the importance the Frankfurt School attributes
to the "culture industry" as one of the major forces which
affect the "openness" of political culture of modern
societies. As I already indicated in the previous chapter
referring to Marcuse's interpretation of the spread of
instrumental reason in modern societies, the distortion of
the universe of communication, to which a major contributor
is the "culture industry", is thought to have brought about a
"closed" culture characterized by the progressive closure of
the universe of political discourse through the exclusion of
dissent and critique, and therefore, the political agenda has
been significantly reduced to questions of simple choice
among different means to reach given and undisputed ends.
Although this interpretation of the changes in understanding
the " political" and the nature and limitations of political
action in modern societies could be criticized for its
"pessimism", it nevertheless retains its importance as a
critical approach to the political effects of mass
communication, as the work of the Frankfurt School focused on
the processes of "consensus construction" through mass
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communication, and therefore provided the theoretical
background for the development of critical approaches to the
study of mass communication and political culture.
Political Economy of the Mass Media 
The concern of social scientists with the mass media as
industries led to the development of political-economic
approaches to the study of mass communication which attempted
to investigate the impact of media ownership structures or,
more generally, the economic dimensions of mass
communications in the activities of media institutions and
the processes of the formation of ideology.
By emphasizing the dependence of ideology and culture
on the economic base, studies of this kind have concentrated
on the economic processes, market relationships and the
structures of ownership and control of media organizations.
One of the main tenets of the political-economic perspective
in the study of mass communication is that media
organizations operate in more-or-less the sane way as any
other economic organization. The mass media are regarded as
an integral part of the economic basis of society (see for
example Murdock and Golding 1974; 1977).
In one of the pioneering works stressing the importance
of the political-economy perspective in the study of mass
communication,	 "Capitalism'.	 Communication and	 Class
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Relations" (1977), G. Murdock and P. Golding, basing their
analysis on classical Marxist theory argued that ownership
and control are the determining factors in media activities
and directly influence cultural production, and the content
of media messages. Their analysis demonstrated the
significance of the changing patterns in the ownership of
media organizations from concentration to conglomeration, of
the reduction of the number of media owners and of the
diversification of media industries as it suggested the links
between media owners and the ca pitalist class and the
commonality of their interests (p.p. 32-3; also Murdock
1982). According to Murdock and Golding as the media
organizations are economic organizations, the symbolic forms
they produce are effectively commodities. In this context,
economic considerations such as the need to increase
profitability, or to expand to new markets (i.e. acquire new
audiences) lead to conscious choices which entail less
economic risk and affect cultural production.
Referring to the first of the consequences of market
pressure for cultural production, Murdock and Golding point
out that the material produced and diffused by the mass media
tends to be limited to what could guarantee profitability;
this situation could lead to increased selectivity and
exclusion of symbolic forma on the basis of the criterion of
Potential commercial success (p. 37). What is more, they
argue, as processes of concentration Progress and
monopolistic tendencies increase, the media increasingly tend
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to exclude "voices lacking economic power or resources" (p.
37). As accessibility to the media market is determined by
possession of substantial capital, the position of groups
already established in the main mass media markets is
consolidated at the expense of those groups which lack the
necessary economic resources for successful entr y (p . 37).
Thus, Murdock and Golding claim,
"the voices which survive will largely belong to
those least likely to criticize the prevailing
distribution of wealth and power. Conversely, those
most likely to challenge these arrangements are
unable to publicize their dissent or opposition
because they cannot command the resources needed
for effective communication to a broad audience"
(p. 37).
As	 economic	 considerations prevail	 in cultural
production, Murdock and Golding detect 	 an increasing
tendency towards audience maximization, or rather, a
preference to larger and wealthier markets at the expence of
poorer and smaller sectors of the potential audiences.
Therefore communities, or groups whose size or purchasing
power are incapable to guarantee increasing profits tend to
be neglected or served as parts of larger or wealthier
populations	 (p.p.	 38-9).	 The
	 "need"	 for	 audience
maximization, it is claimed, affects the content of media
messages, as the latter have to be attractive and familiar to
the audiences. In this way, the exclusion of media products
that might not meet these criteria, hinders and discourages
any creative or innovative effort in cultural production (p.
39).
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As research progressed and gave rise to debate regarding
the advantages and limitations of the political economy
Perspective, the interplay between the cultural and economic
aspects of mass communication was conceived in a more
flexible way than in initial approaches (see Golding and
Murdock 1991: 19). In subsequent research new concerns
emerged such as the relation between state regulation
institutions and mass communication industries, obstacles to
the sovereignty of the consumers of media products, the
relationship between social and economical location and
access to cultural resources and competences for differential
'readings' of media texts (Golding and Murdock 1991), or the
relation of variations in audience response to media messages
with their location in the economic system (Murdock 1989).
Political-economic approaches constitute an important
contribution to the study of mass communication as they focus
on the important implications of ownership, market pressure
and other economic and political considerations to cultural
production that had been neglected by approaches focusing
exclusively on the content of media messages. However they
appear to underestimate other factors of at least equal
importance. It should be emphasized that media organizations
do not always operate on the basis of the logic of
Profitability. As McQuail argues, difficulties for such
approaches arise when the mass media are under public
ownership (McQuail, 1987: 64), or, one mi ght add, even in
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cases of privately owned media, other priorities could be
detected, such as political affiliations or loyalties,
aspirations for political influence or control, or for the
acquisition of other privileges. Thus in some societies the
mass media could be an integral component of clientelistic
networks - as in the case of the Greek press which will be
discussed in more detail in the following chapters - and
therefore economic considerations might be of secondary
importance, or even irrelevant in the production and
diffusion of media messages. Having said that, it should be
recognized that recent developments in the field (Murdock
1989; Golding and Murdock 1991) have indicated considerable
progress towards expanding the scope of "political economy"
approaches to mass communication.
Political-economic approaches offer valuable insights as
far as aspects of the material context of cultural production
are concerned, provided however that the economic aspects of
mass communication are treated as an important and
necessary, but not sufficient explanation of cultural and
ideological media effects (Hall 1986: 46-7).
Hegemony and the Politics of Signification:
Towards a Critical Paradigm
Another critical a pproach to mass communication has
developed within the context of British cultural studies.
Premised upon the Gramecian concept of hegemon y (Gramsci
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1968) and the work of R. Williams on culture (especially
Williams 1980b), the exponents of this approach saw culture
as a continuous process through which hegemony is
accomplished and challenged.
As I have already argued in my discussion of political
culture, the concept of hegemony allows us to understand
domination, not as total domination, but as the outcome of a
continuous cultural and political striving for its
achievement, and as the result of struggle, negotiation and
compromise between dominant and subordinated classes and
groups. The consequences of such a shift in the analysis of
culture and ideology are ver y significant as the dominant
schemata of perception, cognition and practice in a society,
or group, that is, what Gramoci called "common sense" can no
longer be considered to be a "product" of the dominant groups
in society, imposed by them, nor can they be considered to be
permanent and rigid. They are rather the outcome of a
struggle for the definition of reality, of a "politics of
signification", of social struggle over the determination of
meaning (cf. Volosinov 1973; Hall 1977, 1982; J.B. Thompson
1984; Laclau and Mouffe 1985).
However, the adoption of a hegemonial approach to the
study of culture and cultural production should not reach the
culturalist extreme of discarding the notion of structure, as
every culture is, in a sense structured, or in other words,
cultural production is subject to certain "constraints" and
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made possible through certain "resources" which are rooted in
objectified historical experience (see for example Giddens
1979, 1981, 1984; also Berger and Luckmann 1966). As Hall
observes, the 'deep structure' of cultural products, which
has been one of the main concerns of structuralist
approaches, could, in the context of a hegemonial approach,
be understood as a
"network of elements, premises and assumptions
drawn from the long-standing and historically
elaborated discourses which had accreted over the
years, into which the whole history of the social
formation had sedimented, and which now constituted
a reservoir of themes and premises on which, for
example broadcasters, could draw for the work of
signifying new and troubling events" (Hall, 1982:
73).
It is precisely this	 "deep structure" upon which
cultural products are formed and become intelligible, as it
constitutes a common stock of taken-for-granted knowled ge, or
the basis for communication for the members of the society or
the group. It is important to point out that signification or
discources premised upon this "deep structure" constitute a
specific interpretation of reality. Thus as Hall points out,
a statement about a situation is just a proposed definition
of a situation, although in everyday interaction this is
misrecognized (p. 74). This misrecognition, is an effect of
the closure of the universe of discourse, a closure which
makes us recognize specific propositions about "reality" as
true, accurate and familiar.
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This equivalence between language and truth, is achieved
through discursive practice, or rather through the struggle
in discource. As Laclau has shown (1977; also Laclau and
Mouffe 1985), discources constitute an arena of social
struggle for the achievement of hegemony, where signifiers
are disarticulated 	 from and	 articulated in competing
meaning-systems	 in a continuous	 competition for the
definition of 'reality'.
The mass-media, being as we saw, an important factor in
cultural production are thus deeply involved in the processes
of signification and the definition of reality. The mass
media manufacture consent not primaril y because they are
under compulsion or constraint. Rather, their claim to
objectivity, or their attempt to represent themselves as
neutral increases their sensitivit y to "common sense", to
consensus. They are thus, rather unconsciously, enmeshed in
the hegemonic struggle as they draw upon pre-constructed
definitions of the situation in order to produce their
messages. As Hall argues, the production of symbolic goods
involves rendering "events" or "reality" intelligible by
articulating them within the hegemonic framework of a society
and thus by winning the concent of the audiences to "the
preferred reading" (Hall 1977: 343-345).
Thus, it could be argued that recent developments in
cultural studies have contributed to the emergence and
convergence of critical approaches to the study of the
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relation between mass communication and culture. What is
particularly important is the fact that these approaches
emphasize the contradictory nature of media performance. This
is so as the centrality of the notion of hegemony in these
approaches implies the recognition of the contradictory
character of culture, and therefore of the contradictor y work
the media have to perform by reproducing not only the
hegemonic culture but also the contradictions which structure
its field (Hall 1977: 346).
Mass Communication and Political Culture: 
Some Concluding Remarks 
One of the spheres of social activity that has been
profoundly affected by the	 pervasiveness of mass
communications in modern societies is that of politics. The
emergence of the mass media has had significant effects as
far as the communicative process, institutional arrangements
and authority structures relevant to contexts of political
interaction are concerned. What is more, mass communication
has become an important source of our knowledge about
politics and has affected the ways we participate in the
political sphere. Indeed, in modern societies, the mass media
have become "definers" of the "political" as the experience
derived from mass communication is partly constitutive of the
domain of social activity which is regarded as politics.
Mass communication has led to the reorganization of
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forms of political interaction. In societies penetrated by
mass communications, the mass media are able to bypass the
traditional channels of Political 	 communication and to
disseminate political information without institutional
control (McQuail, 1969: 12). What is more, as the mass media
become an important channel of political communication, the
nature of	 the latter is affected significantly. More
precisely, the one-way flow 	 of political communication
establishes a rather asymmetrical relation between the
"sender" and the "receiver" of political information, as it
implies a limited capacity of the public or rather, the
audience, to exert effective and direct control on the
process. Furthermore, as the deployment of the technical
media of mass communication makes political interaction
across temporal and spatial distances possible, a new kind of
mediated publicness, entailing the reconstitution of the
boundaries between public and private life, 	 emerges
(Thompson, 1990: 245-8).
As Thompson argues, in contrast to the more traditional
notion of publicness, this new notion of publicness which is
dependent upon the media of mass communication, is
non-dialogical in character, and does not depend on spatial
limits (p. 246). Indeed, in societies penetrated by the mass
media, it could be argued that experience of political
events, especially events that are spaciallY and temporally
remote, is an experience largely mediated by the institutions
of mass communication. Consequently, it a ppears that mass
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communication has the potential of Practically extending the
limits of the public sphere to an unprecedented extent, by
introducing a mediated publicness.
It is important to point out that although Thompson's
claim that the kind of mediated publicness created by the
development of mass communication creates new opportunities
for the restriction of invisibility and for the accessibility
of a political domain that would normally be out of sight is
quite valid, one should also be aware that its "mediated"
•
character entails the "manageability" 	 of this extended
visibility. In this new, expanded realm of the political,
which has been made possible and is sustained by mass
communication, the relationship between political problems,
events or personalities and audiences (i.e. the public)
becomes increasingly mediated, and therefore manageable.
While problems, or specific	 political actors such as
governments, political personalities, parties or
organizations and their activities become increasingly
visible, it is also true that their visibility is in some way
managed. Or, in other words, media products are not mere
reflections of 'reality', but rather specific interpretations
of it. These 'managed' accounts of 'reality' are first of all
managed in the sense of being the outcome of processes of
selective introduction and exclusion of issues from the
universe of discourse (Bourdieu 1977), and of the way issues
are introduced to the universe of discourse, that is, on the
Politics of signification. "Political reality" is therefore
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not "natural", it is rather a product of representation, of
processes of definition, or signification. Or, in other
words, our understanding and experience of specific actions
and situations depends on complex processes of selection and
exclusion of alternative significations, through the struggle
in discource.
As I have tried to point out in the previous pages, the
mass media are an important factor in the social struggle
over the definition of 'reality'. They are therefore crucial
in the study of political culture, as they play a major and
decisive role in the definition and demarcation of what is
political and what is not in a society, of what might be
discussed or disputed, or also, in setting the terms under
which such a discussion will take place, as well as the
limits of acceptability or unacceptability of action. Thus,
drawing upon the hegemonic culture, the media provide
political realities where they did not exist before or alter
existing political realities in such • a way that they
contribute to the determination of political acceptability or
deviance. What is more, they do so rather unconsciously, by
drawing upon pre-constructed definitions of the situation,
which are held to be accurate and objective descriptions of
reality, while in fact they are socially constructed,
enmeshed in the struggle for hegemony.
However, bearing in mind that the media reproduce not
onl y the hegemonic culture but also the contradictions which
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structure its field, it becomes evident that one of the most
important objectives of the study of the relationship between
mass communication and political culture should concentrate
on precisely how the mass media in specific circumstances
facilitate or obstruct social and political change. Although
the degree of rigidity or flexibility of the frames of
political discourse and action is not sufficient, it is
nevertheless indicative of the extent to which a political
culture is closed and authoritarian, or open and democratic.
PART II
POLITICAL CULTURE AND MASS COMMUNICATION IN GREECE:
A SOCIAL/HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
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PART II: POLITICAL CULTURE AND MASS COMMUNICATION IN GREECE:
INTRODUCTION
Part II constitutes an attempt to explore the formation
and the contours of contemporary Greek political culture and
the role the press has played within this context. As far as
the analysis of Greek political culture - or of political
culture in general for that matter - is concerned, I would
argue that neither the organization nor the functioning of
cultural practices can be understood if these are examined
only from the point of view of their current forms and
contemporary social articulations. They need also to be
considered as the product of historical processes.
Recovering this past, therefore, and attempting to explore
the ways it is selectively articulated to current political
and cultural practices, is an essential part of the analysis
of political culture.
Based on this assumption, chapter 4 will focus on the
analysis of the structural and institutional framework within
which contemporary political practices unfold and in the
li ght of which they become meaningful. Through a relatively
brief overview of the history of contemporary Greece I shall
attempt to examine the processes of reproduction and change
of structural elements of the Greek social formation and
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assess their impact in the formation and transformation of
those institutions	 which have provided the frames of
political action and debate in contemporary Greece. A
social-historical analysis of the Greek social formation is
important as it will make intelli gible contemporary patterns
of political action. indeed, it seems to me that data from
quantitative research of political attitudes and behaviour
cannot be intelligible unless we interpret them in the light
of such a background.
In chapter 5, I shall concentrate on the institutions of
mass communication, and in particular on the Athens daily
political press. Departing from a social-historical analysis
of the institution of the press, that is, of the social,
political and economic context in which it has developed, as
well as the internal relations of power, I shall examine the
part it has played in the definition of the political, and in




THE FORMATION OF GREEK POLITICAL CULTURE
Greek society during the nineteenth century.
Until the beginning of the nineteenth century, Balkan
societies, including Greek society, were subjugated parts of
the Ottoman Empire and, as such, had not experienced the
transition from absolutism to parliamentarism, and thus,
followed a different path of development from that, or those,
of western European societies. The Greek war of independence
and the political crises of 1843-44 and 1862-63 were not
fundamentally disruptive of traditional forms of social
organization and behaviour. Despite	 the propagation of
Western political	 institutions, Greek society was not
"European", in the	 sense that it did	 not share the
experiences of most European societies during their
transition from feudalism to capitalism and from absolutism
to Parliamentarism.
The social and political system on which the Ottoman
empire was based, was or ganized in such a way that it would
secure the reproduction and perpetuation of the established
relationship between the Ottoman central bureaucracy and the
independent peasantry. More precisely, in rural Ottoman
society, a mass of independent or semi-independent peasants
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with a hereditary ri ght on the use of the land, had to pay
through taxation a significant portion of their economic
surplus to the central bureaucracy. 1 For the majority of the
independent and semi-independent peasants this relationship
with the centre was acceptable, despite occasional extensive
taxation, as	 the sultan	 and his	 central bureaucracy
.guaranteed their	 relative independence from	 the local
functionaries in exchan ge for their cultivation of the land
and for the	 extraction of economic surplus	 of their
production through taxation. Any challenge to this
relationship by local functionaries would constitute a threat
to the reproduction of the social system, that is, to the
status of the free peasant and to the ability of the central
government to survive; consequently both the central
bureaucracy and the peasantry were hostile towards attempts
of local functionaries to transform themselves into powerful
landed aristocracies, while Ottoman law posed serious
obstacles to any attempt to transform the patterns of
landholding or the mode of surplus extraction within the
empire.
Despite frequent attempts - often successful - by local
functionaries to appropriate land or the surplus extracted
from the peasantry, it could be argued that the status of the
free peasant, that is, the recognition of his/her personal or
family right to cultivate land in exchange for part of
his/her economic surplus constituted a very important feature
of the Ottoman	 social formation. As long	 as central
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government guaranteed social stability and the peasants'
independence and land rights, the peasants were quite content
with the status quo. Even in cases of social instability and
upheaval the christian peasants' revolts were expressions of
their resentment of local functionaries' and landowners'
attempts to alter their status, with no intention to cecede
from the Ottoman empire (Stavrianos 1958: 144). Mouzelis
points out the essentially conservative character of the
Greek peasantry as he argues that the rural population in the
early nineteenth century was "less interested in political
independence and rather wishing to return to the good old
ages when the powerful Ottoman government could secure their
rights and limit the greediness of the landowners and the
officials" (Mouzelis 1977: 30-31)
Surplus extraction Was based on the communal
administrative system of the empire, that is, on the
recognition of the village as a communal/administrative unit
with specific fiscal responsibilities towards the local
delegated functionaries of the central government, and on the
introduction of tax-collection through tax-farming,
especially after the sixteenth century.2 The communal system
and tax-farming gave the opportunity to local - christian in
the case of Greece - landowners or notables 3 to acquire
increased status and additional legitimation derived from
their position in the Ottoman administrative system.
In contrast to these social groups which were more or
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less content with the Ottoman status quo, as their land
rights - in the case of the former - and authority and
privileges - in the case of the latter - were linked with its
preservation, the emerging middle-class groups which were
formed by the growth of commercial and financial activities
in the empire, were demanding more involvement in the
political sphere and more independence in their economic
activity, while an active Greek intelligencia, influenced by
European enlightenment and the revolutionary movements of the
time, provided the catalyst for the emergence and spread of
Greek nationalism and the war of independence (Mackridge
1981).
As the combination of the catalytic role of the Greek
intelli gencia and the increasing erosion of the fragile
equilibria which had held the Ottoman empire together led to
the participation of all these groups, with their more or
less contradictory interests, to participate in the Greek war
of independence in the 1820s, it became evident that some of
the main features of post-independence Greek society, state
and politics were already in the making, or already present
within Ottoman society, before the acquisition of
statehood.
While it is true that the war of independence disrupted
old administrative and economic institutions and networks
which used to provide links between the insurgent provinces
and other Parts of the Ottoman empire and that the power
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vacuum and confusion that followed the fall of Ottoman
sovereignt y, made necessary the construction of new
centralist networks to consolidate and unify the insurgent
provinces which had never before constituted a single
administrative or economic unit, it is also true that social
forms and practices that had been an integral part of Ottoman
society, survived and adapted to the new realities of Greek
independence alongside the introduced Western political forms
and centralized administrative practices.
The land issue and the peasantry. 
There is no doubt that during the first fifty years of
the existence of	 the Greek state, Greek society was
predominantly rural, while the economy was characterized by
low accumulation	 of capital, a	 virtually non-existent
industry and, in some cases, subsistence agricultural
production. Given the predominantly agricultural economy of
the independent state, and the association of land-holding
with personal and family independence, land constituted a
most important guarantee of economic security, and a very
precious source of wealth and prestige. In the southernmost
part of the Balkan peninsula - which eventually became the
initial territory of the Greek state small scale
agriculture based on small-scale land property was the main
productive activity. The majority of Greek peasants were
working in their own small propert y and part of the surplus
of their production was extracted b y means of taxation.
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Although, during Periods of crisis of the central Ottoman
government, local - mainly muslim - functionaries managed to
appropriate land and become powerful landowners, 4 most areas
in what would become the territory of the Greek state
retained their predominant small property character.5
After its formation, the Greek state nationalized most
of the muslim-owned land (mainly chifliks) in an effort to
prevent the concentration of the land (and, possibl y , of
power) in the hands of a few owners. The "modernizers",
supporters of centralization, saw in the appropriation of
land by the local notables, military chieftains and the
landowning and merchant groups the danger of setting in
motion a process which would eventually lead to increased
centrifugal tendencies and, at best, to a fragmented state
based on the principle of multicentrism. Thus they opposed
any solution that might eventually lead to the formation of a
class of powerful landowners. However, possibly as a result
of a compromise between the rival elites the national lands
were not distributed to the landless peasants, possibly
because the former were anticipating the right moment for
settling the land issue under more favourable terms. The fact
that a few chifliks were not affected by the nationalization
of the land proved to be of only minor im portance as a series
of laws allowed landless peasants to rent small parts of the
national lands and therefore reduced the availability of
land-workers for the remaining large estates. One of the main
consequences of these developments was that	 potential
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pressure for the creation of a rural Proletariat which
eventually might lead to	 consolidation of capitaliSfiC
•	 .
enterprises in this area of economic activity was
considerably reduced.6 In addition to this, the quite delayed
distribution of the national lands by the government of prime
minister Koumoundouros in 1871 contributed to the prevalence
of small land holdings and functioned as counterbalance for
the annexation of Thessal y - a predominantly chiflik region -
which followed shortly. 7 As Stavrianos observes, the
prevalence of small land holdings "held potential industrial
workers to the soil, particularly because going to the city
and becoming a day labourer was regarded a step down in the
social scale" (Stavrianos: 479). Greek society therefore,
remained a societ y in which the prevalence of small family
land property was a significant feature (Vergopoulos 1965).
The peasants earned their living by mainly subsistence
agriculture and were essentially isolated from the centre
through lack of transport and communication. The state was
viewed, and in some respects is still viewed as an external
'entity (Papataxiarchis 1990). Widespread social and political
mistrust also seemed to permeate Greek political culture as
the government not only perceived as alien to the population,
but also provided	 the peasant	 with minimal, -almost
non-existent services. As in the Ottoman Empire the
relationship between state and population, es pecially peasant
population, was limited to tax-collection.
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The formation of the "political class".
The initial decentralized structures of the Greek state
which were mainly due to the delicate balance of power among
the various rival elites did not last more than a decade.
After ten years of intense political confrontations,
sectionalism gave way to a more centralized state. The
destruction of the traditional unit of administration, the
rural community, and of the communal system, 8 combined with
the succession of the absolutist regimes of Governor
Capodistria and King Otto which favoured a centralized state,
gave a decisive blow to any prospects of creation of
autonomous regions, or of any other possible formula that
would guarantee to members of the aspiring elites their
reproduction at the regional level. What is more, the
inability of the autochthonous elites to appropriate the
national lands and to derive their social power on large
scale ownership . of the land, in conjunction with the
prevalence of small scale land ownership in Greece, reduced
significantly the possibilities for their social and economic
reproduction as distinct social groups.
Facing this impasse, the majority of the autochthonous
elites progressively shifted the basis of their power from
land property to the colonization of the state, or, in other
words from economic to "political paternalism" (Tsciukalas
1977: 224). This reorientation of the autochthonous oligarchy
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of notables, landowners and merchants could be explained bY
the importance of the state in 19th century Greek society: as
in many pre-capitalist social formations where large scale
ownership of land is marginal, there are no established forms
of exploitation in the field of production proper
(Dedousso poulos 1985). Instead, as it has been pointed out
above as far as the case of the Ottoman empire was concerned,
in these social formations, the agricultural surplus is
extracted by the state and its delegated functionaries in the
form of taxation (Dedoussopoulos 1985; also Tsoukalas 1977).
Under these circumstances, it could be argued that the
"dominant" social group is closely connected to the state and
its political and upper level administrative personnel, so as
to be able to appropriate or, more importantly, manage the
appropriation of the extracted surplus. In the case of
Greece, as it has already been mentioned, the establishment
of a centralized state seemed irreversible as this was the
form of statehood preferred by the foreign patrons of Greece
and was definitely favoured by the regimes of Governor
Capodistria and King Otto. It therefore became evident that
any visions of sectionalism hardly constituted a realistic
option. The advantages of controlling the processes of
surplus extraction and distribution, given the fact that the
possibilities of acquiring more landed property were quite
remote, left open just one option for the notables and
chieftains. Instead of continuing to base their power on
their influence and prestige at the level of the local or
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regional community - a strategy with a quite uncertain
future as new authority and power relations were being
doveloped in the centre as well as in the periphery of the
new state, and threatened to erode the traditional bases of
the power of the autochthonous elites	 they sought to
transform their	 local social influence	 into political
capital. Thus, they turned to the state or, more precisely,
they started	 to	 occupy	 political	 and	 high-level
administrative	 positions	 and,	 later,	 to	 use
Parliamentarianism as a means of safeguarding their own power
and interests. Their transformation into a political class
meant that the autochthonous elites would in the future
acquire influence and prestige, not as mere communal and
regional potentates, but due to their access to political
decision making processes and because of their management of
the extracted surplus. In this way this new political
oligarchy retained its mediating role between the local
community and the "alien" and "remote" centres of power, by
operating within the structures of the state. As Tsoukalas
observes "in this way, a large part of the families of the
notables and the chieftains,	 sustained their political
influence in the countryside up to today" (Tsoukalas 1977).
The "colonization" of the state by the autochthonous
oligarchies was achieved rather easily as, although they were
not powerful enough to challenge the central government of
the absolutist re gimes of Governor Capodistria and King Otto,
they were still in a position to use their considerable
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influence in their communities as a means of acquiring access
to the state ap paratuses. It was therefore quite clear that
their presence in or influence on the state apparatuses
presupposed their ability to sustain the reproduction of
their influence and prestige at the local level through the
establishment of quite sophisticated clientelistic networks.
As clientelism is in principle a relation of exchange, the
autochthonous elites had to secure their reproduction as a
political class	 by directly	 or indirectly	 allocating
resources and rewards to their local clients. This allocation
could take various forms, the most common being public
appointments, hiring the services of clients or offering
state subsidies or other benefits. In any case, whatever form
the exchanges might have taken, it is important to emphasize
that clientelism played a formative role as far as Greek
society and Greek state were concerned. It was important
insofar as it provided the basis for the development of
"state fetishism" in a . society of aspiring candidates for
public employment and state support. It was also central in
the formation of the widespread social perception of the
state as an instrument for the satisfaction of individual
demands. The state bureaucracy was viewed as a mere
appendage of the party/clique system, as a part of
clientelist networks, and therefore was not considered to be
a relatively neutral institution for executing policies and
Providing services as was the case in most Western European
societies.
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Thus, the integration of an individual into a patronage
network would usually entail the possibility of upward social
mobility as in Greek society, given the economic stagnation
and insecurity that prevailed in the rural areas, employment
in the continuously growing civil service was considered to
be extremely prestigious in both financial and social terms.
Another important consequence of clientelism was the
"vertical" organization of Greek society which it established
and developed to such an extent that any "horizontal" way of
social and political organization became almost impossible.
The clientelistic rationale did not allow for the
articulation of social contradictions and conflicts in the
political sphere. As Psomiades observed, in Greek society
."[i]nstead of belonging to a number of functional
groups, the individual tended to belong to one
group, which served all of his needs" (Psomiades
1976: 150).
As needs were dealt with on an individual basis,
collective interests tended to be misrecognized and
fragmented. In this way, politics enjoyed a high degree of
autonomy from social divisions and processes as the political
sphere was disengaged from social sructures and conflicts
(Dertilis 1977a; 1977b), or rather, as Tsoukalas has pointed
out "political conflict" reflected "class conflict only
indirectly" (Tsoukalas 1979: 125). For example, in the first
fifty years of Greek independence, the pauperization and
insecurity of	 the rural	 population in Greece, which
-132-
constituted a potentially explosive political issue was not,
or was marginall y articulated in the discources of the
political elites and, therefore, peasant grievances were not
translated into political issues and did not inspire any
serious political action. On the contrary, these collective
grievances were effectively neutralized as they were dealt
with on an individual basis within the context of
clientelistic relationships. The relative autonomy of the
political sphere was very clearly manifested by the
resilience Of a particular mode of oligarchic parliamentarism
in Greek politics (Mouzelis 1986), that is, of a particular
type of "symbiosis" of parliamentary institutions with
clientelistic forms of political exclusion of the majority of
the electorate from the political process. Legg noted that
the clientage system in Greece meshed so well with the
institutions of modern representative democracy that it
managed to reproduce itself and to remain a very significant
factor in Greek politics (Legg 1969: 39-40). Thus, whereas
the political institutions in Greece were
representative-democratic in form, the majority of the
electorate were effectively excluded from the political arena
and political debate and their representation was annulled.
Consequently, parliamentary, and more generally political
debate, was focusing mainl y on personal or legalistic issues
while issues of relevance to the mass of the electorate were
systematically ignored.
The autonomy of politics in Greek society could also be
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demonstrated by an examination of the characteristics of the
Political parties of the nineteenth century - which are also
closely linked to the Phenomenon of oligarchic
parliamentarism. More precisely, the formation of political
parties in Greece was initiated from above, as they did not
constitute the expression of any organized social interests
and movements. They were rather political cliques formed on
the basis of personal relations, with no principles. As
Tsoukalas points out, the
"majority of rank and file, supporters or even
simple voters of all parties, - even of those which
were promising the formation of 'parties of
principle', were regarding the party, mainly as an
instrument that would enable their participation in
the mechanisms of distribution of state funds"
(Tsoukalas 1977: 97-98).
Therefore, political parties were not the product of any
significant socio-political division and conflict, rooted in
civil society; they were rather loose political groups rarely
inspired by principles, and normally characterized by
opportunism and fluidity. The composition of a political
party was not certain or stable, as personal conflicts could
easily affect political alliances and lead to the transfer of
whole clientelistic networks from one political part y to
another.
A closely related issue to the "peculiarities" of the
"political" in Greece was, and still is, what Mouzelis called
"the formalistic character of politics" (Mouzelis 1978:
134-148). As politics was disengaged from social conflict,
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and acquired a status of autonomy, Political . conflict was not
focusing on social issues but rather, on issues of
legalistic, or personal nature. So, while issues of social
deprivation and inequality did not reach the universe of
political discourse, political and parliamentary debate
concentrated on legalistic issues and often took the form of
personal feuds.
1850-1940: Towards Social Change._
Despite the defeat of sectionalism and the creation of a
centralized state, it would be wrong to claim that the whole
territory of the new state had reached a similar level of
economic development. Certain parts gf the Greek territory
were characterized by a high degree of integration to the
international market; we could briefly say that there were
significant regional variations as forms of rural capitalism
were just appearing in Thessaly in the 1880s, while Patras
and Syros were mainly commercial centres. On the other hand,
other areas were characterized by differing degrees of
economic isolation, introversion, low monetarization and
commodification of their local economies.
It is important to point out that recognizing the uneven
economic development, of the Greek territory does not imply
recognizing the existence of two distinct sectors of
development as dualist theories of development would suggest.
On the contrary, the, situation was far more complex as the
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"extent"	 and	 the	 "quality"	 of	 development	 and
underdevelopment in each area varied significantl y. What
might be interesting	 in these remarks is what these
quantitative and qualitative differences in development
suggest: the lack of a national economically dominant group,
and the existence of a multitude of local dominant groups.
As it has already been shown, the autochthonous elites
managed to establish a relationship with the state by
adapting to the new realities of centralized administration
and parliamentarianism. In contrast, the maj ority of the
"bourgeois" groups which were emerging in areas where
commerce, trans portation, rural capitalism or manufacturing
was developing remained quite isolated and did not transform
into a national bourgeoisie. As G. Burgel observes both the
political class and the economic class were mutually
indifferent in the affairs of the other (Burgel 1976:
248-265). This could in part be explained by the extrovert
character of the local economies, of the commercial and
manufacturing centres of Greece, such as Syros and Patras; it
could be argued that these centres, having their markets
abroad, were more integrated in the international market than
with the rest of Greece. Thus, their advanced integration to
the international market, combined with the lack of any
internal market, the relatively low monetarization of the
economy and the almost complete lack of internal
communications and transportation appear to have contributed
to the lack of any interest bY these economic elites in
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direct or indirect participation in the political sphere.
This unequal economic development among the regions of
the newly established state was perpetuated by the virtual
lack of communication and transportation networks which
inhibited any industrial venture or any effective attempt for
further monetarization and commodification of these areas. It
could therefore be argued that during the first half, and
indeed throughout the nineteenth century, despite the
incorporation of the Greek economy to the international
market - or, precisely because of its peripherialization -
its geographical and social fragmentation constituted an
important obstacle to the formation of a unified internal,
national market, and of national, social and political
identities. As the only ways in which the population of the
geographically and culturally fragmented realm were
integrated in political life were the clientelist networks,
which in any case distorted and mystified any collective
grievances or demands, it was evident that the emergence of a
civil society independent from the state, or any national
social organizations was thwarted in advance.
What is more, the international economic climate did not
facilitate the consolidation and possible expansion and
strengthening of some of these groups. More precisely,
international competition in the field of industry in
general, given the fact that the Greek state had adopted a
rather liberal dut y and tarrifs policy, did not provide
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fertile ground for the development of the virtually stillborn
Greek industry, while in the middle of the 19th century, the
ship construction industry suffered a major crisis as the
steamship was introduced in the field of maritime
transportation and displaced the traditional sailing ships
(Mouzelis 1978: 35).
It was only after 1860 when very cautious steps towards
overcoming the physical and economic fragmentation of the
realm and towards industrialization, or rather towards the
creation of the infrastructure for industrialization can be
detected. More precisely, in the period between 1880 and 1895
the governments of H. Trikoupis implemented a series of
institutional - legal changes, complemented by extensive
investment in the field of public works, transportation and
industrial infrastructure. Despite the substantial effects of
their investment policies, their overall vision of industrial
or capitalist modernization failed and its insignificant
results were wiped out when the traditionalist opposition
returned in office.
It therefore seems quite misleading to link these
reforms which focused mainl y upon legal and institutional
modernization, with the emergence of the middle classes as
Tsoukalas claims (Tsoukalam 1981: 14), as it seems that there
was no social base - at least, any significant social base -
which would be able to support and sustain this process of
institutional and economic change. Although it cannot be
.4•16..	 3, VI
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denied that such an emergence took place it a ppears that the
importance of these strata in the developments in Greek
society has been exaggerated. A more plausible explanation
which might throw more light to the developments near the
turn of the nineteenth century would, in my opinion,
emphasize the international conjuncture as the international
economic recession the symptoms of which began to be felt in
Greece around 1880 made imperative the implementation of
protective and developmental policies. More precisel y, an
immediate result of the recession was the crisis of Greek
exports which could be counterbalanced mainly by
protectionist measures for the development of local industry.
What is more, the reorientation of western capital towards
investment in the underdeveloped peripheral countries as a
response to the recession, and especially its transformation
into finance capital provided an influx of capital in the
underdeveloped countries 	 including Greece - which made
possible the creation of an industrial infrastructure,
railways and other important public works. It could therefore
be more plausible to argue that under a favourable
international situation the Trikoupis government attem pted an
"industrial revolution from above" (Tsoukalas 1977: 109). As
Tsoukalas points out, this revolution was not eventually
successful, as the weight of bourgeois elements or strata
associated with industrial development in Greek society was
rather minimal and, on the other hand, as TrikouPis's
voluntarist legalism could never be succesful without an
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adequate social basis (p. 109). 	 Similarly, most of the
attempts to rationalize the econom y, state administration and
the political system had little success as they were
restricted to the legal-institutional level (Kondogiorgis
1985: 126). It should be pointed out that even in this
experiment of social engineering the state acted without
attempting to engage society in this process of
modernization, reconfirming in this way the "incongruence"
of social and political processes and the autonomy of
politics.
The first signs of success in attempts to modernize the
infrastructure and the economy came in the beginning of the
twentieth century when the national adventures, and
especially when the products of the policies of these
governments, that is, the numerous petty bourgeois strata
faced the deadlocks of the policies of economic stagnation.
As the communication between the previously isolated regions
of Greece became easier - as a result of the investments of
the end of the nineteenth century - and, as over 1,500,000
refugees from Asia Minor settled in the Greek state, the
foundations for a unified national market were finally set.
What is more, as the possibilities of emigration to the
United States became restricted (Tsoukalas 1981: 27), a
sufficient labour market was created for the first time.
Furthermore, if we take into account the global tendency
of that period towards substitution of imports and self
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sufficiency - a result of the inter-war recession in
conjunction with the unprecedented influx of foreign capital
in the period between 1922 and 1932, in the form of either
loans or investments (Vergopoulos 1978: 63-7), it seems that
most of the preconditions for industrialization were then
present in Greek society and economy.
As a result, in the same period, the rate of increase of
industrial production was rapid, and the principle of self
sufficiency made the Greek market less dependent on imports,
and Greek industry more inde pendent as it increasingly relied
on the use of raw material coming from the national primary
sector. What is more, as Mouzelis points out, the late
twenties and thirties were a period of unprecedented
concentration of capital, and of the establishment of forms
of collaboration between banking and industrial capital
(Mouzelis 1978: 24). On the other hand, it should also be
pointed out that during the same period, Greek industry,
which concentrated on the production of consumer goods,
continued to be characterized by low productivity and by
small scale capital investment. As Vergopoulos observes,
while the total number of those employed in the industrial
sector rose from 154,600 in 1920 to 350,000 in 1938, about
93% of them were working in small enter prizes which employed
1 to 5 persons (Vergopoulos 1978: 77). What is more, Greek
capitalists abstained from investment in heavy industry as
capital investment in that sector of industry demanded
significant capital (Vergopoulos 1978: 75).
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Therefore, it could be argued that the inter-war years
constituted a transitory period during which the Greek social
formation was characterized by an articulation of a dynamic
emerging capitalism, mostly concentrated in pockets or
islets, with a persistent simple commodity mode of production
which was characterized by relatively low productivity and
low level investment.
It was also marked b y the eruption of an intense
political conflict, the "ethnikos dichasmos" or national
schism which tore Greek society into two bitterly opposed and
irreconcilable camps with conflicting loyalties; one loyal to
the throne and its incumbent, King Constantine, the other
supporting the liberal leader Eleftherios Venizelos. As
Mouzelis argues the national schism, being primarily an
intra-dominant class type of conflict had managed to displace
other, potential forme of inter-class conflict, as it
disoriented the peasants and the masses of the Asia Minor
refugees and involved them into a formalistic political
conflict bearing little relevance to their own grievances and
interests (Mouzelis 1978: 25) - the schism constituted
primarily a conflict between traditional and liberal elements
of the bourgeoisie regarding the bourgeois hegemony over the
nature and the pace of the transformation which Greek society
was undergoing during the inter-war period (Mavrogordatos
1982: 74-77, also Diamandouros 1981: 4-5). However, Mouzelis
Points out that this, intra-dominant class type of conflict
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'gradually gave way to a 'masses v_ the dominant classes'
type of conflict" (ibid.). Indeed, the ra pid socio-economic
change of the period, the creation of' an industrial
proletariat and the influx of dispossessed refugees gradually
affected the political debate, as the political conflict
tended to transcend the formalist character of Greek politics
and to articulate social issues. It should however be
emphasized that these changes were rather marginal as the
only notable political organization associated with this
qualitative shift in Greek politics, that is, the newly
founded Communist Party assumed a marginal ' role in the
political arena, and was unable to challenge the political
supremacy of the dominant class (see for example Elefandis
1979: 44-45). This inability of new social forces to overcome
the restrictions of the "closed" universe of political
discourse, was also reflected in the futility of the attempts
of Venizelos to dismantle the clientelistic system. As it has
been noted, the persistence of clientelism was such that
"idealistic" attempts for political and structural reform,
soon reverted to "pragmatism", that is, acceptance of the
status quo while several "new politicians" followed the
example of more traditional patrons and founded new "local"
parties (Mavrogordatos 1983: 82-87).
However, the inter-war period witnessed a transformation
in the political sphere as beside the Persistence of
clientelist politics, and the existence of a multitude of
"local" Parties, emerged the "charismatic leadership" of King
-143-
Constantine and of Eleftherios Venizelos, and an essentially
. bi-polar, multi-party system. The significance of these
changes was that they tended to set limits to the flexibility
and political mobility of local and national clientelist
bosses, as the allegiance, or lack of allegiance, to the
charismatic leader and the creation of a "political
consciousness" on the basis of the national schism, were
progressively gaining equal importance with the clientelistic
loyalties (Mavrogordatos 1982: 33-34).
However, the dominant class, affected by the military
defeat of 1922, which led to the abrupt end of the
irredentist ideology of "Megan Idea" (Grand Idea) and its
consequent ideological divestment and problematic
legitimation, took a defensive stance and eventually resorted
to the physical and symbolic repression of the emerging
working class activism, and of the Communist Party. According
to Diamandouros
"Indeed, anticommunism and the defensive mentality
that it represents and exemplifies can be regarded
as the mechanism employed by the Greek middle class
to fill the ideological vacuum created by the
collapse of the Great Idea, following the defeat in
Asia Minor. Put somewhat differently, anticommunism
was the ideological instrument of legitimation
adopted by a weak, fragile and insecure liberal
regime faced with a situation marked by territorial
loss, psychological withdrawal, a profound sense of
malaise, moral crisis and despair, and by the need
to consolidate itself against real or perceived
enemies, external or internal." (Diamandouros 1981:
•	 7)
Indeed, facing the prospect of the loss of its hegemonic
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supremacy, the dominant class attempted to rebuild its
hegemony upon an anticommunist ideology. The establishment of
the Metaxas dictatorship, in 	 contrast to the numerous
previous coups d'etat which constituted forms of
intra-dominant class political conflict (Veremis 1977) and
reflected the relative autonomy of politics, was the first
dynamic political reaction to the potential threat to the
hegemonic arrangements, posed from below. The destruction of
the clientelist networks during the German occupation that
followed the Metaxas dictatorship, the massive support of the
rural population to the Communist-led resistance coalition,
EAM, and the civil war that followed the liberation of
Greece, were some of the decisive factors which led to the
institutionalization	 of	 processes	 of	 exclusion and
intolerance under the ideological guise of	 the threat of
communism in the post-war period.
The post-War period: aspects of continuity and change. 
World War II and the civil war which followed it had
quite important economic, cultural and political
consequences for Greek society. The destruction of the
country's industry, productive infrastructure and the
disorganization of its economy in general had altered the
economic and social map of the country.
A series of factors such as the suspension of
"democratic" political life which had been imposed by the
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Metaxas dictatorship and went on throughout the German
occupation, EAM's	 efforts to establish more participatory
political institutions in the countryside during the
occupation, in an attempt to organize the rural populations
and to prepare its post-war power base, had dismantled the
traditional patronage networks which constituted the most
important channel of integration of the rural population to
national politics. What is more, the problem of mass
destitution that followed the war constituted a potential
threat to the fragile legitimation of state power. As regime
viability imperatives coincided with the emerging U.S.
post-war policy objectives for European reconstruction (i.e.
the Truman doctrine for the restoration of national economies
of 1947 and the Marshall plan), two basic aims were set. The
first priority was the achievement of national, social and
economic integration of the population, while the second
concerned the closely related process of strengthening the
role of the post-war state (Vergopoulos 1981).
While most other western European states were responding
to the challenges of reconstruction and to crises of
legitimation by developing welfare institutions, the Greek
political elites chose a more "traditional" and familiar way:
A rather rapid establishment of 'modernized' patronage
networks seemed to be the most effective means of securing
legitimation and, at the same time, increasing their control
over a substantial part of the population. However, as we
have pointed out there were numerous obstacles for an
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enterprize of	 this sort. First, the	 establishment of
national, social and economic integration was dependent
upon the "restoration" of the petty bourgeois strata and
their political presence, as they were perceived to be a
reliable source of potential domestic support for the
reproduction and stabilization of the regime (Vergopoulos
1981).
The achievement of such a task was undertaken by the
state whose responsibility for the creation of the petty
bourgeoisie was both direct and indirect: In the first case
it resorted to the traditional method of recruitment for the
civil service and the numerous state controled organizations
and companies, creating in this way the problem of a
gigantic state with an enormous bureaucratic organization the
creation of which did not correspond to any productivity
increase imperatives.
On the other hand, as most economic activities were
dependent upon a series of loans permits and licences
established by the increasingly bureaucratic state, a system
of allocation of access, or influence privileges over the
distribution of public as well as foreign aid funds and
resources was established which eventually led to the
creation of a mass of self-employed professionals who were
more or less dependent on the redistributive and reproductive
functions of the post-war state. This policy of "social
engineering" soon proved succesful, as the mass of the petty
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bourgeois strata were integrated to the reestablished
clientelistic networks, thus providin g a conservative basis
for the legitimation of the status quo. Soon, as their per
capita earnings increased due to the rise of invisible
earnings, the growth of the paraeconomy and
industrialization, the hegemony of the dominant groups was
based on the promotion of a "dynamic pattern of consumption"
(Dedoussopoulos 1987: 27-34; also Tsoukalas 1986b: 287-316).
However this dynamic pattern of consum ption, coupled with the
industrialization which reached its pre-war levels in 1954
(Tsoukalas 1981: 110), and despite its disappointing increase
rates in the following decade, was soon to affect the
post-war consensus and more importantly, its social base.
During the 1950s and early 1960s as a result of the
process of urbanization a considerable increase in the
investments in the field of housing construction was observed
(Burgel 1976: 383). The relativel y low prices in the housing
market, combined with the continuously increasing incomes
soon resulted to the formation of a society of small-property
owners. Urban property ownership, became a widespread
Phenomenon, in many cases being a substitute for land
ownership in the rural areas of Greece. This easy access to
housing ownership constituted both an economic and an
ideological mechanism for the " petty-embourgoisment" of Greek
society, which was of major significance as far as the
Post-war developments were concerned. On the other hand, it
should be pointed out that the sharp rise in investment in
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the housing industry, although it could be used as a
barometer of the economic situation, at the same time
constituted the basis of a fragile development as this form
of economic growth was dependent upon the political and
economic conjuncture and could easily be reversed. Indeed, as
it has been argued, the rapid development of the housing
construction sector affected the structure of the Greek
economy as a whole as it diverted needed investment from
sectors of the economy - notably the industrial sector -
which could reduce the country's economic dependence and
constitute a solid basis for long-term growth (Burgel 1976:
394, Dedoussopoulos 1987: 31, Vergopoulos 1986).
Indicative of this pattern of "fragile development" were
the developments in the industrial sector. Although the
technical and economic planning, combined with the
introduction of a liberal legal framework concerning the
regulation of foreign investments during the 1950s had
created favourable conditions, such as preferential low rates
for the use of public goods, and relaxing of the currency
export regulations for foreign investors (Mouzelis 1978:
27-8), and prepared the ground, and eventuall y attracted,
foreign - and some domestic - capital investments, it has
been demonstrated that this type of capital investment
perpetuated and enhanced the underdevelopment of the Greek
economy, as the chosen pattern of industrialization was based
on, and reproduced, technological and financial dependence
(Dedoussopoulos 1987: 30, Vergopoulos 1986: 27), and the
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beneficial effects of its growth were transfered abroad
(Mouzelis 1978: 29).
Although the importance of industrial investment should
not be disregarded, there is ample evidence to support the
argument that the economic development of the country was
premised on the rapid growth - apart from the housing
construction and technical industr y - of the services sector,
with particular emphasis on the tourist and maritime
transportation industry (Fotopoulos 1985: 94-99; Karapostolis
1984: 206) while the rapid growth of incomes in Greece
between the years 1960-75 was achieved through the massive
export of labour to industrialized countries, and the high
demand in maritime transportation which was characteristic of
the period. Thus, if we take into account the positive,
albeit ephemeral, impact of invisible earnings (mainly income
generated by the maritime transportation sector, from
remittances of Greek migrants to their families and by the
tourist industry) which occasionally reached 20% of the GDP
(OECD, Economic Studies: Greece; quoted in Vergopoulos 1986:
189), it is quite clear that the pattern of growth of the
Greek economy would not be easily sustained in adverse
international economic conditions. 9 Behind the facade of a
rapidly developing economy, the reality was one of easy and
ephemeral growth without the necessar y institutional and
social transformation for modernization and sustained
development (Vergopoulos 1986: 169-203).
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Despite its	 fragility, this	 process of	 economic
development,	 characterized by the creation of employment
opportunities,	 the	 extension	 of	 house	 ownership,
diversification of sources of family and individual income
(Karapostolis 1984: 227-229) combined with substantial
injections of imported income through the remittances from
Greek migrant workers, which su pplemented rural and petty-
bourgeois family incomes, led to the formation of new
consumption patterns and to the progressive convergence of
consumption patterns of different social strata, especially
between the urban and rural populations (Karapostolis 1984).
As it has already been mentioned, these aspects of
Greece's economic development constituted the basis of the
post-war "hegemony" circumventing the potential problems the
emergence of an industrial proletariat would entail. 10 The
convergence and creation of new consumption patterns based on
the availabilit y of new and multiple sources of income, had
such a profound effect that consumption became one of the
prominent modes of 'social hypostatization' (Karapostolis
1984: 269). In a society with limited opportunities for
upward social mobility 11 the sphere of consumption - and the
practice of conspicuous consumption - became a central
activity,12 a reaction to the inequalities and discrimination
which were reproduced in the socio-economic sphere and a way
of transcending.them (Karapostolis: 250-51).
Thus, the distribution of imported wealth and its impact
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in the sphere of consumption constituted an important form of
socio-economic integration and the basis of consensus
formation or at least reduced and put under control social
tensions and conflicts, and helped to maintain the bases of
the social, economic and, to an extent, the political status
quo (Vergopoulos 1986: 188).
However, at the political level, the situation was
considerably different. The civil war ended with the total
defeat of the Left and its anti-capitalist project. The
post-civil war state did not express a balance of power
between contradictory social forces. On the contrary it
manifested the dominance of the victors. Thus, while the
Greek state attempted to retain a semblance of democratic
legality through the introduction of a new constitution, and
the re-establishment of parliamentary democracy, it
introduced a number of administrative and legal "emergency"
measures in the post-war constitutional order. This was
achieved by "institutionalizing" the supremacy of the latter
over the former within the framework of a "constitutional
dualism" (Alivizatos 1981: 220-228; 1986, esp. 447-600). This
dualism made possible the formal political integration of
those who could be	 classified	 "nationally minded"
(ethnikofrones) through the 1952	 liberal constitution,
while	 the	 "emergency"	 legal	 and	 administrative
para-constitutional framework (parasyndagna) excluded those
who were not considered to be loyal to the regime, and
sanctioned the coercive core of the Post-war state.	 This
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institutionalization of anti-communism was not confined to
banning the communist party or to the persecution of those
who had activel y supported the communist part y and related
organizations, but was extended to the creation of a network
of state organizations and government departments dedicated
to the cate gorization of the population on the basis of
expressed or even suspected Political allegiance or
sympathies, not only of the individuals concerned, but also
of even distant relatives and friends. This categorization
was used as the premise of systematic discrimination against
those who were classified as sympathetic to the communist
Cause and made possible the establishment of exclusivist
political structures. 	 On the	 other hand,	 by issuing
certificates of "healthy social beliefs", the part of the
po pulation which supported the established right-wing
hegemonic project was preferentially treated, and was able to
gain access to the significant resources and employment
opportunit y offered by the state, and state-controlled
organizations and enterprises.
Another aspect of this constitutional dualism was the
central position of the Greek army in post-war politics.
Despite the typical introduction of the 1952 constitution and
re-establishment of a parliamentary system, the army 13 had
established its tutelage over the political process, by
setting the limits of acceptable political action or reform
(Haralambis 1985; 1989) and b y guaranteeing the supremacy of
the para-constitution and of the crYptogovernment operating
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outside the formal political institutions.
This exclusivist and coercive political system, soon
became incongruent with the process of economic integration
associated with the economic development, as the reasons of
its reproduction were increasingly becoming irrelevant and
losing their tenuous legitimacy. Whereas social tensions were
considerably reduced as a result of the economic processes
outlined above, the rigid political system was reproducing
divisions and tensions through its inbuilt institution-
alization of exclusion and coercion (Haralambis 1989:
184-200) thus endangering the reproduction of consensus. As
it has already been pointed out, political exclusion meant
simultaneously economic exclusion, and therefore negation of
the integrative effects of the process of economic
development, as access to the benefits of this development,
participation in the sphere of consumption was to a certain
extent linked with access to clientelistic networks and to
the state which was denied to the victims of the processes of
political exclusion.
It is in this context, of the incongruence, and in some
cases, contradiction between the process of social
integration through participation in the market, and the
process of political exclusion, that the political events in
post-war Greek society can be interpreted. It highlights the
importance of the army - the real centre of power - in
frustrating attempts and demands for the modernization and
-154-
rationalization of the political system 24 and the reasons
for the 1967 coup d' etat.
It could be argued that the 1967 coup and the ensuing
dictatorship constituted the ultimate attempt to counter the
tendencies and efforts to modernize the political system
through the activation of the "contractual" content of the
inactive 1952 constitution, and therefore, to rationalize the
modes of political integration through the establishment of
Political democracy. The dictatorship, in fact, in its
attempt to perpetuate the exclusivist political system by
reversing the slow process towards the "normalization" of
parliamentary democracy (Diamandouros 1983: 52), tried to
introduce a semblance of political normalization by
integrating the para-constitution and the constitution in a
single constitutional text (Alivizatos 1981: 228), that is,
by giving to the former, formal parity to constitutional
rules, and by turning the "exceptional" emergency character
of the post-civil-war regime into a permanent one, while the
colonels' regime based its legitimation on the forms of
economic integration that have been outlined.
The fall of the dictatorship signified the collapse of
the post-war balance of political power, as the army lost its
privileged position in the political structure, and the
para-constitution Was abolished. The political scenery
changed as the vacuum left by the demise of the old centres
of political power was Boon filled by the political parties
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of the post-dictatorship period as what has been called "the
state of the parties" (Karabelias 1989: 167), that is, the
Greek equivalent of the Italian "partitocrazia" emerged in
the political landscape- 1 B In very little time the political
parties managed to establish their hegemonic role in areas of
political, cultural or other social activity. The
post-dictatorship period is characterized by the colonization
of economic, trade union, cultural, and other "voluntary"
associations by political party organizations to the extent
that most spheres of social life become arenas for party
competition. It is characteristic that in this period emerged
four major peace, women's, or students' "movements" dominated
by the four major political parties. Similar divisions,
reflecting party antagonisms could be seen in most trade
union, technical, scientific, commercial or cultural
associations and organizations (see Mavrogordatos 1988). The
impact of the "colonization" of social life by the political
parties was highly significant in two respects. First, the
political parties gradually managed to displace other forms
of social and political representation, and to effectively
monopolize the universe of Political discource, and to
dominate the processes of articulation of "legitimate"
political, or social issues. This ability of the political
parties to shape the outlines of the "definitions of the
situation" was reinforced as the main signifying agents, that
is, the media of mass communication, have until recently been
under the influence or control of the major political
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parties, as I shall attempt to demonstrate later, reproducing
therefore a closed, Party-dominated universe of discourse.
This occupation of "strategic" positions in social and
political life by political parties permitted and perpetuated
the continuation of practices of extra-institutional
political integration, notably of clientelistic practices.
However, it should be pointed out that the collapse of the
post-civil-war political structures had also affected the
conditions under which the clientage networks could be
reconstituted after the fall	 of the dictatorship; the
progressive transformation of the political parties from
parties of personalities to centralized political
organizations gradually reduced the importance of individual
patrons, and transformed considerabl y the relations of
clientage as political parties assumed the role of the
patron, and party members became the clients.
This adaptation of clientelism to a party-dominated
political system was appropriate to the fundamental choice of
the political party leaderships to sustain the consumption
Patterns which had emerged during the period of rapid
economic growth, although the economic crises of the
seventies and the repatriation of migrant workers had
affected adversely the economic situation of the country.
This decision entailed the reproduction and expansion of the
distributive role of the state, sustained bY external and
internal borrowing,	 and therefore the creation of a
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hydrocephalous public sector which functioned mainly for the
meeting the needs of the bureaucratic clientelist system (see
for example Tsoukalas 1986b; Lyrintzis 1984).
The new clientelistic practices	 were coupled with
populist rhetorics which reproduced extra-institutional forms
of political integration and perpetuated the "privatization"
and political other-determination of the "citizens". With
differing deg rees of success, both "Left" and "Right" wing
parties addressed a homogenous, indivisible community, the
people; denying in this way the social divisions, the
plurality of conflicting and contradictory collective
interests. If recognized, they would fuel demands for social
and political integration on the basis of contractual
regulation of conflicting collective interests - that is,
through the activation of the "content" of the liberal
democratic institutional framework - and therefore threaten
the parties' central position in the political systemic
State, Political Parties and Civil Society. 
The above historical and sociological analysis shows
that the circumstances under which the Greek State was formed
in the nineteenth century were quite different from those
which lead to the emergence of western European states.
Despite differences among western societies, it is generally
argued that the processes of the formation of the modern
state in western Europe were inextricabl y linked with the
-158-
simultaneous creation of a legally recognized domain free of
state intervention and control, the civil society. 17
Although the reasons for the formation of civil society
as a social domain of non-state activity, are of course quite
complex, it could be argued that the specific role the state
was called to assume in the context of the rise of capitalism
has definitely been one of the main factors in the emergence
and consolidation of civil society. More precisely, the
non-interventionist, restricted role of the state in early
capitalism left free space for autonomous, voluntary social
organizations and activities to be established. In this way,
a number of social organizations expressing social solidarity
and cooperation could be considered to be part of the civil
society as all of them were characterized by their voluntary,
public and non-state character.
However, the Greek state was formed under completely
different circumstances and assumed a quite different role
from that of its western counterparts. I have already
demonstrated that the social dynamics that led to the
formation of the modern state were absent in the Greek case.
As a matter of fact, the Greek state was not formed after a
long historical process which in the case of other European
states coincided with the period of absolutism (Anderson
1974); rather, the Greek state was "forced" into existence
and built not as the outcome of a long social process, but
"in the image" of its western counterparts (see for example
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Tsoukalas 1986a: 108-109).
In addition to this, as no distinct class or social
group had been able to become sociall y dominant, it became
quite clear that the struggle for the acquisition of
political power would become the prevalent feature of Greek
society throughout the nineteenth century. In this context,
the state became the "apple of discord" among the elites
which emerged during the war of independence. The importance
of the state in Greece soon meant that its "colonization" by
the contesting political elites of the early 19th century,
would eventually turn into the "colonization" of the society
by the state, as the logic of clientelism would gradually
erode social life. The very nature of clientelism, based on
the centrality of the state and its distributive capacities
in Greek society was a major force which prevented the
formation of autonomous social organizations and the
consolidation of social practices and institutions that would
resist the colonization of society by the state.
Eventually, the persistence of clientelistic practices
and the centrality of the state became an impotrtant aspect
of Greek political culture: social aspirations or
dissatisfaction took the form of individual demands towards
the state which were channelled through, and dealt with in
the clientelistic networks. What is more, the "vertical"
organization of clientelistic networks and the consequent
fragmentation - or quite often, individualization - of
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collective experiences rendered the development of forms of
autonomous collective action and the formation of a strong
network of voluntary associations characteristic of civil
society almost impossible.
As Diamandouros remarked,
Prompted by this vacuum (of voluntary
organizations), the state ... has ste pped into much
of the territor y that properly belongs to voluntary
associations. The result has been a pronounced
state paternalism that, in turn, has severely
impeded the development of autonomous voluntary
associations. (Diamandouros 1985: 58).
These tendencies towards state paternalistic
interventions in social life became a prominent feature of
social and economic life after the end of World War II, and
especially after the civil war.
The destruction of the pre-war clientelistic networks
which constituted the predominant form of social and
political integration provided the opportunity for a
renegotiation and reorganization of the boundaries between
the state and civil society. However, the civil war which
followed the liberation of the country, and its prolonged
consequences as they were reflected in the dominant political
culture of the time (Tsoukalas 1981), facilitated and
eventually led to, not only the restoration of the "ancien
regime", but also to the establishment of new distributive,
"social engineering ", and social control tasks. As it has
been pointed out above, the survival of the post- war regime
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was dependent upon processes of political exclusion and
economic integration which were both linked with increased
coercion and control state functions on the one hand, and a
new and expanded distributive, and more generally economic,
role on the other.
The importance of the establishment of a social control
state lay both in its ability to resort to the use of
physical force against its opponents, or against "political
deviance", and in its ability to legally impose and enforce
restrictions on activities which could be considered to be
subversive. In this context, the state denied cultural
activities such as literature, arts, and other forms of
communication, their autonomy by enforcing restrictive
measures, monitoring cultural activity and the flow of
information. l e Another manifestation of the social control
function of the post-civil-war state was its paternalistic
intervention in trade unions as the case of the notorious
state involvement in the affairs of the Greek General
Confederation of Labour indicates (Diamandouros, 1983: 58)
which led to the fragmentation and neutralization of the
labour movement.
As far as the distributive and economic role of the
post-war state are concerned it could be ar gued that the
necessity of creating consensus after the civil-war made
imperative the achievement of rapid economic development, and
especially, the	 distribution of	 its benefits to the
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population. As it has already been argued, it was this
necessity of the regime to achieve economic integration of
through participation in the sphere of consumption that
initiated, or rather accelerated the process of expansion of
the civil service and of the state controlled sector of the
economy, a persistent feature of contemporary Greece.
The fall of the dictatorship signalled the end of the
coercive, exclusivist political structures, but did not
affect the distributive role of the state. On the contrary,
as the growth rates of the 1960s and early 1970s could no
longer be sustained, the state attempted to maintain the
consumption patterns of the population by offering employment
or other clientelistic benefits and rewards, by suppressing
the levels of unemployment through the assumption of control
of economic sectors which were "deserted" by private
investors and by undertaking responsibilit y for their debts,
increasing in this way its involvement in social and economic
life.
Greek Political Culture: some conclusions. 
Using this brief analysis of some of the most important
parameters of Greek social and political life, we can now
proceed to a discussion of Greek political culture.
As I haye suggested, one of the most significant
aspects of a political culture is the relationship between
the citizen and politics, that is, the wa y people understand,
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define, and come into contact with the political sphere. As
it has been pointed out (pp. 130ff), one of the main
characteristics of modern Greek politics is what C. Tsoukalas
has termed "the 'overpoliticization' of the Greeks, their
pathos for politics and public affairs" (Tsoukalas, 1977:
100-105).
A recent survey of political attitudes and behaviour in
the countries of the European South (Greece, Italy, Portugal
and Spain) provided empirical support for this Conclusion as
its findings indicated that among the countries of the
European South (Mavrogordatos et al. 1988; Kafetzis 1988),
Greece ranked top in terme of interest, understanding and
positive orientations towards politics. What is more, as
another attitude survey indicates, the levels of interest in
politics in Greece are among the highest in the European
Community (Eurobarometer, June 1983).
However, the validity of such an - unqualified - claim
is doubtful, as these surveys have attempted to provide
comparative data without taking into account the particular
ways in which "politics" has become, and is, understood and
actualized in each of the societies in question. In this way
the unqualified term 'politics' is more mystifying than
enlightening as it is used in survey questions as an
a-historical, universal term, outside its particular cultural
context.
As Tsoukalas points out, the interest of Greeks in
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politics can be interpreted according to the particular way
in which political power and political representation were
developed in Greece (Tsoukalas 1977: 101). Although the
initial relation between the population and the "alien" and
virtually "artificial" establishment of centralized western
political institutions was one of mistrust, it soon evolved
into an "instrumental" relationship. Clientelism, and later
bureaucratic clientelism reproduced the idea of the state as
a neutral instrument, able to satisfy sectional and private
needs and, indeed, a review of political practices since the
19th century provides ample evidence that this was the case.
As competing elites saw politics as an essential activity for
their survival, and the state as a domain that had to be
conquered for this purpose, the rest of the population,
through its incorporation in clientelistic networks,
eventually cane to realize that access to the protection of
organized political power could guarantee security, and offer
privileges, employment and status.
Thus, contrary to the ideology of liberal democracy,
which has been an important element in cultural
representations of the state in Western Europe and North
America, in Greece the state has not been regarded as the
expression of a social "contractual" relationship between
citizens, as an expression of collective interests but rather
as an instrument for the satisfaction of individual, private
interests. The very nature of the prominent mode of political
incorporation, that is, clientelism has played a significant
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role in the "individualization" and "privatization" of
political experience and practice, as the establishment of
vertical relationships has constituted a serious obstacle for
the formation of collective, interpersonal political or
politically-related experiences and action.
In this way the understanding and actualization of
politics, and the relationship between the citizen and
poliitical power acquire a particular meaning as politics
becomes an essentially private activity, which however
retains a formal semblance of publicness. Thus participation
in public political occasions, such as elections, public
meetings, electoral campains, debates or membership in
political parties, could be interpreted as the "necessary"
public manifestations of an essentially private activity,
oriented towards private gains and benefits. It is on the
basis of this particular nature of political experiences and
practices,	 that we can understand the vague distinction
between private and public sphere (Demertzis 1988b: 85), the
"state fetishism" (kratolatria), the obsessive
Preoccupation with politics in everyday life and the
excessive politicization of the press (Tsoukalas 1977: 102)
which have been persistent features of Greek political
culture.
It should also be emphasized that the "private"
character of politics in Greek political culture perpetuates
the heteronomy of the "isolated" individual and indicates
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acceptance of the social and political status quo in
principle, as Participation in political life appears to
constitute an attempt to make the most of the existing
situation, but hardly indicate any willingness to alter it.
This view is further reinforced by the low interpersonal
trust which ap pears to be characteristic of modern Greek
society (Demertzis 1990b: 94; Eurobarometer, June 1986; also
Tsoukalas 1977: 103; Lipowatz 1988: 91-94) which appears to
sustain the privatization and fragmentation of society and
the limited scope for collective action and the formation of
collective identities which might challenge aspects of the
political and social status quo and end their "heteronomy".
Finall y, it would seem to me, that another important
aspect of Greek political culture, which has played a major
role in the maintenance of a "closed" universe of discourse
and more generally, political sphere, is the phenomenon of
political party predominance over social life. As it has
already been pointed out, the phenomenon of "party democracy"
emerged in the period that followed the fall of the colonels'
dictatorship. Taking advantage of the power vacuum that
followed it, the political parties occupied crucial positions
in the political system and in society which permitted them
to adapt the traditional clientelistic system to their
advantage and become mediators between their clients and the
state. Thus their clientelistic practice continued in the
form of bureaucratic clientelism, that is, through the
transformation of the traditional clientelistic system which
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had been based on the formation of personal relationships,
into a system characterized by the predominance of
party/member, or party/supporter relationships. Thus,
clientelism continues to reproduce the "private" character of
politics, and therefore to	 perpetuate actual political
alienation, especially as political parties lack internal
democratic structures 	 that might	 make their activity
accessible and intelligible to their membership.
As social and political integration is achieved through
individual support and loyalty to political parties, the
latter have managed to virtually dominate the political
universe of discource, the political communication channels
and more generall y to succesfully overcome and eliminate
alternative forms of social or political representation, or
collective action which might constitute a threat to their
dominant position in society (Haralambis 1989: 323). It could
therefore be argued that the Greek political culture is
characterized by increased interest 	 in politics,	 and
participation in political life. However politics, is
understood and actualized as an essentially private activity
aiming towards personal gain.
Although social life appears overpoliticized, politics
is devoid of its social content, the universe of discourse is
closed to discourses which might challenge the privatized
character of politics, and threaten the political and social
power relations. Thus, the Greek political culture has
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discouraged grassroots political and social initiatives while
it has encouraged the formation and re production of "parties
of personalities", or mass parties under the tutela ge of
strong individual or collective leadershi ps operating within
the framework of a clientelistic or bureaucratic
clientelistic political system. In other words, according to
the typology of political culture introduced by Mainwaring
and Viola (see pp. 76-77 above), the Greek political culture
is characterized by the predominance of "ri ght authoritarian"
and	 "left	 authoritarian"	 practices,	 values	 and
_
interpretations of the political. "Political" experience is
fragmented or individualized, and the degree of political
alienation renders political action effectively incapable to
alter the life conditions and to achieve some form of
self-determination and autonomy of the individual. It is
important to point out that 'political alienation' does not
refer to low membership or party support levels, or to lack
of partici pation in politics, it rather refers to the
inability of the individualized citizens to realize the
social and political role of the state and the political
parties in the reproduction of relations of domination and
exploitation.
CHAPTER 5
THE ATHENS DAILY PRESS; AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The development of the Greek Press 
in the 19th century 
The publication of the first Greek newspapers did not
take place in predominantly Greek-populated areas. In fact,
the first Greek-language newspapers appeared in Central
Europe (in the Austro-Hungarian Empire) at the end of the
18th century, and a little later in Western Europe, mainly in
France and Britain (Karykopoulos 1984: 11-31; Koumarianou
1371: 5'-ig'; Jusdanis 1991: 129-135). These first
Greek-language newspapers were mainl y literary or rather
"cultural" papers, containing articles and commentary on
cultural and language issues and providing a forum for
_
philosophical debates. They were promoted by the Greek
speaking	 intelligentsias	 which	 established	 the
pre-revolutionary Greek-language press in Central and Western
•
Europe, to spread the doctrines and ideas of western
Enlightenment among the Greek speaking populations of the
Balkans and Asia Minor, as well as of the diaspora, in an
attempt to disassociate the Greek "nation" from Ottoman
dominance and its Ottoman past and to "reintroduce Greece
into the western 'civilized' world".
If we take into account the fact that these attempts to
publish newspapers in the Greek	 language, and for
Greek-speaking publics	 coincided with the outbreak of
nationalist movements in South-Eastern Europe, and especially
the Ottoman Empire, it is not surprizing that this
"westernist" stance of the Greek press was reflectin g and, at
the same time aiming at, the formation of a Greek national
consciousness (Enepekidis 1965; Jusdanis 1991: 129-135).
When the Greek war of independence eventually broke out,
the first attempts to establish newspapers in the liberated
areas took place, though not always with a great success. In
1821 the first manuscript newspapers appeared in an attempt
to mobilize the Greek speaking populations of Hersos Ellas
against Ottoman rule (Koumarianou 1971: e'-k'; Karykopoulos
1984: 33), while at the end of the same year the first
Printed newspaper, "Salpinx Elliniki" [Greek Trumpet], was
published in the Peloponnese. However, even though its
publisher, Theoclitos Pharmakidis, was one of the very few
intellectuals who had gained considerable experience and
skills through his involvement in the publication of
Greek-language newspapers in Central and Western Europe and
who would guarantee the paper's success, the paper was
published for only a short period. Mainly due to
Pharmakidis's determination not to acce pt the measure of
preventive censorship the local revolutionary government
wanted to impose,1 8 the short lifespan of "Salpinx Elliniki"
was by no means untypical of the emerging Greek press of the
early post-independence period. Indeed, the paper's closure
was one of the	 first manifestations	 of the uneasy
relationship between the emergent Press and the
administrations (see Koumarianou 1971: kb'). Thus, subsequent
attempts to publish newspapers seem to have had a similar
fate to that of "Salpinx Elliniki", as similar obstacles
drove important newspapers as "Ta Ellinika Chronika" [Greek
Chronicles] and "I Efimeris ton Athinon" [Newspaper of
,Athens) to cease publication in 1826.
During the first decade of the independence war, the
liberation of many relatively small regions and the
establishment of several different local administrations, in
conjunction with the tradition of "multicentrism" as the
prevailing form of government in the Ottoman empire
determined some of the characteristics of the press of the
first revolutionary years. The newspapers of this period were
not a voice for the liberated ,areas as a whole; they rather
reflected the political fragmentation of the revolutionary
and early post-independence administrations and the
dependence of the emerging press on these authorities. The
majority of the newspapers were affiliated, or linked in
some way with the numerous local administrations the
decisions and laws of which appeared regularly in their pages
along with news about the developments taking place in the
war of independence.
The dependence of the press on the regional authorities
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was quite evident as the publication of most newspapers was
discontinued, or their offices and equipment were relocated
every time there was a change in the seat of a local
administration. Although the impact war operations had on the
operation of the press during the war years should not be
underestimated, it should be pointed out that the relocation
of the newspapers whenever the seat of a local administration
was moved, is IN strong indication that local societies in
Greece could not "sustain" the press of the period, in the
sense that the social conditions for its emergence did not
exist at the time. It could be argued instead that the press
was closely associated with the regional political and
administrative bodies, the political elites, and the public
sphere they sustained, ls and therefore its viability was
dependent upon its (political and geographical) proximit y to
the centres of political and administrative activity.
In June 1827 the first national newspaper and, as
Koumarianou argues, one of the best of the period, the
"Geniki Efimeris tie Ellados" [General Newspaper of Greece]
, faced a serious cripis when its director Theoklitos
Farmakidis, protesting once again against the lack of respect
for the independence of the press by the administration,
resigned (Koumarianou: 	 Apparently Farmakidis's
resignation was due to the decision taken by the Third
National Assembly of Troizina to appoint Count Ioannis
Capodistrias as the first Governor of Greece but his
objections were probably not directed towards the person of
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Capodistrias, but towards his political project; the
creation of a more centralized administration with a powerful
executive.
In fact, it reflected the confrontation between the two
main political projects of the time, in which the press
quickly became enmeshed; that is, the confrontation between
•
those supporting a less centralized model of government which
would be more prone to "colonization" b y personalities and
-
political factions which had traditional local authority, or
military or economic power, or which had gained political
Capital through their involvement in the independence war,
and, on the other hand, those which would favour a more
"centralized state with a powerful executive at the expense of
most of those politically aspiring persons and groupings. It
is not surprizing that the press had been deeply involved in
these confrontations throughout the 19th century,. given the
association of newspapers with political factions in the
context of the developing patronage networkiii which were soon
to beceme a prominent feature of political and Social life.
As the establishment and international recognition of the
boundaries of the Greek State and the consolidation of a
central government during the governorship of Ioannis
Capodistrias minimized the Ottoman threat and intensified the
social and political divisions and conflicts, it became clear
that the press would be a POwerful weapon in the hands of
these aspiring political elites against the governments of
Governor Capodistrias, and, later, King Otto.
-174-
Thus, the establishment of a more centralised state bY
the first Uovernor, loannis Capodistrias, in the period
lbze-113:31	 and the absolutist regime of King Utto which
followed it, had important
nevelopment of the Ureek press
consequences as far as the
was concerned. First, the two
regimes introduced new legislation which restricted the
freedom of the press, provided for preventive censorship and
confiscation of newspapers and established various obstacles
for the publication of newspapers and books. 20 As a
consequence of these measures, especially during the reign of
King Utto, newspapers 	 had to cope with continuous
- confiscations, while journalists had to face attacks and
abuse, prosecutions, jail sentences or, as a last resort,
they had to default and go into hiding.21
However, the temporary suspension of the constitution
by Uovernor Capodistrias and King Utto's determination not to
accept or grant a constitution provided a fertile ground for
the expression of these conflicts through the "constitutional
question"; a question which was bound to occupy the pages of
almost every breek newspaper, as well as political life in
general, for years to come. It is during this period that the
preoccupation with the constitutional problem and the
underlying social antagonisms led to a progressive shift of
emphasis from news reporting to political comment, or comment
related to political personalities and issues. So profound
was this change that the space dedicated to comment in the
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newspapers soon became disproportionately larger than that
reserved for news reporting . Comment; in its various forms
(mainl y "chronografima", political satire and caricature),
became thus an integral and important characteristic of Greek
newspapers. Its importance can be demonstrated by the huge
expansion of commentary, political satire and caricature
developed by literar y figures - famous novelists, poets and
artists. 22
The Emergence of the "Party-political Press". 
The agreement of King Otto to grant the 1644
constitution and to respect the decisions taken by the newly
established representative legislature and the parliamentary
system as it has been developed during the reign of King
lieorge I, provided the political conditions for the
development of what has been called "party-political press";
a phenomenon which can only be understood in the context of
the general social and political changes which were taking
place at that period as a result of the introduction of the
parliamentary s ystem and of the effort of several .social
groups to take advantage of it and use it as a vehicle for
the foundation of their political power.23
For it was the change in the political structures,
notabl y, the constitutional concessions of King Otto and the
establishment of parliamentariam in Greece that provided a
unique opportunity For the realization of the primates and
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otner elites' desire to survive as a powerful social group.
It became the cornerstone of the construction or
sophisticated clientelist networks and led eventually to the
'seizure of the state by the advocates of the primates'
spirit.
It was therefore in this context of the adaptation of
parliamentarism and representative institutions to
clientelistic logic and practices, and or tne rormation of
parties of personalities, that the press aquired its
party-political role. Newspapers . operated within patronage
networks, and each paper came to assume the personality of
its patron, as well as that of the party their patron
supported.
It should be emphasized that the phenomenon of the
party-political press appeared in Ureece at a time when the
political parties, far from being bureaucratic ana
centralized organizations, were mainl y loose unions of
members of parliament around a political leader, that is,
Parties of personalities and not parties of principles
(MeYnaud 18/4: ZU0).
It follows that the press was only party-political in
the sense that newspapers of the period - far from adhering
to Political ideologies or supporting certain policies, Which
mi ght be advocated by a party with more or less concrete
ideological principles or political programme - were in fact
supporting, if not expressing, the views of particular
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political personalities, and were enmeshed in tne clientelist
networks of the period. Instead or being known for their
liberal, conservative or radical political orientations,
Greek newspapers were recognized by their relationship to
prominent politicians; such is the case of the "Ethnofylax"
(Guard of the NationJ (1662) which was supporting
Thrasivoulos Zaimis, the "Ethniko Ynevma" (National piritj
(1868-1876)	 which expressed the views of Alexandros
Koumoundouros, "1 Efimeris ton Syzitiseon" (The Newspaper or
Debates] (18(U-lb), faithful to	 Ep. Deligeorgis, the
"Proia" CflorningJ (1874-1904), eager supporter of Ih.
Diligiannis, and finall y the "Ora" LHourJ (1875-1888) and "Ui
Kairoi" [The TimesJ which had both been supporting Harilaos
Trikoupis 44nd advocating his innovative, for the period,
policies. It should however be pointed out that While all
those newspapers declined or even discontinued their
publication as soon as the political career of the
personality they supported had ended, in the case of "Ui
Kairoi", the newspaper seems to have outlived H. Trikoupis's
political end, and its commitment to innovative policies
appears to have persisted as it welcomed the political
changes brought about bY the 18U8 military intervention and
as after 181U it became a zealous supporter of Eleftherios
Venizelos and nis reformist policies.
-178-
The "Industrialization" of the Press. 
During the 16/Us, a combination of factors such as the
spread of literacy, the creation of a transportation
infrastructure, the constitutional guarantees of freedom of
the press which had been introduced in the constitution of
1864 (article 14) and the beginnings of "modern" advertising
created a more favourable climate for the activities or tne
press and eventually facilitated the economic and
technological expansion or tne press enterprises to such a
degree that it nas been argued - although with too much
enthusiasm - that 16(3 was the starting point of the
"industrial period"	 of the	 breek press	 (Mayer 195/;
Karykopoulos: 66).2+
More precisely, in the period between the 16/Us and the
. first decades of the ZUth century, new advanced printing
machinery and tecniques were imported, cooperation between
Greek newspapers and foreign press agencies such as Reuter,
and Stefani was established, while the first (ireek Press
agencies such as the "Spyros Tsagaris" newspaper agency
(1875), the telegraphic agency "tetanopolis" and the
semi-official "Athinaikon Praktoreion Eidiseon" LPIthens News
Agency) were founded. These changes resulted in the
improvement of the quality or news lin terms of speed of
diffusion and accuracy of inrormation), the specialization of
the newspaper personnel, the increase 0f the number of Pages
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of newspapers and, finally, improvements in the size and
format of the newspapers. What is more, new newspapers
emerged, 25 the publication of newspapers became more
frequent, and quite soon the majority of Athens newspapers
were being published on a daily basis, while the average life
span of newspapers became longer.
From an economic point of view, during this period the
press was transformed considerably, mainly in the sense that
since the lbrus, alongside newspapers which retained their
traditional characteristics as publishing ventures which did
not primarily operate under economic criteria, new press
organizations with a more enterpreneurial character emerged;
it is in those newspapers that the printing unit constituted
a more or less economic unit needing and pursuing the
attraction of capital and being enmeshed in relations of
economic competition, while advertising - especially during
the last years of the 19th century - emerged for the first
time as an additional, but not yet fully explored and
consequently decisive, source of income.
As these transformations were taking place, it could be
argued that from the 16170s the traditional type of Ureek
newspaper - that is, one of a small personal or family
business, with 	 limited personnel (one or two editors, no
j ournalists, free-lance or co-operating commentators,
non-existent or limited capital) - began to retreat slowlY,
although it proved to be remarkably resistant. Alongside it,
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a more commercial t ype of newspaper and newspaper operation
was emerging; the internal structure, the content, and mode
of operation of the most characteristic newspapers of this
kind during this period (such as the "Efimeris" [Newspaper]
published	 by D.	 Koromilas in	 1873, the	 "Akropolis"
[Acropolis] published by V. Gavriilidis in 1883, "I Estia"
[Vesta] launched initiall y as a magazine by a group of
writers and poets in 1876 until in 1894 its director G.
Drosinis turned it into a daily newspaper, D. Kalapothakis's
"Embros" [Forward] published in 1897 and Koussoulakos's
"Scrip") illustrate the sea change that was taking place at
the time.
Soon after the editing and printing innovations which
were introduced by the "Efimeris", in an effort to catch up
with their new competitors, other Athens dailies became
involved in an unprecedented, for the Greek press,
competition. Most influential in this formative period of the
Greek press was the "Akropolis", a newspaper which has
managed to survive throughout the 20th century and is still
published today. In his attempt to create a modern newspaper,
comparable with other leading European newspapers, its
founder and director Vlassis Gavriilidis imported advanced
technological printing equipment and was the first to
introduce	 interviews,	 reportage and	 other forms of
investigative journalism into the Greek press. At the same
time, he was the first	 to foresee the importance of
advertizing as a potential source of revenue for the press.
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However, it should be emphasized that these changes did
not affect the totality of the Greek press, but just a
handful of innovative newspapers which were nevertheless
obli ged to operate under a climate in which the press was
mainly an	 instrument for the realization	 of personal
political ambitions 26 in accordance with the general
political climate of the period in which political cleavages
existed between political personalities and not according to
differences of principle.
Therefore, as the political agenda was still fluid, and
political conflicts were not fought by parties of principle
but by parties organized around a person whose purpose was to
secure a clientele which would enhance their political
Position, newspapers constituted one of the means through
which this could be achieved. In this sense the readership of
a newspaper did not possess an economic value as such, but
constituted a mainly political asset, as a larger number of
readers became translated into more political power and
additional benefits for the publisher, editor, or patron of
the newspaper.
It is also true that the limited and weak
commercialization of a part of the Greek press brought about
an increasing awareness of the need to attract a larger
readership and made necessary the expansion of the newspapers
in terms of staff and contributors.e7 It is not surprizing
then, that	 during this period	 correspondents, regular
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commentators and contributors in the Athens dailies were also
some of the most important writers and artists. It is in this
climate that political satire -verse and caricature - the two
most developed genres in Greek journalism of the period,
blossomed.
Political satire and caricature: The 
hyper-politicization of the press 
Political satire, in its various forms, that is, prose,
verse and caricature has been one of the most prominent
characteristics of the Greek press since the reign of King
Otto. Initially, satire (in verse and caricature variants) -
due to the capacity of verse and image to appeal to a mass,
mainly non-literate, public 	 was a powerful means of
expression of the political conflict between the forces
supporting the absolutist and modernizing project of King
Otto's administrations on the one hand, and the traditional
social and political elites on the other.
As Kondogiorgis has argued (1885: 126-128), it was only
after the 1870s that satire, and especially political
caricature developed more "refined" and sophisticated
techniques of representation and reflected the emerging
social and political contradictions which became more
apparent through changes which were brought about by the
modernizing policies of the governments of A. Koumoundouros
and, more importantly, H. Trikoupie. 28 As satire constituted
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a key medium of Political confrontation and criticism it is
not surprizing that mans, quality newspapers of the period
began their publication as satirical papers. However, despite
the qualitative changes which commentators note, and despite
some exceptions which prove the rule, the techniques and
themes of satire continued to be influenced by the
traditional tendency to personalize political conflict - even
at a time of deep and extensive social transformation - and,
therefore, to reproduce elements of the hegemonic political
culture. It is in this context that we could interprete the
emphasis on personalities instead of issues, ideas and
policies, the hyper-politicization of social life (including
the press) to which Tsoukalas has drawn attention to
(Tsoukalas 1977: 100-105) and which has been discussed in
more detail in the previous chapter.
The 20th century; the first decades. 
One of the most striking aspects of the development of
the press in early 20th century Greece was the publication of
numerous new dailies. In an already saturated market, where a
limited number of readers was being offered an extremely high
number of political dailies and magazines, new daily
newspapers appeared throughout the first half of the
century.
This	 Period WEIS	 characterized by	 continuous
confrontation between the supporters of the traditional
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political establishment which had gathered around the
monarchy on the one hand, and social forces disillusioned bY
oligarchic parliamentarism. The latter gathered around the
liberal politician Eleftherios Venizelos and made demands for
economic, social and political change. This schism between
"pro-Venizelists" and "anti- Venizelists" led to a succession
of military coups, dictatorships, constitutional crises and
changes which eventually resulted in the establishment of the
dictatorship of Ioannis Metaxas in 1936, four years before
Greece's entry into the Second World War. In this context of
the national schism the personal character of Greek politics
adapted to the new political reality as numerous personal
political parties were formed, occupying a place in one of
the two main opposing camps.
This political situation had significant repercussions
as far as the press was concerned. Throughout this period
newspapers had to face a renewal of restrictive practices
such as preventive censorship, prosecution of publishers and
journalists and sometimes even the anger of and intimidation
by the supporters of the o pposite political camp. However,
what is more striking, and illustrative about the state of
the Greek press is the fact that ., j ust as we can see the
formation of numerous political parties, in the same way, we
can see the publication of numerous new political newspapers
with strong political attachments to specific political
figures.
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This tendenc y cannot be explained in terms of a high
level of market demand as one might expect, or as the
manifestation of the democratic sensitivity of certain
publishers and journalists as Karykopoulos has suggested
(1984). A more plausible interpretation would be based on
recognition of the particularity of the Greek political press
and the fact that in most cases newspapers were closely
linked with the promotion of specific political interests,
the expression of the views of certain political
personalities and usually functioned as either apologetic or
propaganda instruments for their political affiliates.
in this light, it is understandable why, with the
proliferation of political personalities, more newspapers
were published (see for example Peponis 1983: 114). There is
a continuity between the 19th and the 20th century, in the
tendency to perceive a newspaper not as an economic
enterprise but as a political asset. The typical outcome was
the publication of newspapers with no long term prospects,
either because of the instability of the political
situation, or because of the lack of any economic
considerations that might ensure their survival.
By the end of the period 1922-35, the saturation of the
market, which did damage even to the few dailies which were
struggling to operate in a more enterpreneurial manner, made
the publishers realize that their papers could not exist on
the limited income the y generated from the market and forced
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them to seek alternative ways of securing financial
resources. Since the most obvious and accessible source of
finance was the state, the tendency for the press to become
dependent on the state was gradually reinforced. Thus, the
limited dependency already established during the premiership
of H. Trikoupis, 23 through the mechanism of tax and duty
exemptions, gradually increased and involved new forms of
financial support of newspapers by the state and banking
capital.
Thus, it could be argued that the trends which
characterized the end of the 19th century continued to
develop throughout the first decades of the twentieth
century. Two distinct rationales concerning the function of
the press appear to have coexisted. According to the first,
emphasis should be placed on the pursuit of the organization
and operation of newspapers on the basis of commercial
criteria, away of strictly personal political allegiances;
hence the adoption of and search for basic principles which
would lead to the formation of a more or less stable
readership. In contrast, the second rationale depended on
traditional practices which continued to exist within the
press, that is, the treatment of newspapers as mainly
political ventures, not guided by purely economic interests.
Newspapers were consequently viewed as a means to secure
political benefits for their owners or their patrons, and
were linked mainly with the promotion of specific personal
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p olitical interests.
In this climate of two contradicting rationales,
characterized by the appearance, short life, and eventual
demise of numerous newspapers, appeared some dailies such as
"To Ethnos" [The Nation] (1913) by S. Nikolopoulos, the
"Eleftheron Vima" [Free Tribune] by D. Lambrakis, "I Vradyni"
[The Evening Paper] (1923) and "I Kathimerini" [The Daily]
(1919) by G. Vlachos which, along with the "Akropolis", were
successful.	 Despite	 temporary interruptions to their
publication throughout the period, they survived, most of
them to this day.
Another distinct case, in this period was the
publication of the "Rizospastis" [Radical] (1929) 3° as the
official instrument of the Socialist Workers' Party of Greece
(SEKE, later Communist Party of Greece or KKE). "Rizospastis"
clearly displayed the emblem of the Communist Party next to
its masthead and made clear it was the official instrument
of the KKE. It could be argued that "Rizospastis" was the
first newspaper in Greece to be consistent with the
Principles and official point of view of a political party.
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The Post-War Trends: The Political
and Legal context
After the liberation of Greece from the Axis occupation
and in the climate of the civil war (1944-49), most of the
newspapers which had been forced to close during the German
occupation were relaunched while several new dailies claimed
their own share in the press market. As the defeat of the
Communist and Left forces in the civil war had deprived them
of any kind of participation in the political life of the
country and had resulted in the banning of newspapers that
might have been sympathetic to their views, the newspapers
which were launched after the civil war did not reflect the
whole spectrum of political views, but only those contained
in the division between the conservative and centre forces,
the roots of which could be found in the conflict between the
anti-Venizelists and the pro-Venizelists which dominated the
pre-war period. The sole exceptions to this, were the
publication of the "Dimokratiki" [Democratic] (1951) and its
successor "Avgi" [Dawn] (1952) which were expressing the
views of the "Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera" [United Democratic
Left], the only legitimate party of the Left. However, the
constitution of 1952 introduced a series of restrictions
which virtually	 silenced the voices of	 dissent. More
precisely, while the constitution formally prohibited
censorship or any other preventive measures, it did allow the
confiscation of newspapers and other printed material, and
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introduced a series of restrictions and prohibitions on the
exercise of journalism. The reasons given to justify the
confiscation of newspapers and printed materials were very
vaguely defined but amounted to quite general restrictions.
They included an insult to the person of the King and his
family, or to the Christian faith, or to the established
moral order, or, finally, the revelation of information
regarding the position or movement of the armed forces. The
constitution permitted confiscation in cases of publication
of articles which could be considered to be an incitement to
revolt, or a danger to the national integrit y of the country,
or incitement to commit treason (Constitution of Greece 1952,
art. 14).
Furthermore, if the violation of these restrictions
occured three times, it could affect the legal capacity of
the persons who were found responsible, to exercise the
vocation of journalism and could lead to the temporary or
permanent discontinuation of the publication of the
newspaper. In view of these measures, it is not surprizing
that, any opposition could be easily supressed, for in the
context of post-civil-war exclusivist and coercive politics,
any difference of	 opinion could	 be interpreted as
subversion.
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Characteristics of the Press in the post-war period. 
As far as the characteristics of the press throughout
the post-war period were concerned, it could be argued that
the press was organized in accordance with, more or less, the
same clientelistic rationality which had dominated its past,
especially as political patrons restored and re-established
. their patronage networks, and clientelism became the dominant
mode of political incorporation and integration. Once again,
the phenomenon of the publication of a plethora of political
dailies was repeated. However, it is worth pointing out that
most of the new publications did not survive and it was the
older newspapers which eventually came to dominate the press
market. Furthermore, taking into account the fact that the
,publishers of some of the older dailies not only succeeded in
.retaining the position of their newspapers, but also launched
•additional publications (as in the case of "Vradyni" [Evening
Paper] whose publishers launched the financial daily
--"Nautemporiki" [Maritime-Commercial], or .of "Kathimerini"
[Dail y]	 and its "sister" paper, "Mesimvrini" [Afternoon
• Paper], or even of "Eleutheron Vima" [Free Tribune].- now "To
, Vima n [Tribune] - and its evening counterpart "Ta Athinaika
Nea" [Athens News]), it could be argued that one of the
-.characteristics. of the press of the period was .8 "cautious"
.pattern . of expansion of	 already established 1341,14-shin&
organizations.
After 1967, the persistent attempts of the colonels'
. dictatorshi p to curb the oppositional press through the
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progressive abolition	 of the financial	 privileges and
.concessions of the newspapers (McDonald, 1983: 128-143),
combined with the intensification of censorship and other
forms of coercive control (Alivizatos, 1986: 642-649;
.McDonald, 1983: 95-128), led to the voluntary or forcible
discontinuation of the publication of many newspapers, while
the unfavourable and uncertain atmosphere it had brought
about, temporarily halted the developments that had been
taking place in the previous years; developments which, after
the return to democratic government, would accelerate,
especially as Greece made progress along the path of
capitalistic development. It is significant that when the
dictatorshi p collapsed, on Jul y 24 1974, only six newspapers
were being published; however, soon the number of the
published newspapers increased substantially (McDonald, 1983:
180) to reach 22 daily papers in 1990. Indeed, the return to.
democratic government in 1974 restored the confidence of
existing and prospective publishers and set the conditions
•for new developments in the Greek press.
The most important parameters shaping these developments
have been the state and its role vis-a-vis the '-press on the
one hand, and the realization of the potential economic value
of-participation in the press market by already existing , as
well as aspirant publishers. Of course, apart from these two
main parameters, other considerations would include the
relationships between the publishers and the political
Parties and the attitudes of the latter toward the press as
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a whole, or, in other words, the partisan role of the Athens
press.
The State as a decisive parameter in the development 
of the Press in Post-Dictatorial Greece.
The social significance of the state in Greece, that is,
its decisive influence upon every kind of social, political
or economic activity, left its impression on the press. Apart
from its ability to intervene through the exercise of its
legal and administrative power, the state, and to a certain
degree the governing party(ies), have been able to playa
-
q&aaor. role, -and sometimes to directly determine developments
in the press.
First, the state has the power to control the sums and
the terms of bank loans to press organizations (Kyriazidis,
1986: 31-36). In practice the criteria which usuall y app l y in
decisions concerning loans to press organizations have always
been quite obscure, because the publishers have not been
treated as ordinary enterprises. The extent and importance of
this form of intervention is illustrated by the estimate that
between 1974 and 1981 the amount lent to Athens' newspapers
reached 1,600,000,000 drachmas while, according to unofficial
estimates, by 1983 the total debt of the same newspapers
had risen to 2,931,000,000 drachmas (Kyriazidis, 1986).
.What is more, there is evidence that the loans have so far
been given selectivel y; for example, since PASOK took office
in 1981, and by 1983 the loans received by the pro-opposition
-193-
dailies	 increased by	 only 26%	 while	 those of the •
pro-government papers rose by 104% (Kyriazidis, op. cit.) It
is therefore very clear that the ability of the state to
intervene and determine the details concerning loans to press
organizations is an effective medium for exerting pressure,
or even rewarding newspapers. In addition to controlling the
loans to existing newspapers, the PASOK government decided to
offer a substantial loan to G. Popotas, an aspiring political
daily publisher .  A similar, but much more ambitious
governmental attempt to "create" an entire press organization
which would have been sympathetic to the governing party, was
made through the financial support - with public funds - of
the "Bank of Crete" of the banker and aspiring press baron G.
Koskotas. 31 	Although both ventures	 collapsed and this
irregular spending of public funds has been referred to the
courts, these cases prove that	 there are no adequate
guarantees	 or restrictions	 concerning the limits of
governmental intervention in the press.
Less conspicuous forms of state funding can be concealed
under the pretext of transactions between state-owned or
controlled organizations and publishing organizations. This
possibility was clearly illustrated in 1985 by the decision
taken by the "Agricultural Bank of Greece", a state-owned
bank, to buy unwanted property from the "Lambrakis Press
Organization" at a very high price and at a time when this
organization was facing serious financial problems.
Different but quite effective forms of intervention by
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thp g overnment take the form of social security provisions,
or of initiatives which reduce tension between workers and
employers. In such an attempt, the 1981 PASOK government
facilitated the transition to the new printing technology of
photo-composition, by introducing new legislation which
guaranteed employment for all printers who were likely to be
affected by the changes and provided for the allocation of
2,000,000,000 drachmas for this purpose (Karykopoulos, 1984:
135). Finall y , there are more trivial but still numerous
opportunities for a government to finance the press
indirectly. For instance, government ministries, state owned
companies and organizations are estimated to spend
600,000,000 drachmas p.a. on advertising (Kyriazidis, 1986);
as there have been no guidelines or regulations specifying
how this amount should be spent, indirect state subsid y in
the guise of selective advertizing has become the norm.
Equally effective have been methods of direct state subsidy
through a series of dut y and tax exemptions (mainl y the
alleviation of dut y on newsprint, and the introduction of
preferential tax rates), a variety of	 concessions or
"information subsidies" (Gandy 1982). the provision of
exclusive information and low price services offered by the
state to publishing enterprises.
Therefore, the state has the ability, and has regularly
taken advantage of its ability to play a decisive role in the
economics of the press by using a variety of overt or covert
means; such is its economic power that it may not only
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suPpbrt or burden financiall y, but may even compete with the
existing Publishers bY providing the necessary capital for
the publication of totally new newspapers as it has attempted
to do in the past when it feared losing effective control
over the existing ones.
Athens Dailies as National Press. 
Another important development in the post-war period,
especially after 1960, was the progressive transformation of
the Athens press into a "national" one, as the former
gradually penetrated provincial Greece and eventually led to
the decline of the provincial press. The first indications of
these developments were provided by the findings of research
conducted in Patras in 1965-67 (Carmocolias 1974), which
showed that the daily circulation of Athens dailies in Patras
(the third largest city in Greece) was twice as large as that
of the combined circulation of the three local newspapers. It
was also pointed out that in 1964, in terms of circulation,
the newspapers of the centre (Athens and Thessaloniki
combined) accounted for 72 per cent of the total newspaper
circulation in Greece (Carmocolias 1974: 32-33).
These trends continued as the combination of economic
and cultural underdevelopment of provincial Greece, and the
centralized character of the Greek state, prevented the
creation of conditions - such as adequate local and regional
markets, local cultural life, or a local public sphere - that
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would sustain a viable local or regional press. As a result,
the existing press was mainly restricted - in terms of topics
and readership - to the local level, and it was unable to
acquire a regional, let alone a national role.
Data published in the National Statistical Yearbooks
shows that the penetration of the Athens press in provincial
Greece increased significantly after the restoration of
democracy and during the 1980s. Thus, while in 1977, only
30.5 per cent of the Athens dailies were sold in provincial
Greece, as opposed to 69.5 per cent sold in Athens, in 1986
the proportions of the sales were 45,2 and 54.8 per cent
respectively.
The penetration of the Athens press in provincial Greece
has been facilitated by its availability, and es pecially of
its evening editions, in most parts of the countr y almost at
the same time they appear in Athens news-stands (Peponis
1983: 127). What is more, the technological and
organizational superiority of Athens publishing enterprises,
have been considerable advantages in their competition with
the smaller regional newspapers. The latter have been unable
to provide the extensive coverage of national and
international news offered by their Athens counterparts, and
therefore have been unable to challen ge the gradual but
decisive transformation of the Athens dailies into national
media.
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The Greek Publishers; An Anatomy. 
Another, extremely important, issue which has already
been raised in the discussion on the role of the state, is
that of the publishers, their political and economic role,
the extent of their autonomy and their motivation. A
categorization of the publishers/owners of press
organizations in post-dictatorship Greece according to their
backgrounds and	 political,	 editorial	 strategies and
motivations is quite illuminating in this respect. A first,
schematic, distinction that has been proposed is that between
the "traditional" publishers, the Communist Party of Greece,
and those enterpreneurs who have bought and invested
substantial amounts on old newspapers or old titles
(Kyriazidis, 1986).
The first group, the traditional publishers, comprizes
all those who continue a family publishing tradition such as
Ch. Lambrakis, owner of the "Lambrakis Press Organization",
E. Vlachou, publisher of "I Kathimerini", or the Kyrou
family, publishers of "I Estia". The Communist Party of
Greece, being the owner of the "Rizospastis", the morning
daily of the party, and "Rizos" (short for "Rizospastis"), a
weekly, and later daily, evening paper, should be considered
as a special case. The third group, comprizes investors who
entered the press market relatively recently by buying either
existing newspapers, or the right to use the name of old
discontinued newspapers.
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Although there are some reasons which seem to justify
the use of this distinction, such as the differences in
labour intensity, printing technology and infrastructure or
loans burdens between "traditional" and "new" enterprises,
there are grounds for	 believing that this distinction
underestimates	 the	 process	 of	 technological	 and
organizational modernization which several "traditional"
enterprises have undergone since the 1970s. It does not allow
for the substantial differences between "traditional" press
organizations which have introduced new technology and modes
of operation and those which have not. Furthermore, it could
be argued that there are several other criteria which might
be equally illustrative of the state of the Greek press in
different ways. Thus we could differentiate according to the
economic importance of press organizations. We would then,
for example see that the "Lambrakis Press Organization",
mamd by a "traditional" publisher and publishing two
newspapers and numerous periodicals has equal importance - in
terms of economic significance - with the relatively younger
enterprises of G. Bobolas (Ethnos [Nation]) who entered the
publishing market as an already successful businessman,
owning several construction and manufacturing enterprises,
and with the dynamic publishing enterprize of A A Voudouris
(Eleftheros Typos [Free Press)), or finally, with C.
Mgopoulos's (Eleftherotypia [Freedom of the Press]). In this
way, we could distinguish between an economically strong and
dynamic group of publishers on the one hand, and a second
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group. comprizing economically weak enterprises which are on
the verge of closure.
However, economic criteria alone are not sufficient to
comprehend the diversity of the Athens press. We should also
take into account the long-term political motivations of the
majority of the publishers. The most important examples of
political motivation, though not the only ones, have been
those of the Vardinoyiannis	 family, ship-owners, major
shareholders of one of the major oil refining and
distribution companies in Greece and of an Athens football
club, and owners of the newspaper "Mesimvrini", and, for
quite different reasons, the Kouris brothers, owners of
several political and sports newspapers, and recentl y, of two
radio stations and a TV channel. 32
In the case of the Vardinoyiannis famil y, it would seem
that despite the fact that their newspaper "Mesimvrini" has
been estimated to have been operating with an annual loss in
excess of 175,000,000 drachmas p.a. (estimates of 1984),33
they appear determined to subsidize its operation and
continue its circulation. It could be argued that this choice
made by its owners has been a result of their determination
to be in a relativel y influential political position. As the
economic interests of the Vardinoyiannis family are closely
linked with the state and its economic policies, the
ownershi p of a newspaper could be considered to be -a
considerable political asset that could be used as an
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additional	 instrument	 for exerting pressure on the
government.
In the case of the Kouris family, strict secrecy has
prevented an in dePth analysis of their economic situation.
It is known however, that during the past few years, they
have been expanding their operations in the mass-media with
the creation of an Athens morning and evening paper
("Dimokratikos 	 Logos"	 [Democratic Speech]	 and	 "Niki"
[Victory]	 respectively), a	 Thessaloniki evening daily
("Avriani tie Thessalonikis"), a sports paper ("Filathlos"
[Sports fan]), two radio stations and a TV channel ("Kanali
29"), in addition to their original daily "Avriani". Although
there is speculation that the Kouris brothers enterprize has
been supported not only economically but also politically,
through the reluctance of the PASOK governments to allow
their prosecution for several failures to comply with
internal revenue legislation, it is impossible to be certain
of their actual economic circumstances. Their political
dailies have been BO influential	 that their very close
relationship with PASOK in general, and with certain of its
most prominent personalities, has not been one of
subordination to party-choices; on the contrary, it would in
some cases appear to be a relationshi p of inter-dependence.
Finally, the fact that one of the two brothers, M. Kouris
succeeded in becoming a member of parliament, in conjunction
with his publishing practices, could indicate that they
retain the essence of the clientelistic rationalit y, that is,
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the effort to gain political and economic power through their
participation in, and influence on the state and its
apparatuses.
After the mid-eighties, a new situation arose, partly as
a result of the restructuring and "globalization" of the
media industries worldwide and of the new opportunities which
emerged with the "privatization" and deregulation of
broadcasting in most Western European countries, and partly,
as a result of the lack of confidence of the then PASOK
government in the pro-government press, and the party's
consequent effort to either create new, sympathetic
newspapers, or to reinforce one or two of the existing
dailies. The publishers, who saw these moves as an attem pt to
bypass and isolate them, and saw a threat to their
participation in the share of state benefits, as well as to
their share of a promising market, appeared determined to
limit their dependency on the state and to increase their
economic self-sufficiency. This decision seems to have been
the turning point which eventually led to the formation, for
the first time, of a dynamically enterpreneurial culture in
the press which will possibly determine the future
developments in this and other areas of mass communication.
The Greek Press in Transition? Current Trends. 
In the period 1970-80 the Athens dailies experienced
important changes 4113 the restoration of parliamentary
democracy resulted in the increasing motivation of both
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existing and prospective publishers to publish new titles, or
re-launch several newspapers which had discontinued their
Publication during the seven-year-long dictatorship. Thus,
the re-appearance of prestigious newspapers such as the
"KEMhimerini", or the launching of new "ambitious" - in terms
of circulation - dailies such as, the "EleftherotYpia",
combined with the increasing public interest in the
political developments of the period could explain, to a
certain extent, the increase in the circulation of Athens
dailies which from 175,760,384 in 1970, rose to a peak in
1978 with an annual circulation of 240,957,471.
However, after 1978, there was a reversal of this
pattern of growth and the total circulation of the Athens
dailies fell to 205,266,177 in 1980 (National Statistical
Service of Greece Yearbooks: 1970-85). The decline in the
Athens dailies' circulation after 1978 appeared to be rather
persistent and coincided with an increase in operational,
printing and distribution costs (Dimitriou 1986). What is
more, as the number of newspaper titles continued to
increase, 34 their economic problems seemed to be deepening as
an already limited market had to be shared by more aspiring
publishers and more newspaper titles. In addition to these
developments, the technological and economic weaknesses (see
of most press organizations had made them vulnerable and
dependent on the various forms of state financial support and
funding with the expected consequences as far as the
autonomy of the press was concerned. 	 The information
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contained in tables 6 and 7 indicates that - with the
exception of relative newcomers in the press market such as
"Ethnos", "Eleftheros TYPOS", "Eleftherotypia" - the majority
of Athens dailies were characterized b y a combination of low
investment, low profitability or more often financial loss
and considerable debts to banks and other financial
institutions (most of which controlled or regulated by the
state). The consequences of this situation would become
very clear in the mid-eighties when the then government
attempted - albeit unsuccessfull y - to use it s powers in
order to control and direct the developments in the sphere of
the press.
A new element was the increasingly competitive radio
and, more importantl y, television which threatened the
survival and role of the print media, and especially the
newspapers (Dimitriou 1986; Peponis 1983). The broadcast
media tended to claim a part of the informative role which
had been virtually monopolized b y the newspapers a decade
earlier, while by being accessible to large audiences they
attracted a substantial share of advertizing expenditure
(Tables 8 and 9). The inability of the newspapers, and of the
press in general, to attract both readers and advertisers,
and therefore to compete more successfully with the
broadcasting media, deprived the press organizations of
essential sources of income. The accumulation of these
Problems and the need for domination, or even survival, in
the market, resulted in fierce antagonism between the news-
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TABLE 6
Capital, Profits, Losses and Liabilities of
Athens Dailies (1985)
Newspaper	 Profits	 Accrued	 Own	 Liabilities




Akropolis -166.4 564.9 134.0 590.0 222.4 20.4
Apogevmatini +7.8 14.0 484.6 316.0 212.2
Apogevmatini
tie Kyriakis +15.3 49.5 194.7 117.9 104.6 188.9
Vradyni -56.4 47.4 172.6 89.0 11.9
Ethnos/
Ethnos tie
Kyriakis +101.3 211.1 939.9 179.2
Eleftheros
Typos -74.8 193.2 220.0 261.1 0.7 95.6
Elefthero-
typia -115.2 780.4 380.0 848.3 405.5 288.9
Kyriakatiki
Elefthero-





Kyriakis -15.5 45.8 18.0 70.9 2.5 31.3
Mesimvrini -169.6 499.2 475.2 403.6 196.6 68.4
D.O.L. -263.1 855.6 827.2 1,415.0 377.3 274.0
Rizospastis/
T ypo-
ekdotiki S.A. 2 +12.1 131.3 1,163.1 779.1 422.9 1,512.9
Total -790.8 3254.4 3909.7 6485.2 2137.5 3,369.4
NOTES: Liabilities: (a) General. (b) Bank Loans. N.
Kyriazidis claims that the real amounts owed to banks might
be substantially higher (Kyriazidis, 1986).
1. Dimosiografikos Organismos Lambraki A.E. The Lambrakis
Press Organization S.A. balance sheet includes details of the
financial state of all its publications (Newspapers: Ta Nea,
To Vima, To Vima tie Kyriakis, Magazines: Tachydromos,
Oikonomikos Tachydromos, Archaiologia) and a Travel Agency
(Travel Plan).
2. The information of the balance sheet of Typoekdotiki
includes details of the economic performance of its daily
newspaper "Rizospastis" and of its printing plants.
Source: N.I. Kyriazidis (1986).
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TABLE 7
Profits and Losses	 of Athens' Dailies (1986-7)






tie Kyriakis -0.3	 +10.9
Vradyni -87.5	 -75.9
Ethnos/Ethnos







D.O.L.	 1 +5.7	 +498.6
Rizospastis/
Typoekdotiki S.1.2 +30.3	 -91.4
Kouris Bros Papers NI	 +13.7
Total -131.2	 +679.4
NOTES:
1. Dimosiografikos	 Organismos Lambraki A.E.	 The
Lambrakis Press Organization S. A. balance sheet
includes details on the financial state of all its
publications (Newspapers: Ta Nea, To Vima, To Vima tie
Kyriakis, Magazines: Tachydromos, Oikonomikos
Tachydromos, Archaiolo gia) and a Travel Agency (Travel
Plan).
2. The information of the balance sheet of Typoekdotiki
includes details of the economic performance of its
daily newspaper "Rizospastis" and of its printing
plants. Its poor economic performance might be due to
the fact that it undertakes the free printing of
Communist Party literature.
Source: N.I. Kyriazidis (1987 and 1988).
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TABLE 8
Greece ; mass-media: Share of advertizing
expenditure by medium (1979 and 1980).
Medium Advertizing expenditure (in milion drachmas)
1979 1980
Television 1,731	 47 2,155.6 49.6
Newspapers 1,039	 28 1,125.2 25.9
Magazines 748	 20 786.5 18.1
Radio 172	 5 280.2 6.4
Total 3,690	 100 4,347.5 100.0
Source: A. Peponis	 (1983).
TABLE 9
Greece and United Kingdom; advertizing expenditure:
percentage by medium (1979 and 1980).





Television 47. 0 28. 6 49.6 35.1
Newspapers 28.0 67.3 25.9 52.9
Magazines 20.0 11.0 18.1 9.2
Radio 5.0 3.1 6.4 2.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: For Greece, A. Peponis (1983); for the United
Kingdom, my calculations from J. Tunstall (1983).
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papers and their publishers, which not rarel y took the form
of defamatory campaigns and direct attacks between them
(Kouloglou 1982: 35-39).
In view of these circumstances it has been widely
accepted that the press in Greece has been undergoing a major
crisis not only in economic terme, but also in terms of its
quality (Peponis, 1983, Dimdtriou, 1986, Kouloglou, 1982).
Thus, it has been argued that the main synptome of this
"crisis" could be located in the progressive decline of
income and profits from both circulation and advertizing, in
the chronic dependence of the publishers upon the state and
the state-controlled banking system, which perpetuated the
newspapers' inability to become economically self-sustaining
organizations, especially as an additional important factor
of the "crisis" was the newspapers' long legacy of
accumulated financial losses of the past, which, at the time,
seemed extremely difficult to overcome.
However, it should be pointed out that the impact of the
so-called "crisis" of the press was not felt in the sane way
by all newspapers. In fact, without underestimating the fact
that the evening press was also affected, due to its
inability to expand its readership, it was the morning press
that bore the brunt. This could be explained to a certain
degree by the convergence which had taken place in the time
of circulation of morning and evening dailies, and in the
weaknesses in the distribution system More precisely, the
fact that the "evening" newspapers were	 printed and
-208-
distributed before noon, in addition to the fact that their
dispatch in many areas outside Athens coincided with the
dispatch of the morning press made the latter less appealing
to the public as the "evening" press contained up-to-date
news.
Other, no less important, reasons for the declining
attraction of the morning press were the lack of a morning
home distribution scheme, which would make the morning press
more accessible, and, more importantly, the rather long
afternoon break in the working day (only recently abolished -
although it is still in force in the summer months) which
almost coincided with the distribution time of the "evening"
press and thus provided the impetus for the expansion of the
evening papers at the expense of their morning counterparts.
As a result of this "crisis" publishers have very rarely, and
rather unsuccessfully, attempted to publish a morning paper,
while at the same time, existing publishers had to withdraw
from, or reduce their presence in the sphere of the morning
Press. 36
While taking into account these unpromising developments
in the sphere of the morning press, we should recognize the
broader context. Instead of overemphasizing the crisis as
such, we should view it as a stage of a longer process of
reorganization and rationalization of the press
organizations, and of the mass-media in Greece as a whole.
The first step in this direction seeme to have been the
introduction of	 Photosetting technology .
	 Following the
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example of "Ethnos" which was printed on Web offset presses
in September 1981, "Rizospastis" and "Eleftheros Typos"
adopted the new technology over the next two years, while the
majority of the remaining dailies and Sunday papers joined
soon. As the new technology which was adopted by the majority
of the Athens' press was time-saving and certainly less
labour intensive than its predecessor (based on the use of
linotype machines), it was an important move towards the
rationalization of the press organizations and certainly a
decisive moment in the reorganization of the labour force and
the pattern of capital-labour relations.
The decision to abandon the previous labour intensive
technologies tri ggered a 'aeries of industrial disputes as a
large number of print workers were threatened by the prospect
of redundancy. In the summer of 1980, publishers responded to
massive strikes with a lock-out. Fierce confrontations on the
issue of new technology and the conditions under which it
should be introduced were finally brought to an end when the
government intervened to offer guarantees to print workers
that their jobs would not be affected b y the forthcoming
changes. These guarantees were included in legislation
introduced in the summer of 1981 which allocated substantial
funds towards the costs of employment and retirement
involved.
As in the case of the 1986-87 Wapping printworkers'
dispute in Britain, it became evident that the transition to
the new technologies had been just the starting point of
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changes in the overall logic of the operation of the press
organizations. Publiehers were attempting to diminish the
power and influence of the print unions, with the approval
and, in some cases the help, of the government. 36 Another
dimension of this transition was the progressive shift
towards the use of freelance reporters and staff in the
everyday operation of some newspa pers, as publishers adopted
a less unionized staffing policy at all levels in their
organizations. These developments strengthened the position
of the publishers, increased considerably their control over
the editorial policy of their papers and gave ample space for
their economic recuperation over the years.
Another aspect of the efforts to achieve economic
recuperation, which was made possible by the new
technological developments was the attempt to stabilize the
existing readership and, if possible, to dxpand circulation
by adopting a more attractive, tabloid format. The importance
of the visual image was recognized and the traditional layout
of the newspapers was revised to give greater prominence to
photographs, especially colour photographs. In the quest for
a larger readership, the contents of the majority of the
daily press were extended to cover more topics of general
interest such as sports, health and fitness, leisure or
fashion, leading to close similarities with general interest
magazines.
The economic developments in the field of the press over
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the last few years indicate that the response of the
publishers to the so-called "crisis of the press" has been
successful from a commercial point of view. While in 1985
only 3 out of 11 Papers were profitable (Table 6), in 1986
the majority of the Athens' daily and Sunday papers seemed to
have overcome their financial problems, and in 1987 these
trends seem to persist (Table 7).
Although the economic performance of most newspapers
has been very bad, combining a low and unstable readership
with increasing liabilities, in this period, the overall
economic outlook for the Athens' dailies and Sunday papers
has been more favourable. With the exception of "Vradyni",
which has been facing the prospect of bankruptcy, and
"Akropolis" and "Mesimvrini" which have been sustained
because of the generous financial support of their owners
(the Anastasopoulos family who have the control of two steel
and metal processing plants, in the former case, and the
Vardinoyiannis brothers, ship-owners, major shareholders of
one of the biggest oil companies in Greece and of one of the
most popular Athens football team, in the latter case), the
major Athens press organizations have witnessed a period of
relative growth, decreasing liabilities, increasing profits,
stabilized circulation of their papers (Table 10) - despite
several consecutive price increases - and, in some cases,
even embarked upon expansion to other media areas.
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TABLE 10
Average Circulation of Morning and Evening Newspapers
published in Athens in 1981, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988.
NEWSPAPER NAME	 1981	 1984	 1985	 1986	 1987	 1988
ELEFTHEROS
TYPOS	 -	 49,500 79,600 103,551 126,609	 149,933
ETHNOS	 90,321. 201,800 202,900 171,260 159,463 	 146,111
ELEFTHEROTYPIA 120,609 100,000 106,800 108,779 123,402 	 126,464
TA NEA	 189,354 129,200 134,800 123,932 117,156	 112,908
AVRIANI	 75,743 98,000 154,500	 NI	 104,296	 101,807
APOGEVMATINI	 113,667 126,300 117,500 	 99,780	 92,100	 84,975
24 ORES	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 50,623
EPIKAIROTITA	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 44,305
RIZOSPASTIS	 42,884 51,400 59,500	 54,100	 46,692	 40,481
I PROTI	 -	 -	 44,9001	 NI	 35,500	 34,599
I VRADINI	 55,256 76,000 73,300	 62,014	 51,503	 33,047
ISSIMVRINI	 22,228 29,600 42,100	 35,971	 35,182	 30,387
I KATHIMERINI 	 19,143	 NI	 26,700	 NI	 24,749	 22,503
ELEFTHEROS	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 15,980
DIMOKRATIKOS
LOGOS	 -	 -	 10,8002	 NI	 10,588	 10,147
AKROPOLIS	 50,819 45,200 34,300	 23,733	 14,706	 7,403
KATHE MERA	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 6,588
ESTIA	 7,248	 7,500	 7,300	 NI	 6,713	 6,487
I AVGI	 9,054	 8,800	 9,200	 NI	 5,647	 4,664
ELEFTHEROS 3	 -	 -	 --	 -	 "-	 2,413
ELEFTHERI ORA	 7,105	 5,800	 2,987	 NI	 1,346	 1,329
TO VIMA 4	 49,138	 NI	 27,600	 -	 -	 -
ELEFTHEROS
KOSMOS	 14,062	 -	 -	 -
TOTAL	 866,631	 1,134,787	 955,652 1,033,254
1. Information based on the September 1985 average circulation.
2. Information based on the September 1.985 average circulation.
3. ELEUTHEROS became an evening newspaper in 1988.
4. The publication of TO vim was discontinued between 1982-1984 while
in 1984 it was re-published. In 1984, its daily edition was
discontinued again while the Sunday VIMA (TO VIMA TIS KYRIAKIS)
continued being published.
NI. No information
(Source: N. Kyriazidis 1982, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989)
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In addition to the stabilization of their readershi p , it
seems that the Athens papers benefited greatly from the
advertizing boom in the Greek market. The growth of the
advertizing market which took place in Greece during the
1960s reached extremely high rates after 1987. It has been
estimated that in 1988 and 1989 advertizing expenditure
increased by 90% (Kyriazidis 1990) while in accordance with
the economic forecasts, in 1990 the growth rate was expected
to reach 16% (Fishburn 1990: 114) despite the recession.
TABLE 11
Greece ; mass-media: Share of advertizing
expenditure by medium (1988 and 1989).




Television 18,864,502 47.5 23,035,119 42.5 22.11%
Newspapers 6,892,667 17.4 10,172,965 18.8 47.59%
Magazines 10,671,096 26.9 16,575,356 30.6 55.33%
Radio 3,263,3545 8.2 4,366,200 8.1 33.79%
Total 39,691,620 100 54,149,640 100 36.43%
Source: Kyriazidis 	 (1990).
In	 the	 same	 period (1988/89), the advertizing
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expenditure increase in the Athens press (47.59%) exceeded
that of the mass-media average (39.7%) thus constituting a
major factor for the economic recuperation and growth of the
Athens press organizations (Table 11).
From economic recuperation to expansion; The position of the 
Athens press in the changing Patterns of ownership and 
control of the mass-media in Greece. 
Having overcome the economic hardships of the first part
of the 1980s, and due to a series of other factors which I
shall try to outline below, the antagonistic relations among
the major publishing organizations gave way to a less tense
climate which occasionall y permitted informal or formal
cooperation amongst some of the Athens press publishers.
As,	 after 1986,	 the speculation concerning the
deregulation of the broadcasting media in Greece turned into
the strong likelihood that it would occur, and in
anticipation of the potential penetration of the Greek media
market b y multinational capital as a result of the
integration of Greece in the European Community, the Greek
publishers soon took cognizance of the possibilities and
challenges which were presented to them. More precisely they
realized that, as events rapidly unfolded, they had to secure
their position and possibly expand their activities in and
beyond the sphere of the press in order to resist pressures
from multinational capital or, at least, to become partners
in the new markets.
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An additional decisive factor which influenced the
developments, at that point was the attempt of the Papandreou
government to undermine the position of Athens press
publishers by encouraging and financing the formation of a
loyal media "clientele". The preferential treatment by the
government of G. Popotas, and later the Kouris brothers, as
well as the eventual marginalization of the existing
publishers and the creation of the media empire of the banker
G. Koskotas under the approval and encouragement of the prime
minister and members of his cabinet precipitated the changes
in media ownership patterns. It could therefore be argued
that, among other things, the decision of several publishers
to extend their activities to other areas of the mass-media
was a part of their effort to render their organizations
economically viable and less dependent on the decisions of
the government.
In this way, throughout the second part of the 1980s,
we can see the formation of several distinct strategies of
multi- or cross-media expansion and development of daily and
Sunday press organizations; one, chosen b y the "Lambrakis
Press Organization", involves the acquisition of magazine
titles and even of whole publishing enterprises. 37 Another,
based on different priorities, is the expansion strategy of
banker G. Koskotas's "Grammi AE", or of the Press
organization founded by the Greek Communist Party
"TYpoekdotiki AE" which was premised upon massive investment
in new printing technologies.
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Another significant opportunity for expansion and,
possibly, concentration of media ownership in Greece was
provided by the crisis of public service (state-supervised)
broadcasting in Greece in the mid-1980s. The setting up of
popular illegal municipal radio stations by the conservative
mayors of Athens, Thessaloniki and Piraeus and, later, local
TV stations by the latter two, as a weapon in their political
confrontation with the socialist PASOK government in 1986
brought to the foreground of public debate the issue of
"free" broadcasting. Early on, press organizations realized
the opportunities arising out of the political crisis and
launched a public campaign for the cause of "free" radio and
television. Although in the context of the political
confrontation between the conservative mayors and the
government, the demand for "free" broadcasting referred to a
re-distribution of communication resources among the main
political parties, 	 the press organizations seized the
initiative by redefining "free" as private, commercial as
well as municipal broadcasting. In 1957, while still lobbying
for the allocation of a significant part of the emerging
broadcasting industry to existing print-media enterprises,
the Athens publishers took advantage of the steps taken by
the government towards the legalization of private local
radio and television, and of the lack of any anti-trust
legislation, and started organizin g their penetration to the
broadcasting arena by establishin g the first private FM
stations which soon became extremel y competitive to their
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state and	 municipal	 counterparts,	 by creating the
infrastructure for the establishment of, or participation in
private television channels 30 and	 by forming the first
nationwide private broadcasting networks. It was precisely
this prospect of private television broadcasting which
dictated the cooperation between certain publishers because
the cost of ventures of this type could not be carried by
individual publishers.
Finall y, in a venture which might prove to be most
significant insofar as the developments in the media industry
in Greece are concerned, the "Lambrakis Press Organization
AE." also joined forces in 1987 with the Kourentis brothers,
representatives of Silvio Berlusconi in Greece, by founding
"Video-Star ALE.", a company specializing in the production
and distribution of TV and radio programmes (Kyriazidis,
1988), which in turn bought 50% of "ATA EPE", a TV
production company. If we take into account the restrictions
in Greek law on the participation of foreign nationals or
foreign companies in the ownership and control of television
channels, it is obvious that such joint ventures constitute a
"legal" channel of participation of international capital in
the Greek media market.
It appears that the initiatives taken b y the Greek press
organizations which I outlined above indicate that their
transformation from loyal political clients of the main
political	 parties	 into	 competitive	 market-oriented
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enterprises has been under wa y for some years. Although it is
still very early to draw conclusions regarding the state of
the media industry in Greece, it is obvious that the
international trends, combined with the internal political
and economic conjuncture of the mid-1980s, played an
important part in the transformation of media industries in
Greece. Alongside the intensification of competition between
media enterprises, there are signs of concentration and
cooperation in the highly fragmented media industry. It would
appear that the transformations which the mass media are
currently undergoing will continue - as they have already
begun - to affect the relations of power between the mass
media and the political parties.
Economic trends: some conclusions. 
As explained above, the "crisis" phase of the Athens
press during the late 1970e and early 80s was followed not
only by its economic recuperation in the second part of the
1980s but also by its expansion into other mass media or
other related areas, such as the printing industry, or radio
and television programme production.
The anticipation of	 legislation permitting the
establishment of private TV channels provided a strong
compulsion for the coordination, and later cooperation and
partnership between certain publishers; this could, in the
long	 term,	 lead	 to	 a	 dominant	 pattern	 of
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centralized-oligopolistic ownership in the mass media market
in Greece more closely resembling the typical pattern in most
Western European countries.
However, these remarks are not intended to sug gest that
the penetration of multinational capital in the quite
profitable market of the mass-media in Greece has been
particularl y rapid. As a result of the restrictions imposed
by the Greek legislation, this penetration has, until
present, been indirect and limited. However, the unification
of the European markets is expected to change this picture
completely. Perhaps the integration of the Greek market
within the unified European market will be the crucial test
which will determine the future developments in the
mass-media in Greece.
The structure of News organizations and news production. 
An attempt to assess the role of mass media
organizations in news production in Greece would have to
confront the problem of the virtual lack of relevant
research. However such an assessment is necessary as it would
provide us with some insights concerning the impact of the
organization, and of professional "culture" in the Athens
press in the production of news.
Drawing upon a recent pilot research project on the
internal structure and operation of 4 Athens newspapers
(Serafetinidou,	 1991)	 we can	 attempt a tentative
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reconstruction of the power relations and professional ethics
within the Athens press.
The research project, comprising interviews conducted
with members of the staff of four Athens newspapers, provided
information regarding the power structure within news
organizations. More precisel y, an analysis of the interviews
indicates the existence and reproduction of clientelistic
structures inside the newspapers: as, according to the
interviewees, staff recruitment was based on personal
acquaintance rather than on professional or educational
qualifications, it would seem that bonds based on obligation
are in existence, with all the consequences on news
production this would entail. What is more, if we take into
account the existence of a long combined probation/
apprenticeship period after recruitment, we can see that, in
addition to the pressures	 of clientelistic obligation,
newspaper publishers and directors can control the work of
new journalists and secure their conformity in the long run.
The research indicated that the political profile of a
newspaper was perceived by its staff as equivalent of its
(usuall y meaning its publisher's or director's) Party
allegiance. Although many interviews contained contradictory
views regarding the existence of a political line which
influences news production. Serafetinidou detected the
existence of latent and, to a de gree unconscious, self
censorship and conformity in three of the 4 papers included
in the research project. More precisel y, whereas occasional
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Blips during the interviews reveal the awareness and tacit
recognition of reporters and other journalistic staff of the
critical role played by their paper's political allegiance in
mnm selection and production, it was not unusual for the
interviewees to attempt to minimize the importance of this.
Although this would appear to be an indication of a conflict
between organizational pressures and a vague sense of
professional integrity and ethics on the part of the
newspaper staff, it should be noted that it confirms
information about the lack of editorial autonom y within the
Athens press (see for example Kominis 1985: 63-77). Indeed,
the data gathered suggest that the publisher's political
party allegiance is central in the selection and presentation
of news while the saleability of news appeared to be another
important factor in these processes.
Another important issue which permeates the interviews
but which has not been raised by Serafetinidou, is that of
the perceptions of "the political" by the staff of the Athens
press. More precisely, it is striking how most interviewees
-
equated "politics" with "party alle giance". Indeed, no other
political concerns, for example a commitment to enviromental
issues, concern about minorities etc. appeared to be playing
any role in the political identity of the papers, according
to their staff. This is a very important point as it bears
directly upon press representations of "the political" as I
hope to show in the following Pages.
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The Athens Press and the "production" of consensus: 
Borne tentative remarks. 
It could be argued that the characteristics of the Greek
political system and public sphere which I have outlined in
the previous chapter, as well as the particular conjuncture
in the field of press economics, affected the role and
significance of the Athens press after the restoration of
democracy in Greece. More precisel y, the predominance of the
political parties over political and social life after the
fall of the 1967-74 dictatorship, the prevalence of
clientelistic modes of political incorporation, and the
economic crisis which the Athens press was undergoin g between
1974 and 1986, contributed to the formation of the particular
relationshi p between the press and the major political
parties.
Although since 1974 only two morning dailies have been
official party newspapers - "Rizospastis" has been the
official paper of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party (KKE), and "I Avgi" was the official paper of the
Communist Party of Greece-Interior (KKE esoterikou), most
other Athens dailies had a clear - albeit informal -
"affiliation" with the major Political parties (Komninou
MC)). Thus, it could be argued that in the period between
1974 and 1986, the Athens daily press was reflectin g the
•
structure of an essentially bi-polar party system,
characterized by the confrontation between "right wing" and
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"democratic" forces, in which the main opposing protagonists
were the right-wing "New Democracy" party and the centre-left
"PASOK", while the two communist parties occupied a secondary
position in the political arena. 39
Thus, at the time, the majority of the Athens papers
were aligned with one of the two major political parties or
political camps, while the secondary position of the Left in
the party system was also reflected in the "representation"
of its discourse in the press. Operating within a society
divided along the lines of an essentially rigid bi-polar
political system and dependent upon the economic assistance
of the state - and, therefore, of the major political parties
the Athens dailies reflected and reinforced the
party-political divisions. As the press occupied a
"subaltern" position primarily to the two major poles of the
party system, and to a lesser extent to its "left/communist"
component it could be argued that it effectively
publicized and reproduced party discourses and, occasionally,
the discourses of party factions.
However, the emphasis on the press representation of
political division and confrontation between Right (mainly
the centre-right "New Democracy" part y ) and Left (mainly the
centre-left "PASOK") (Pezmazoglou 1984; Komninou 1990)
overlooks the significant role the press pla yed in the
construction of the underlying consensus.
For,	 it	 could be argued that 	 despite the
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"confrontational" character of the political sphere, that is,
the apparent lack of consensus in Greek politics, the
seemingly irreconcilable differences among political parties,
their political objectives, discourses and practices, or
despite the "fragmentation" of society along these party
divisions, there has been an underlying consensus regarding
the political sphere and the political process.
More precisely, there is evidence that since the
restoration of democracy, there has been a broad consensus
/warding the centrality of political parties over social and
political life and their role in the maintenance and
reproduction of clientelistic practices and the mentality
associated with them. As. I shall attempt to show in the
following pages, it is precisely this consensus, constructed
and reproduced by the Athens press, by drawing upon "popular"
feeling , "common" sense, and its "legitimate" party-Political
expression, which has been crucial in the preservation of the
relations of political domination which prevailed after the
restoration of democracy in Greece.
Illt
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CHAPTER 6
POLITICAL CULTURE AND MASS COMMUNICATION IN
GREECE: THE CASE OF THE "MARGINALS"
In the previous section it was argued that since the
restoration of democracy in Greece, the relations of
political domination have been sustained and reproduced on
the basis of a broad consensus regarding the definition of
politics and the recognition of its boundaries, of the main
legitimate participants, and of the range of available
options for political action. These widely accepted
fundamental schemes of cognition, perception and practice
upon which politics was, and is, actualized have constituted
the core of the	 hegemonic	 political	 culture in
post-dictatorial Greece.
The most significant features of the hegemonic political
culture, as has been shown, include the essentially "private"
character of politics, the fragmentation and atomization of
political practices and experience under the domination of
highl y	centralized	 political	 "party-patrons"	 with
authoritarian internal political structures, and the
centrality of clientelistic, statist and populist political
Practices in the definition of politics and in the setting of
the boundaries of the universe of political discourse and
action.
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In this part I examine the relationship between this
consensual basis of the Greek political system and the
performance of the daily press of Athens, which, as has been
seen, has virtually dominated the national print-media market
in terms of circulation, competitiveness and dissemination of
political information, and therefore has been a significant
institution as far as the production and dissemination of
"definitions of the situation", and the setting of the
boundaries of the universes of political discourse and
political action are concerned.
Studies dealing with the performance of the press in
Greece are extremely limited, in both number and scope
(Pezmazoglou, 1984; Komninou, 1990). They have emphasized the
polarization of the Athens press along the lines of the
essentially bi-polar	 Greek party-system. 	 Komninou in
particular, has argued that until 1986 the press
systematically publicized the particular "definitions of the
situation" which were formed by the two major' political
parties, thus reproducing a bi-polar universe of discourse in
which the achievement of consensus was impossible. It was the
achievement of the independence of the press from the
political parties which followed the economic recovery and
restructuring of the print-media in the second part of the
1980s, Komninou argued, that opened the way for the
Production of .consensus as the majority of the daily press
progressively moved towards political positions close to the
centre of the political spectrum.
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These studies appear to overemphasize the divisions and
conflict among the established political parties and their
subsidiary organizations, especially as both analyses adopt
institutional definitions of politics, and concentrate on
party-political discourses and press performance just before
the parliamentary elections of 1981 and 1989 respectively,
periods in which confrontation among political parties was
bound to be more intense. It would therefore seem to me that,
the rather limited definition of the "political" adopted and
the particular context in which these studies took place, as
well as the lack of a satisfactory theoretical and
methodological background a could explain why both studies
failed to discern that even while the Greek press was
reflecting the bipolar division of the party system, it was
also playing an important role in the construction of
consensus regarding the reproduction of relations of
political domination, the centrality of the major political
parties in politics and society, and the maintenance of their
viMAmd monopoly in the universes of political discourse and
political action.
In Part I, a case Was presented for adopting a more
flexible definition of "politics" that would transcend the
boundaries of the conventional political sphere of a society
- itself a product of political domination. The adoption of a
more flexible definition of the "political" will enable us to
take into account the processes of politicization and
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depoliticization	 of	 social	 domains	 excluded	 from
institutional definitions of politics, and allow us to
refocus the analysis on the processes of construction of
political domination, that is, on the antagonism between
hegemonic and counter-hegemonic projects for the definition
of the "political".
Thus, to return to the case of Greece, the struggle for
the politicization and depoliticization of social domains
should be an important concern in the study of Greek
political culture, providing valuable insights into its
relative openness or closure, flexibility or rigidity, and
therefore its democratic or authoritarian character. Such an
approach broadens the scope of the study of political culture
by including in the sphere of politics new forms of political
action and discourses as well as new actors, or potential
actors, hitherto neglected by most studies in contemporary
Greek politics. Among these forms of political action are
social movements, political, social, ethnic and religious
minorities or subcultures which have either been excluded
from, or refused to be incorporated into the "political
.sphere".
According to this perspective the attempts of some
groups to forge a distinct identity, often refusing to become
assimilated to	 the "political	 sphere" should not be
disregarded. The ability 	 (or inability for that matter) of
social minorities such as youth subcultures, or gay, lesbian,
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and feminist grou ps, or ethnic and religious minorities such
as the muslim or romany population of the country, immigrant
and refugee communities, or finally, of more overtly
political minorities such as the numerous extra-parliamentary
political groups, to acquire the status of legitimate
participants in public and political life, and to participate
in setting the boundaries of political debate and action
while retaining their identity and distinctiveness, is a
crucial parameter of Greek political culture.
It goes without saying that this alternative definition
of politics	 and of	 political culture,	 has important
ramifications as far as the conflictual or consensual
character of the political universe of discourse, and more
generally, of the Greek political culture are concerned. More
precisely, by regarding the party system and the
institutionally sustained universe of political discourse as
just a part of the political domain in Greek society, we are
in the position to unveil the consensual core of Greek
political culture which has been obscured by the conflictual
character of the party system and of the party-dominated
universe of political discourse.
For, the earlier discussion showed (p.p. 162-168),
despite the ap parently irreconcilable and confrontational
character of the political sphere, the political parties and
organizations of the "'democratic' or 'constitutional' space"
and universe of discourse, to use Ferrajoli's terminology
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(Ferrajoli, 1985: 37-39), appear united in their
self-presentation as the sole legitimate holders of, or
contenders for political power and in their resolve to impose
their definitions of the situation, and to set the boundaries
of political debate and the limits of political tolerance, by
excluding and denying legitimacy to issues, actors and forms
of political action which are opposed to their dominance.
Therefore, as far as Greek political culture is concerned, it
is important to note that, its consensual character is also
complemented b y its "exclusive" facet, that is, the
exclusion of dissent and the low level of tolerance towards
any radical or alternative political opposition. Central in
this respect is the closure of the universes of political
discourse and action, which have systematically inhibited and
frustrated the formation of new, alternative and oppositional
collective identities	 which might challenge the very
relations of political domination which sustain them. Thus,
non-conformist or even merely 	 "different" social and
political groups are not able to be "heard", while
alternative and oppositional discourses, forms of social
action and lifestyles are displaced and symbolically
excluded.
This exclusive aspect of Greek political culture can be
traced through numerous Cases, where alternative or
oppositional definitions, values and lifestyles of social and
Political minorities clash with, or merely differ from the
hegemonic definitions. In such cases, difference is isolated,
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repressed or symbolically excluded.	 Thus, the cultural
isolation of, say, ethnic and religious minorities from the
rest of the population and the ignorance of the majorit y of
Greeks of the social and political conditions under which
their muslim, romany or sla y fellow citizens live does not
necessarily mean that the latter have not attempted to
communicate their experiences and grievances, but that the
universe of public discourse, and in particular, the universe
of political discourse has not been accessible to them.
Although the case of the muslim minority in
north-eastern Greece is a sensitive one due to the turbulent
relationship between Greece and Turkey and their conflicting
regional interests and policies, and certainly cannot be
comprehensively addressed here, it nevertheless offers a
characteristic example. The almost hysteric reaction of Greek
public opinion to the increasing tendency of the muslim
minority of the area to represent itself as Turkish, and the
outright delegitimation and symbolic repression of attempts
of its members to give cultural and Political expression to
the "turkishness" of the minority are indicative of the
exclusive character of Greek political culture. The
'definitions of the situation' Produced within the minority
not only differ considerabl y from their mainstream
counterparts, but are also systematically dis placed and
excluded from the universe of discourse in Greece.
Similar conclusions could be drawn in the cases of
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social minorities such as the discriminated-against gay and
lesbian communities, or radical feminist groups which refuse
to be incorporated in the relevant organizations of the main
political parties, conscientious objectors' groups, or the
more politically oriented extra-parliamentary left-wing,
autonomist and anarchist groups, as well as, more recently,
foreign immigrants and refugees. The political significance
of the ability or inability of these minorities to gain
access to the universe of public discourse and to participate
in the production of definitions of the situation has been
noted by Brodie and Jenson who argued that whether minorities
create their own collective identity or not is a profoundly
political outcome, dependent in large part on the activities
of political parties and other organizations that alter the
language of politics (Brodie and Jenson, 1980: chapter 1).
This is the reason why I intend to focus upon the press
representations of one such minority, and, in particular, on
the role mass communication plays in the reproduction of the
dominant discursive field through processes of repression,
mn.ginalization and symbolic exclusion of minority dissent.
More specifically, I shall attempt to study the press
representations of the confrontation between the state and a
social/political minority, or rather a cluster of minorities,
which has become known as the "marginals" (perithoriakoi).
An important reason for the selection of this particular
minority was the pronounced "political"	 character and
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relative longevity of these groups; to the extent that the
"marginals" attempted to develop and sustain their own
distinct lifestyles, and more importantly, to the extent that
their political strands resisted pressures to become
integrated into the "democratic - constitutional" political
sphere for over a decade, it could be argued that they
constituted a counter-cultural milieu 2 and therefore an
actual - albeit negligible - challenge to the relations of
political domination. Although the state responded to their
"challenge" with attempts at physical repression such as the
intensification of policing and the implementation of urban
planning policies informed by law-and-order preservation
objectives, it was clear that at that moment of
confrontation, the politics of signification, that is the
particular ways in which the "marginals", their repertor y of
political action, and their confrontations with the state
were represented, became crucial, as signification became one
of the battlefields in the struggle for political hegemony.
Thus, media representations of the "marginals" during
the numerous confrontations between them and the state,
constituted an important parameter in the struggle for the
maintenance of political hegemony, as they mediated the
Publicizing of competing versions of political reality, and
played a major role in facilitating or restricting access to
the universe of public and political discourse. Indeed, it
mild be argued that the Athens daily press was the main
source of information during the confrontations between the
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authorities and the "marginals", and it therefore played an
important part in mobilizing public opinion around the
'common' or 'popular values' of normality, law and order,
and democracy, and against the threat of the "marginals".
The case studies and their background
The appearance of the "marginals" in the major urban
centres of Greece after the transition from the authoritarian
regimes of the period 1967-74 to democratic government, and
especially in the 1980s became a matter of public concern and
fuelled intense public debate around the issues of 'deviance'
and 'terrorism'.
From 1973 onwards, many anarchist, autonomist and
leftist groups were being formed in the main urban centres of
Greece. They were normally formed by relativel y small numbers
of young people and constituted loose networks often based on
relationships of friendship, and on common social and
political concerns. They sought to challenge the dominant
social values and to undermine the exploitative and
repressive character of society. Thus, they derived their
distinctiveness from their alternative values, visions and
lifestyles; they emphasized the centrality of 'freedom',
'creativity' and 'imagination' in their lifestyles as opposed
to 'traditional', 'common-sense', 'petty-bourgeois' values of
'restraint', 'responsibility' and 'pragmatism'. They were
critical of a variety of aspects of social life such as its
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hierarchical organization, the institution of paid work, the
distinction between work and leisure, the repression of
sexuality, formal schooling and education, academic
authoritarianism at the university, ps ychiatric violence,
materialist values, consumption and consumerism, the
destruction of the environment, militarism and military
service, and of what they interpreted as the subordination of
social life to the political parties and their subsidiary
organizations. In these respects, the 'marginals' conform to
standard definitions of 'sub-' or scounterculture'.3
Although the relationship between these groups and the
political parties of the Left has always been one of
hostility, as the latter attempted systematically to exclude
the former from any political event, leftist and anarchist
groups participated in or attempted to "infiltrate" political
events and "movements", especially in the "student movement"
which was dominated by the Communist and Socialist parties,
and were always present in the annual marches for the
commemoration of 'Polytehneio', the uprising of students of
the Athens Technical University against the colonels'
dictatorship. All these events provided the anarchist and
leftist groups with the opportunity to assert their
distinctiveness, to express their political positions and to
voice their opposition to the domination of the students' and
worker's movement by the political parties of the Left and
Centre-Left.	 In addition to	 their	 participation in
demonstrations and other events organized by the parties and
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organizations of the mainstream Left and Centre-Left, in
several occasions, leftists, autonomists and anarchists
occupied University departments, demonstrated on their own,
and resorted to unconventional, as far as Greek politics were
concerned, forms of collective action such as the 1981
occupations of empty houses, the 1986 motorcyclists'
demonstration against the use of nuclear power, or the
'symbolic' burning of the Athens hotel where the French
National Front leader, Jean-Marie Lepen addressed supporters
of Greek far-right political organizations in 1984. In 1979,
leftists and anarchists enjoyed widespread support among
students when they played a significant role in the student
occupations of the Athens Chemistry and Law Schools, and
called students and workers to "rise against the state".
However, in subsequent occupations and demonstrations they
were more isolated as the Greek Union of Students (EFEE) was
effectively dominated by the mainstream political parties.
Towards the end of the 1970s,. Exarcheia, a central
Athens borough in which were situated many private tuition
schools (frontistiria) as well as the buildings of the
National Technical University (Polytechneio) and of many
departments and laboratories of the University of Athens, an
area with a substantial student population, and a centre of
left-wing political and cultural activity, progressively
became the melting-pot in which leftist and anarchist groups,
interacted with youth subcultures such as the rockers
(rokades), the freaks (frikia), and the punks and formed the
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social	 milieu	 which	 has been	 called the	 "margin"
(perithorio). I am using the term milieu instead of
sub-culture, or counter-culture, in order to emphasize both
the connections and divergencies within the social space of
the "margin". 4 Far from indicating the existence of a unified
group or movement, the terms "margin" and "marginals" should
be taken to refer to a series of co-existing, essentially
loose sub-cultural and, in many cases, counter-cultural
networks, which have co-existed - in terms of territorial
co-existence, cultural interaction and partial fusion - and
have shared experiences of social and political
marginalization. It should however be noted that apart from
Exarcheia, similar convergences took place in several other
areas of Athens and other cities of Greece, although
Exarcheia, being an area where universities, schools,
music-clubs, cinema theatres, and other leisure facilities
were abundant, attracted young people from a variety of
backgrounds, and provided a 'fertile' territory for the
formation of subcultures and counter-cultures.
Although the "subcultural and counter-cultural milieu"
of the "marginals" has attracted no interest other than the
essentiall y negative and dismissive comments of the mass
media, one should not underestimate its cultural-expressive
aspects; the 'marginal' milieu has developed and sustained
its own - not insignificant	 cultural life with the
organization of 'alternative events', the existence of two
publishing houses and bookshops,	 the autonomist
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alternative	 'Communa' (Commune)	 and	 the anarchist
libertarian 'Eleftheros Typos' (Free Press), as well as a
multitude of 'alternative' periodicals, newspapers and
brochures. Although many of them are published irregularlY3
or had to discontinue their publication due to their limited
readershi p , some have survived and even attract a wider
readership including readers outside the 'marginal' milieu.
Among	 the	 numerous	 periodical	 'alternative'
publications, the most significant have been 'Ideodromio'
[Road of Ideas] which, apart from commentary on social and
political issues, focuses on art, literature and cinema and
has been influenced by the surrealist movement, 'Rixis
[Rupture] which has been influenced by the Italian
'autonomia' and is a forum for theoretical debate, and
publishes articles, news and comments on politics, youth,
ecological issues, feminism, and conscientious objectors'
groups, 'Poll ton gynalkon [City of the Women], a radical
feminist periodical, 'Pezodroulo' [Pavement], a publication
of theoretical and historical articles, I ra theloums ola'
[We Want it All], a youth 'counter-cultural' periodical, and
'Convoy', a periodical with a substantial readership from
the broader Left, focusing on social, political, ecological
and cultural issues, while 'I Anichti Poll' [Open City],
'I Mani'	 [The	 Midwife].	 '0	 Anarchos'	 [Anarchic].
SPartakos i	[SPartacus]	 and the	 initially underground
newspaper '0 SPastis° [Smasher] have also been widely read
mumg leftists and anarchists.	 Despite their small
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readership, these publications indicate the existence of some
degree of political and cultural debate in the milieu which
however has been ignored by the Press during the coverage of
events involving anarchists, autonomists or leftists.
In the political field, although the 'marginals' have
been persistently represented as being obsessed with
destruction of property, and disruption of everyday life, it
should be noted that, apart from their violent confrontations
with the authorities from which press stereotypes have mainly
derived, they have also a history of political action that
has been ignored or misrepresented by the mass media. More
precisely, they have launched or participated in political
initiatives which challenged	 - although,	 by no	 means
threatened -	 the centrality of the	 mainstream political
parties in the political process. Initiatives of this sort
have been the formation of the 'Initiative against the visit
of Jean-Marie Lepen', a committee which organized public
meetings and a demonstration in protest of the visit of the
leader of the French National Front in Athens in 1984, and
which assumed political responsibility for a 'symbolic
attack' against the hotel where Lepen addressed his
supporters, or the 'Anti-nuclear Initiative', an ad hoc loose
umbrella committee, which attempted to coordinate collective
action against the use of nuclear power just after the
Chernobyl nuclear power station accident in 1986.
The distinct lifestyles, and political, and occasionally
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social, deviance of the 'marginals' provided the ground upon
which processes of social exclusion were to be developed. The
press played a very important role in the symbolic exclusion
and paved the way for the intensification of 'law-and-order'
policies such as 'cleaning-up' urban planning interventions,
police raids and repressive policing methods or, as well as
legal or paralegal restriction of civil ri ghts under the
excuse of the protection of law and order. Furthermore,
alongside the 'difference' of the 'marginals', the violence
which often characterized their confrontations with the
police, provided the mass media with the opportunity to
exploit commercially and ideologicall y the marginal groups.
Although I am adopting the terms 'commercial' and
'ideological exploitation' which were introduced by Stanley
Cohen in his discussion of deviance exploitation (Cohen,
1987: 139-143), I should emphasize that my a pplication of the
term 'commercial exploitation' refers to specific ways of
using the deviant in mass communication for the pursuit of
profit. By 'commercial exploitation' I mean mostly the Athens
newspapers' attempt to increase their circulation by focusing
selectively on specific aspects of the lifestyles and action
of the 'marginals' which, provided they were presented in
particular ways, were certain to attract public interest and
therefore increased readership and circulation. On the other
hard, by 'ideological exploitation' I refer to the "use of
the deviant in communication, particularly Public, to defend
or announce an ideolo gy ..." (Cohen, p . 139), or in the
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particular case of Greece, the symbolic exclusion of the
'marginals' as an intrinsic part of processes of development,
and reinforcement of the dominant political culture.
In the next chapter I therefore intend to focus upon the
particular press representations of these marginal groups in
a series of 'events' in which they were involved, and to
explore the particular ways in which these representations
are linked to the reproduction of the hegemonic political




REPRESENTATIONS OF THE 'MARGINALS' IN
THE ATHENS PRESS CASE STUDIES
Preliminary notes on the research: selection of 
case studies and newspaper samples 
Although throughout the 1980s there have been numerous
occasions in which public interest was focused on the
s marginals e , it is obvious that for practical reasons only a
limited number of case studies could be included in this
work. As this study was made some time after the events had
taken place, several obstacles had to be overcome, mainly in
the selection of the particular case studies, of the
mnmpapers, and of other relevant material that could be
included in the research.
The limited availability of back newspaper issues and
the difficulty in accessing them In public libraries was one
of the major problems and, therefore, constituted one of the
most decisive criteria, both for the selection of the
'events' that would form the basis of the case studies, and
for the composition of the newspaper samples which were
included in this study.A second problem was the rapid change
which the Athens press was undergoing at the time. As noted
in Part II, the late 1970s and 1980s was a period which
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witnessed the launching of several new newspa per titles;
however many Athens dailies of the period either had a very
short life or had to be relaunched on a different basis (e.g.
as evening or weekly papers). For this reason, particular
efforts were made to ensure that, despite the instability and
fluidity of the press market, the sample(s) were
characterized by both the elements of continuity and change
in the Athens press of the period, that is, both traditional
and new newspapers were included whenever possible. What is
more, particular care was taken to include newspapers which
were representative of the widest possible range of political
afilliations and opinions (Table 12), and to maintain the
presence of both 'popular' and 'serious' papers in the
sample.
TABLE 12
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Finall y, attention was also paid to the size of the
readershi p of the selected newspapers, in order to ensure
that the Papers included in the sample had a sizeable
combined readership and therefore constituted a source of
information for a significant part of the public (Table 13).
Thus, on the basis of these criteria, the samples used
in the analysis that will follow are fairly representative of
the Athens press, as they are characterized by diversity of
political opinion - or rather, of political party affiliation
- and, at the same time, a high combined readership.
The newspapers selected are "Apogevmatini", a popular
evening paper with conservative political affiliation,
"Avriani", a populist evening paper supporting PASOK and
striving to present itself as the voice of the moral majority
of the "people", "Eleftherotypia", an evening daily which
aspired to express a wide spectrum of views from the centre
to the left, "Ethnos", a popular evening daily suPPortingt
policies advocated mainly by the Communist Party (KKE), and
other left-wing parties and seeking to attract a
left-of-centre readership, "Kathimerini", a serious
centre-right morning broadsheet, "To Nea" and its morning,
and later Sunday sister paper To Vima", supporting PAalK,
and "I Vradyni", a right-wing paper supporting th&
centre-right part y of "Nea Dimokratia" but also idealagLcallY
associated with the extreme right_
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noted that throughout the late 1970s and the 1980s, the
Athens press focused on the 'mar ginals', their activities,
and their lifestyles on numerous occasions. More presicelY,
a series of policing and control measures such as the
imprisonment or temporary detention of 'marginals', the
police operations in Exarcheia under the code-name 'Virtue',
the combination of	 law-and-order	 and urban Planning
initiatives for areas of Athens, the 'public concern'
regarding the 'marginals' mainly in the form of recurring
lawlessness, drug and terrorism panics throughout the 1980s,
or instances of collective action taken by the marginals such
as hunger strikes, university building occupations,
squatting, demonstrations, riots, or finally the "marginals'"
campaigns against drug trafficking in the area of Exarcheia
were prominently featured in the front pages of the Athens
papers, while extensive special reports, files with
'background information' and 'debates' on the issue - or
problem- of the 'marginals' often appeared in the press.
This 'interest' of the press however changed to some
extent after its early formative stages, when the 'marginals'
were first encountered by press and readers alike, and the
first definitions	 of the	 situation,	 concerning the
confrontation between the 'marginals' and the state,
appeared. It was during this early Phase of press coverage,
that the inventory and the public languages, which would be
used in future coverage of similar events and in press
representations of the 'marginals', emerged, but later stages
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of reporting of similar events, were characterized by the
further mobilization and convergence of social anxieties
which eventually took the form of 'moral panics . . Therefore,
it could be argued that throughout the 1980s, the initial
inventories and public	 languages used in the press
representations of the 'marginals' were continuously
transformed as new themes were mobilized and converged around
the stereotypes of the 'marginals'.
It is for this reason that throughout the process of
selection of the cases included in the analysis that will
follow, particular attention has been paid to both the
elements of continuity and transition, that is, to the
processes of the emergence of the inventories and public
languages used to publicize particular definitions of the
situation, as well as to their later usage and development by
the press.
However, the analysis which follows is not limited to
the study of the particular languages and inventories in
press representations of the marginals; more importantly, it
constitutes an attempt to throw li ght on the question of how
4-
they are related to the reproduction of the hegemonic
political culture of the societ y within which the former
emerge. In other words, it attempts to link the 'text' of
mnm coverage with the particular social-historical
conditions, that is, the Particular relations of power in
which it is produced.
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Thus, the anal ysis that follows will concentrate on the
study of the particular narratives, structures of argument
and, in some instances, syntactic structure of newspaper
texts, in conjunction with the study of the social-
historical conditions in which these are produced and
employed. In this way, it is possible to treat the production
of these texts as politically relevant, as an instance of the
politics of signification, and thereby to discern the complex
strategies of mobilization of meaning at work, and their
links with processes of legitimation, delegitimation, and
dehistorisization of forms and contexts of social action as
well as of their actors.
The case studies 
The analysis which follows will focus on four 'events'
which attracted extensive press coverage and public interest.
The first case study is based on the press coverage of a
series of occupations of empty buildings in Athens and other
cities by the marginals in November 1981. It seems to me that
this particular case study is significant because the
s margginals' attempted to challenge the mainstream political
organizations by resorting to a novel - for Greek society -
form of collective action, and by addressing in a practical
manner existing social problems such as those of
homelessness, or the lack of cultural infrastructure,
especially for young people. The issue of the occupations
immediately became the focus of controversy as the local
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controversial urban planning intervention in the area, aiming
at the 'restoration of balanced distribution of land uses'
and providing for the limitation of practices which were
associated with the presence of marginal groups in the area.
It was in this climate of confrontation that 'Operation
Virtue' was launched. The Athens press played a significant
role by publicizing and amplifying particular 'definitions of
the situation' and by employing strategies of signification
which linked Exarcheia and the 'marginals' to the themes of
drug-use and criminality, it represented them within the
universe of public discourse as pressing social problems.
The press coverage of the occupation of the building of
the department of Chemistr y of the University of Athens
(Chimeio) in May 1985 was the basis for the third case study.
The occupation of Chimeio led to a prolonged siege of the
surrounding area by police special forces, and to violent
confrontation between the two parties. The press, almost
unanimously, emphasized the lack of a strong state, able to
confront effectively the 'marginal' occupiers. The Athens
dailies mobilized fears of disruption and lawlessness in
order to set in opposition the 'average' citizens/readers and
the 'anti-social' marginals'.
Finally, the coverage of the events which followed the
anti-nuclear demonstrations of May 1986 provided the material
for the fourth case study. The police ban without any prior
notice of two demonstrations against the use of nuclear
Power, organized by leftist, anarchist and ecological groups
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and organizations, some days after the nuclear accident of
Chernobyl, and police attacks against members of the
organizing committees, led to incidents in the centre of
Athens between anarchist demonstrators and the police. These
events and their aftermath (i.e. the magistrate's hearings,
and the trial of those arrested during the incidents) were
covered by the press in detail. What is more, the press
coverage of the events entered a second phase in which the
incidents were treated as a mere manifestation of a much
broader social problem, that of Exarcheia.
Occupations of Empty Buildings: 6 November 1981 - 
13 January 1982. 
On November 9, 1981 a group of mainly young people
(anarchists, leftists, homeless, autonomists) occupied an
empty, unused building in Valtetsiou Street, in the central
Athens borough of Exarcheia. The participants in the
occupation, which I shall be calling "occupiers", soon formed
an occupation committee which issued statements regarding the
reasons that led to this particular form of action and their
plans about the use of the building . During the next few days
one more occupation of an empty, unused building took place
in the sane street, while the committee said they were
planning to renovate a third derelict building in the future,
provided that there would be demand for housing and that the
building's owner would not oppose to such action.
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These occupations were followed by two more in the
suburban area of Neo Irakleio, and in the Athens borough of
Patissia, while on November 16, another building was occupied
in the northern city of Thessaloniki. However, it should be
pointed out that press coverage concentrated on the initial
occupation in Exarcheia and, later, on the occupation of N.
Irakleion, possibly because of the existence of rather
vociferous opposition to them, b y local residents in the
former, and by local authorities in the latter.
The various committees which were formed in this
series of building occupations, most of which were owned by
the state or other public and charitable organizations stated
that they had taken this kind of action in protest against
the acute lack of housing and of spaces for social and
cultural expression, and declared that they intended to
repair and renovate the empty buildings and use them ELS
housing space, and cultural centres for the promotion of free
expression, which would be open to everyone.
After complaints by residents of the surrounding areas,
the denouncement of the occupiers and of their actions by the
major political parties' youth organizations, and their
concerted condemnation by the majority of the press, the
occupations came to an end on January 11, 1982 following a
police operation during which special police forces entered
the occupied buildings, expelled the occupiers and made
several arrests.
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The issue of the occupations immediately became the
focus of controversy as the local authorities and residents
of the areas concerned became a vociferous participant in a
war of statements with the squatters and their sympathizers.
Press performance has been highly significant, as Athens
newspapers provided an effective medium for the "publication"
of the debate, played a major role in the creation of public
outcr y against the occupiers and transformed a limited and
localized event into "national news" of hi gh importance.
It is important to note that the "novelty" of the
phenomenon of the occupations and of squatting in Greece,
after the initial surprize, generated controversy and
guaranteed their prominent position in the news for a
relatively long period.
At the same time, it appears that another important
factor which influenced the way some newspapers covered the
events, was the time at which the occupations took place.
More precisely, as the first occupations took place just over
20 days after PASOK - a "newcomer" in modern Greek party
politics characterized bY a socialist rhetoric, and
associated in the public feeling with the prospect of a more
tolerant and democratic 	 political	 practice than its
conservative predecessors - took office, they were
interpreted as a threat to the change of government by
newspapers sympathetic to the new government which treated
the events with caution and eventual hostility.
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The majority of the press, regardless of political
affiliation or orientation, treated the events, and more
generally the issue of squatting, with hostility, emphasizing
their novelty, "foreign ori gin", absurdity and anti-social
character. As a climate of confrontation developed between
the squatters and the residents of the areas concerned,
generating a debate over the legitimacy or moral
justification of the occupations, and the right of the local
residents to demand the preservation of "normality" in their
neighbourhoods, the press appears to have sided almost
unanimously with the latter. The Athens dailies, immediately,
or after a day of initial surprise that followed the
occupations, became important participants in this public
debate.
The coverage of the events occupied a prominent Position
throughout the period between November 1981 and January 19e2,
The newspapers that have been reviewed in that case are
"Apogevmatini", "EleutherotyPia", "Ethnos s, "Ta Neat", and
"Vradini". The analysis that follows starts with the
newspaper editions of November 9, 1981 and ends on January
14, 1982.
The common element among the newspapers revu.ewed, la
their condemnation of the phenomenon of occupations, as well
as of the groups that participated in them. The the
newspapers, with the exception of "EleftherctYPialo
represented the events in terms of a conflict between the
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anti-social behaviour and way of life , "forei gn" to Greek
societ y, of the "vocal" minority versus the silent majority
of "normal", law-abiding , hard-working citizens.
The press coverage of the occupations was very important
and significant insofar as it comprized extensive reports of
the events (an average of two pages per day) including
several large size photographs and page 1 headlines and was
marked by the emergence of specific techniques and styles of
presentation of the events and of argumentation against the
occupiers by each newepaper, which seem to be further
elaborated and reemployed in future reporting of relevant
events.
However, despite differences in emphasis and the
emergence of specific styles of presentation, the majority of
the newspapers reviewed (like the majority of the Athens
dailies) seem to have adopted a variety of similar
techniques which were directed towards the symbolic and
ideological isolation and discrediting of the occupations as
a form of acceptable action, and of the individuals and
groups which participated in them.
Certain common signifying and symbolic strategies which
were employed in order to discredit the occupiers. First,
reports questioned,	 or rather rejected the occupiers'
motivation and . their justification of the occupations.
Second, they mobilized and built upon public fears and social
anxieties and, thus, cultivated collective phobias which
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reinforced the "cultural lag" that alread y existed between
the social majority and the occupiers.
The most prominent strategies that were used by the
majority of the Athens dailies were intended to "undermine"
the discourse of the occupiers. They were strategies aimed at
questioning and denying any rational or moral, or rather,
common sense, base in the discourse of the groups which
participated in the occupations.
Thus, it can be shown that whenever the occupiers were
able to gain access to the public discourse by issuing
statements or giving interviews, their views and definitions
were systematically represented in newspaper reports as
partial, nonsensical, absurd and, therefore, delegitimated.
This was quite obvious in the case of Ethnos, which adopted a
hostile attitude against the occupiers and used a wide
variety of discursive strategies in order to isolate and
delegitimate their actions. In order to reinforce its
rejection of the anarchists' actions it employed irony. It
mnad appear that this introduction of irony into the text of
the coverage of the events was intended to minimize the value
of the "linguistic" or "symbolic capital" which the occupiers
might possess. Thus Ethnos, doubted the alternative visions
of anarchists and treated their declared goal, that is, an
alternative way of life, as a sham: "the 200 anarchists who
settled in it < =the building> try to ... organize their
lives" (November 11, 1981: 12) 	 or "<the anarchists> sleep
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and have fun" (P
	 13). In the first case, the usage of
ellipsis before the declared aim of the occupiers, that is,
to organize their lives in their own way, is intended to
express puzzlement and disbelief towards the anarchists and
to stress the absurdity of their claim. In the second, the
occupiers' motives were being questioned as the former were
represented as persons motivated by "superficial"
self-interest as their main preoccupation is sleep and
enjoyment. The occupation was therefore not to be interpreted
as an action of protest, or as an action with an alternative
social proposal; it is simply an action of irresponsibility
as it conflicts with "common sense" modes of behaviour.
"Vradyni" also attempted to doubt the sincerity of the
occupiers' expressed motives, or their attempt to demonstrate
their commitment and social reponsibility through gestures,
such as invitations to the press in order to explain their
action, or their offer to help in repairs and renovations of
empty buildings for the housing of more homeless people. This
was mainly done through continuous 11138 of explicit or
implicit irony in its quotations of the occupiers' statements
and its account of their activities. Thus on November 10,
1981 under the headline The anarchists who occupied the
uninhabited building <ellipsis in the original intended
to express disbelief and irony> Invite us ins the paper
quoted a statement issued by the occupation committee:
" Anyone who would like to spend some time as a human
being (?) <question mark in the original intended to
express surprise, disbelief and irony> can come to the
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building we have occupied.
... while at the same time <the anarchists> make
statements and declarations supporting the
<ellipsis in the original intended to express disbelief
and irony> homeless pointing out that:
* There are thousands of uninhabited
buildings in very good condition. And it
is unfair these houses that have been
built by us (7) <question mark in the
original intended to express surprise,
disbelief and irony> for us, to remain
unused when we need them.
And the y conclude by saying (in Robin Hood style):
* We are ready to help in the occupation,
repair and settlement in these houses by
anyone who has a housing problem."
(Vradyni, November 10, 1981: 5)
Throughout the coverage of the occupation the reporters
of "Vradyni" systematically attempted to call into question
any attempt by the anarchists to gain the moral high ground.
The introduction of punctuation marks such as ellipses or
question marks into quotations of statements issued by the
occupiers and their slogans, constituted an indirect comment
'warding the validity of the arguments, and the occupiers
themselves. Thus, in the above quotation, the expressions
"like a human being" and "houses that have been built by us
for us" lost their significance as comments on alienation in
modern societies, or on the asymmetrical relations of power
and on the exploitation of workers by employers respectively,
as the paper introduced question marks in them. In this way
the expressions were presented as nonsense, as absurd
enunciations which reveal the absurdity of the enunciators
and of their actions in general. Similarly, the use of
ellipsis before the word homeless, in the same article and
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more generally throughout the paper's coverage of the
occupations undermined the validity of the occupiers' claim
that there was a problem of homelessness, and was therefore
used in the context of a signification strategy aimed at
divesting the discourse of the occupiers from any moral or
rational basis. The sane could be said about the use of the
"Robin Hood" metaphor in the sane text, as it also seems to
have been a part of this strategy, as it appears to have been
an ironic comment aimed at the occupiers' offer to help
anyone in need of housing, thus doubting their real motives
and intentions.
The occupiers stressed the housing problem and claimed
that the issue of homelessness was one of the main reasons of
their occupations, but most newspapers made efforts to keep
the issue of homelessness out of the universe of public
discourse, and of the political sphere by effectively denying
its existence. There seems to have been a broad consensus
among newspapers on the treatment of homelessness as a
definitely non political issue; in some newspapers it was
claimed that the problem of homelessness was merely fiction
constructed by the occupiers in order to justify their
actions, although it should be pointed out that the attitude
of the press towards similar actions motivated by
harmlessness in western European cities was more tolerant, or
even one of approval, as, it was alleged, the problem of
homelessness was real and acute in these societies. What is
more, even when homelessness was recognized as a problem, the
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people who participated in the occupations, according to most
newspapers, were not in need of housing, as they, allegedly,
chose to leave their family houses. Thus, "Ethnos" condemned
the occupations in an editorial on November 12, claiming that
"An acute housing problem - that could be the cause
of arbitrary occupation of houses - does not exist
in our country. ... Thus, one cannot accept the
reason given by anyone who arbitrarily occupies
houses, as in Valtetsiou Street and in Neo
Irakleio. These 17-30 year-old young people, are
not homeless, nor are they family-men tormented by
adverse economic conditions, who are unable to
house their families. On the contrary, they are
children of families which have houses, and because
of reasons that bear no relevance to the housing
issue, leave their houses to live in communes ..."
(Ethnos, November 12, 1981: 6)
In conclusion, the occupations in Greece were condemned
as an act of mimesis with no real causes, and the occupiers
were denounced, as having no real housing problem - although
no evidence was provided for this by the paper.
On November 10, 1981, TA NEA featured an extensive
report on the issue of building occupations, in its regular
column "The day's report", reserved for the most important
events of the previous day. Under the headline
mOccrupation... Why? How the Phenomenon of the occupation of
a building in Exarcheia can be explained" the paper
emphasized that the occupation was not a new phenomenon in
Greek societ y but a simple imitation of the squatters in
Western Europe.
"The action of the young people who occupied the
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Valtetsiou Street building in Exarcheia four days
ago is not original. A whole decade ago, in London
groups of, mainly young, people started a series of
building occupations. The same happened in Germany,
the Netherlands, Denmark (there are thousands
of homeless people there)."
("TA NEA", 10 November 1981: 3)
Similarly, on November 12, the paper claimed that the
occupiers who were "a bad imitation [sic] of the European
'squatters' , were not facing any prospect of homelessness:
"the overwhelming majority (of the occupiers> are
not homeless. They are anticipating to assert
themselves politically and socially in some way"
("Ta Nea", November 12, 1981: 5).
And on the same day, the analysis of "Ta Nea" concluded
its extensive reportage by refusing to treat the occupations
as a serious issue and suggesting that the occu piers had
homes to return to:
"And the less attention one pays to them, the
sooner they will return to their ... homes"
("Ta Nes", November 12, 1981: 5)
It would appear therefore that by denying any importance, or
"newsworthiness" to the occupations, the paper effectively
refused to introduce the issue into the public discourse as a
serious issue of political significance.
"Vradyni" also tried to discredit the occupiers by
refuting their claims, that is, by insisting that the
"so-called" homeless occupiers were in realit y, according to
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the local residents, children of rich families who do not
need to work as their parents provide them with money and
housing, and, during the occupations with drugs and food!
(December 15, 1981: 8) . Thus, they were represented as not
politically or socially motivated but just as spoilt children
of "bourgeois families" (cf. December 15: 8; also November
21: 5). Eleftherotypia was the only newspaper whose position
on the issue was ambiguous; while on November 10, it
recognized a linkage between the problem of homelessness and
the occupations and carried a story on the impoverished and
underdeveloped districts of Athens under the heading "At the
makeshift neighbourhoods of the plebe-lane A life of terror,
arrests, persecution" 6 which recognized that there was an
actual and acute problem of homelessness. In the rest of its
coverage the paper treated the phenomenon of the occupations
as a mimetic act, as a poor imitation of the squatters'
movement (cf. November 11, 1981: 11).
Another significant attempt to isolate and delegitimate
the occupiers and their actions was made, mainly by
newspapers sympathetic to the government, throu gh their
symbolic	 political	 marginalization	 and	 exclusion.
"Tleftherotypia", "Ethnos" and "Ta Nee" treated the
occupations with suspicion, remarking that actions of this
sort constituted provocation to a three week old government,
and might have been planned in order to achieve the
destabilization of democratic life. "Ta Nea" argued that the
occupiers, betting on the reluctance of the government -
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which in the past had been a fierce critic of the
authoritarian and control practices of the Greek state - to
resort to violence, "felt free to disturb the area residents,
obstruct traffic, and realize their own choices at the
expence of the rights of the rest of the citizens" ("Ta Nea",
November	 12,1981) while	 "Eleftherotypia" and	 "Ethnos"
followed suit.
Further, on November 11, "Eleftherot ypia" asked the
youth political or ganizations of the major political parties
to contribute to the debate on the issue of the occupations.
The paper claimed that in the prevailing confusion over the
issue, the voice of the political youth organizations would
offer answers to the "young occupiers" (P. 11). Despite the
political differences among them, the youth organizations
denounced the occupations with remarkable unanimity. The
reasons offered by most organizations were the "imported"
character of the occupations, the fact that the occupiers did
not really face any housing problem, the heterogeneity and
the lack of any concrete political programme of the
occupiers, while KNE, the youth organization of the Communist
Party, expressed its suspicion of the concentration on issues
related to the gay movement, to the conditions of
prostitutes and to the occupations, at a time when the
problems of the working people should be a priority. Similar
statements were made to "Ta Nea" on Januar y 14, 1982 in the
context of a similar reportage. "Ethnos", on the other hand,
accused the occupiers for their shallow ideology and lack of
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any political and social programme, or proposals for the
future (cf. November 10: 8), and ali gned its position with
those of the youth organizations. The representation of the
occupiers as politically inadequate or even irrelevant by all
three newspapers was also based on their refusal to associate
themselves with one of the established political
organizations. The alignment of press and youth political
organizations could be interpreted in terms of what Elliott
calls "political ritual" (Elliott 1980: 141-147) through
which the unity of Greek youth, and the existing power
relations within it, were reasserted in the context of their
relation of opposition to the "occupiers", while the
"political culture" of the latter, with its alternative and
oppositional potential, unconventional political practices
and virtuall y non-existent hierarchy, was marginalized and
repressed.
The issue of the occupations was thus transformed from a
potentially political one, highly pertinent to issues of
Public policies and political institutions, into the problem
of a deviant, criminal and degrading practice.
As most newspapers did not leave any doubt as to the
existence of a linkage between the European squatters'
movements and the Greek occupations, and as there was general
agreement on the certain failure of such forms of collective
action, as the socioeconomic conditions in Greece were
perceived to be considerably different from those in western
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European societies and definitely did not warrant actions of
this sort, the occupiers were effectively distinguished at
the symbolic level from the rest of the "nation". Thus, most
mnmpapers emphasized the "foreign" character of the
occupations, and therefore, their unacce ptability as a form
of legitimate action,
"They used as their model the 'squatters' movement
of some countries of the West and they attempt to
propagate into our country a reality which has
neither the dimensions - really huge - of the
European models nor their motives.
("Ethnos", November 12, 1981: 6)
"Ta Nea" went even futher and gave extensive publicity
to parts of a rather xenophobic letter of complaint send by
residents of Exarcheia to the prime minister, which
emphasized the "non Greek" and decadent character of such
action:
... The situation is very serious. Our patience
has been exhausted. .... We believe that the
Government has the courage and the power to
confront such phenomena whose roots are in the
decadent societies of the West and not in the proud
history of our people ..."
("Ta Nea", November 10, 1981: 3)
It is clear that the logic of this nationalistic
discourse entails the isolation, or rather, the effective
exclusion of the occupiers from the "people" and the
"nation". It should be pointed out that the qualifier
"decadent", preceding "societies of the West", refers to both
western societies and the occupiers, thus considerably
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reducing the importance and the credibility of the latter.
What is more, if	 we take	 into account the "anti-
imperialistic" elements which were prominent in the
discourses of Greek nationalism during that period 7 we
possibly have some insight as far as representations of the
occupiers within the context of this nationalistic discourse
are concerned; the occupiers are perceived as one more
example of cultural imperialism, an attempt to erode the
Greek way of life.
At the same time, a parallel process of exclusion was in
progress as the occupiers were represented as "different"
from the rest of society in non-nationalistic terms. This
construction of difference occured through the particular
ways in which the occupiers were represented in the press
coverage. Although most of the images constructed are not
easily distinguishable and in man y cases could be considered
as overlapping, we attempt to categorize them on the basis of
the predominance of symbols of social decadence, bad
appearance, disease or "abnormality".
In several reports of the events, "Vradyni" attempted to
represent the occupiers as "decadent" by bringing to the
foreground the issue of the occupiers' attitude to work.
Building upon the declared opposition of the anarchists to
"paid work" in their statements, interviews and graffiti, the
paper ignored the fact that thie antipathy referred
specificall y to	 "paid work"	 as a form of economic
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exploitation, and attempted to generalize it; work as an
important and respectable social activity, and the occupiers'
attitude towards it became a prominent pet-theme of the
paper. Thus the paper reporters represented the occupiers as
idle and lazy persons who loathed work of any kind. The
discrepancy which occured when occupiers stated that they
intended to work, and were seen to work in renovating the
occupied buildings, was simply ignored. Work which would
usuall y be considered as a positive activit y was transformed
into a negative one by the paper:
"The groups of anarchists have been working
intensively, (although of course they loathe work
and as <work> is ideologically incompatible with
them) cleaning the rooms of the buildings they have
occupied ...."
(I Vradyni,. November 10, 1981: 5)
"Vradyni" drawing upon the centrality of "work" in the
worldview of its mainly conservative traditional petty
bourgeois readership, took every opportunity to exploit the
themes of idleness and laziness in order to emphasize the
irreconcilable difference between society and the occupiers.
Thus, on November 13, the paper stressed with obvious
revulsion the fact that some occupiers were sleepin g at 3.00
Pm., a time normally dedicated to work:
... <a> long-haired and dirty occupier of villa
'Stella' who was not allowing us to enter - at
three o'clock in the afternoon - 'because the girls
are sleepIng . (since last night)!".
("Vradyni", November 13, 1981: 5)
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or on November 21, the caption of a photograph of an
occupation committee meeting, stated:
"The anarchists are in conference. It is the only
kind of 'work' they will do".
("Vradyni", November 21, 1981: 5)
What is more, "Vradyni" systematically used images
representing the occupiers as dirty, long-haired, rude,
posing a danger to public health and morality, drug-addicts,
homosexuals, criminals, indulging in sex orgies, drug pushers
and "inciting to homosexual behaviour" throughout the period
under review. For example, characteristic of the compulsive
use of pejorative qualifiers of the word "anarchist" was the
heading of an interview which appeared on November 21:
"INTERVIEW WITH AM ANARCHIST, Dirty, aggreesive, rude"
where the reporter seen o to have felt compelled to give
details about the appearance and behaviour of the interviewee
in the headline. These qualifiers, being open to a multitude
of negative significations of difference, revolt, deviance,
criminality, disease, immorality, or abnormality, provided
ample ground for an effective representation of the occupiers
as the "threatening Other".
This construction of the "threatenin g Other" became
clearer as the papers emphasized the physical and moral
dangers of the "anti-social activities" of the occupiers,
that is, the disruption of everyday life, and the negative
influence of their alleged sexual and drug abuses upon the
local residents' children. Re ports represented the occupiers
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as a threat to society that had to be removed:
"Dirt competes with recklessness and the use of
drugs, and the transformation of those four houses
into pigsties creates 	 infestation of disease,
physical and moral, a real gangrene which the
ministry <of public security> refuses to confront
'I
("Vradyni", November 12, 1981: 1)
The medical metaphors, of infestation of disease and
gangrene, appear to be suggesting both the urgency and the
necessity for remedial action; while the reference to
gangrene could also be perceived to constitute an implicit
but also clear call for decisive action, as the usual remedy
for it is amputation.
Similarly, "Ethnos" represented the occupiers as
drug-users, provocative, vulgar, lazy and arrogant (cf.
November 12-14), while "Ta Nea", apart from using a similar
vocabulary (cf. November 12-14, January 13-14), emphasized
that the occupiers were
"persons who face unresolved family, social,
psychological and personal problems"
("Ta Nea", November 12, 1981: 5)
adding in this way "psychopathological" elements in their
representation, and thus observing the social dimension of
the occupations under the guise of an individualistic-
Psychologistic explanatory schema .
Another prominent way of representing the occupiers was
introduced by "Apogevmatini" on November 10 when, in an
-271-
oversize page 1 headline it represented the occupations in
terms of a state:
'The anarchists are founding
THEIR OWN STATE IN Exarchisia"
while in the reportage that followed frequent references were
made to the "state of Exarcheia" and its "expansion" through
further occupations of other buildings. The usage of terms
related to state, territor y and boundaries continued
throughout the coverage of the occupations, until January 13,
1982, the day it reported that the occupiers were expelled
from the buildings by the police. In that day's reportage,
"Apogevmatini" referred to the action of the occupation, and
to the occupiers by using the words "invasion" and "invaders"
respectively, while it characterized the police operation as
"liberation" of the buildings (January 13, 1982: 1).
"Apogevmatini" was soon followed by "Ethnos" which.
between November 11 and 14, compared the occupied buildings
with "the state of the anarchists". On November 11, under the
headline
The anarchists founded a state of 10 roome
the paper carried a report in which relevant references were
abundant. Thus, one could read that the occupiers wanted "to
continue with new occupations and to expand its <=the
state •s> 'territory' beyond the area of Exarcheia" (p. 12),
while the caption of a photograph informed the reader that
bedrooms constituted a large part of the anarchist
territory
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It could be argued that the two papers, by introducing
metaphors of territory and statehood, achieved the
"territorialization" of the "anarchist threat" and brought
to the foreground the issue of "sovereignty" regarding the
occupied buildings. The y emphasized the loss of control and
jurisdiction over the occupied properties by the legal
makers and the police. Therefore the issues of law and order
and of the restoration of legality, which had been suspended
by the action of the occupiers were tacitly introduced to
public debate through this process of symbolization. It
should be pointed out that just after the expulsion of the
occupiers from the buildings, "Apogevmatini" used the
metaphor of "liberation", that is, of restoration of the
jurisdiction of the police, and, eventually, of the legal
owner. "Ethnos"	 on the other hand, referred to the
possibility of further occupations using the expression
"territorial expansion"	 which in fact exaggerated the
"threat" which the occupations represented.
These strategies of representation of the occupiers were
in fact simultaneously strategies of representation of "the
society", and they provided the readership of the Athens
dailies with schemata for interpretation of the events. These
processes were most clearl y epitomized approximatel y one
month after the first occupation in the introduction of a
retrospective reportage in "Vradyni", under the heading
"Occupations: First Mbilth'
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"With pockets full of ... bourgeois pocket-money
from daddy, with stomach full of filet mignon and
brains empty as a result of the side-effects of
heroin. They do not represent any ideology. Not
even - if you wish - that of anarchism. They are
simply a pityful congregation of drug-addicts,
homosexuals and criminals, whose presence threatens
even ... the Public Health. They break the law and
totally disregard the most essential human rights
("Vradyni", December 15, 1981: 8)
The text included not only references to drug-addiction,
homosexuality, criminality but also to their cause
according to the paper - that is, their bourgeois background
and its degrading effect. It could be argued that "Vradyni"
attempted to demarcate its own - traditional petty bourgeois
- version of "popular" identity by excluding from the
"people" both the occupiers and the bourgeoisie which is
considered to be equally immoral and responsible for the
situation. This form of populism became more obvious as
"Vradyni", denouncing the reluctance of the police to
intervene, emphasized throughout its coverage the right of
the "enraged and disillusioned citizens" to intervene
themselves, using force, and to re-establish order, despite
the illegality -recognized by the paper- of such acts
(December 15, 1981: 8). It is obvious that the order that the
paper refers to, is not the 'legal' order but rather the
'moral' order which had been violated by the profound
disrespect of the occupiers towards simple "family people",
"small-shop owners" and "working people". It should be
pointed out that 	 references to the torment of "hundreds of
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families", the "family man" or the "small shop owner" were
abundant in the coverage of most newspapers, although no
explicit reference was made to the possibility of "violent
citizen reaction" by other newspapers..
The construction of the "decent people" through their
subjection to the "abuse" of the "anarchists" and their
provocative behaviour was quite clear in a passionate
introduction to an extensive reportage of "Vradyni" on
November 21:
"'HOMELESS', 'Autonomous groups', 'Anarchists',
'Tramps', 'Provocators'. Which of these 'labels' -
<given> by the government, the Press and the Public
Opinion - were [sic] the two-fronted hordes of
youngsters who rushed to occupy the buildings of
Valtetsiou Street and the villa of Neo Irakleio?
Who are those 'children' which look at you from
their stand of irony? Which mock your 'subjection'
to the social authorities? Which criticize your
'consumerist frenzy'? Who burst out laughing at
your ironed trousers?"
("Vradyni", November 21: 5)
Here, the reader is effectively interpellated, is
invited to assume the identity of "the victim" of the
occupiers. While the press had previously emphasized -the
local probleme created by the occupations, that is, the
tension and conflict between the occupiers and the local
residents, or had represented the anarchists as challenging
abstact, social norms, the series of connotations which are
employed in this news article personalizes and transfers the
experience of the victim to the reader him/herself. What is
more, the reader is	 interpellated in his/her multiple
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identities; he/she is identified as law-abiding citizen
("subjected" to	 the social	 authorities), as consumer
("consumerist frenzy"), as respectable person (ironed
trousers) and more importantly as victimized, as the object
of irony, mocker y, criticism and ridicule. The first three
identifications which are socially sanctioned and
respectable, represent and reinforce the established social
order, while the fourth, that is, that of the reader as
victim, gives rise to perceptions of the occupiers as a
threat to that order, and consequently to the reader who is
inextricably linked with it at the symbolic level.
Operation "Virtue" in Exsrchela; October 1984 
On the 27th of September 1984 the Athens police
directorate launched a controversial operation, which became
widely known as 'Operation Virtue', for the 'cleaning up' of
Exarcheia square. The reasons which led the leadership of the
Athens police to launch the operation were allegedly the
complaints of residents and traders of the area about the
presence of persons	 with 'antisocial' and 'provocative
behaviour'.6
The operation, consisting of the stationing of strong
police forces in the area, intense policing of the square
and frequent identity card checks resulted in minor incidents
between September 27 and October 1. However, during the night
of October 1,	 the operation was stepped up when the police
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blocked the streets around the square, entered theatres and
shops checking identity cards and making arrests, using
indiscriminate force.
The incidents of that night attracted the interest of
the Athens press throughout the next few days, until October
6, when the police director Mr M. Bosinakis promised to
committees representing the residents of the area that he
would withdraw his men, thus bringing to an end that phase
of what was to turn into a lengthy and complex effort to
eradicate or at least contain possible milieux of social
dissent.
The newspapers which have been used in the analysis that
follows are, "Apogevmatini", "Avriani", "Eleftherotypia",
"Ethnos", "Ta Nea" and "To Vima".
Analysis of the texts reveals two main lines of
interpretation of the incidents. On the one hand the
'Popular' dailies, that is, "Apogevmatini", "Avriani" and
"Ethnos" appear to employ techniques which emphasize the
theme of violence and evoke a sense of horror and chaos and,
at the same time, put special emphasis on the responsibility
of 'anarchists' and/or 'punks' for the 'fights' or 'clashes'
between them and the police.
On the other hand, "Eleftherotypia", "Ta Nea" and "Ts
Vima", while exploiting the themes of violence, chaos and
horror, appear to concentrate on the denunciation of police
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behaviour and brutality during the incidents. It should
however be pointed out that this distinction between the more
'popular' former three papers and the more 'serious' latter
might be misleading, as in contrast to "Eleftherot ypia", "Ta
Nea" and "To Vima" adopted the government and police
definition and treatment of Exarcheia as a problem area, and
generally attempted to represent the issue of Exarcheia, and
especially of the presence of 'marginal' groups there, as a
"social problem", thus introducing it into public discussion
in these terne. "Eleftherotypia" on the other hand appeared
to be emphasizing the tactics and methods of the police and,
on occasions, to question the official definitions of the
events.
In the case of "Apogevmatini", "Avriani" and "Ethnos",
headlines such as ""Brutal beating in Exarcheia" (Ethnos,
2-10-1984), "Night of terror in Eacarcheia. With bombs,
injuries and arrests " (Apogevmatini, 3-10-1984), "Scenes
of violence in the streets" (Apogevmatini, 4-10-1984).
"Fear and terror in Exarcheia" (Avriani, 	 2-10-1984).
"Facarcheia once more in a state of chaos yesterday"
(Avriani, 3-10-1984) occupied a prominent place in the
coverage of the events that took place during "Operation
Virtue" by these newspapers. It could be argued that these
headlines by drawing upon a negatively charged vocabulary and
imagery of lawlessness and lack of order, were intended to
target a readership which would identify emotionally with
those who appeared to be suffering . This is especiall y so,
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because in addition to the reference to tormented "residents"
and "shop-owners", which is present in all these newspapers,
there are specific references to figures which are very
familiar and dear to the average Greek, that is "family-men"
who are unable to provide for their families (Ethnos,
3-10-1984), "terrified widows", "old people" and "children"
who cannot go out and play because of the terrorism of
certain "criminal elements" (Avriani, 2-10-1984). By
identifying the 'victims' of the 'marginals" violence with
categories of the population which, in the 'petty-bourgeois'
or 'popular' imagination, are regarded as respectable, hard
working people (shop-owners, family-men striving to provide
for their families), or as being in need of social protection
and help (widows, elderly people and children) the papers
mobilize 'popular' disapproval and	 condemnation of the
s marginals" breaking of these social norms. As the
readership becomes increasingly concerned - and apart from
the favourable consequences this entails as far as the
newspapers' circulation is concerned the ground is
prepared for pinpointing the culprits and holding them
responsible.
The process of "pointing the finger" at those who should
be held responsible and, ultimately, confronted, is not
identical in all of these newspapers and can range from a
relatively straightforward to a more complex process. In the
case of "Apogevmatini" this task seems to be quite
straightforward as the group which is directly blamed
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throughout the coverage of the events is the "anarchists"
-with the exception of a single reference to "anarchists and
punks" in its October 4 edition. According to the headline of
October 2, ""Exardheia was agitated during the night by the
anarchists", while, one day later (October 3) under the
headline "Night of terror in Exarcheia. With bombs,
injuries, beatings and unrest" appeared the following text:
"Terror	 throughout	 the night	 in Exarcheia.
Anarchists and policemen were engaged in a guerilla
war with	 "Molotov"	 bombs,	 wood-sticks and
stones..."
While, on October 4, according to "Apogevmatini",
"The anarchists 'kept' the centre of Athens for 3
hours. IN THE TRIAL OF THE 18 ARRESTED IN
Exarcheia"
Further, in the text which followed under this headline,
the details of the way in which the 18 arrested were brought
to court ("they were led two by two, with strong police
escort and handcuffed") and the exhaustive list of the
charges they faced can be seen as a means to assert the poor
quality of the character of these persons, demeaning them,
and making them fit the paper's stereotype of the criminal.
Taking a further step in discrediting, indirectly, the
accused, and their possible s ympathizers, "Apogevmatini",
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described the s ympathizers who gathered at the court to
support the accused in terms of their "unacceptable"
behaviour:
"Around two hundred and fifty friends of the
accused, who had gathered at the courtyard of the
court and 50-60 more inside the hall of the
magistrates court, started to disapprove and to
abuse verbally the lawyers, the State, Justice and
the Government."
It could be argued that in the case of "Apogevmatini", a
sizeable conservative paper which at the time appeared to
have no aspirations to attract its readership from outside
its traditional, mainly conservative political camp, the use
of complex processes of representation aiming at the ultimate
discrediting and/or criminalization of the "marginals" is not
necessary as, from the point of view of the paper's
conservative readership, their selection as the undisputed
object of fear, and the "a priori" certainty of their link
with terror and the destruction of law and order, is
"natural".s
"Avriani" and "Ethnos", on the other hand appear to
employ more intricate methods of condensation of images and
themes in their effort not only to identify those who had
been "responsible" for the incidents in Exarcheia, but also,
and more importantly, to "define" the "anti-social" or, even
"extra-social enemy". For example, an article which appeared
in "Avriani" on October 2, 1984, that is, in its first
edition after the events in Exarcheia square under the
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characteristic headline "AFTER THE ANARCHISTS AND
MUM-ADDICTS THE "PUNKS n ESTABLISHED THEIR OWN KINGDOM_ Fear
and terror in Exarcheia!" focused on the problems which the
residents of the area faced because of the "punks" who
gathered in the square:
"Wherever they happen to be, the punks spread
terror, fear and panic to the residents of
Exarcheia. The disturbances and clashes they cause
in the area <are> an everyday occurence, while, in
a state of panic, the residents see the police
remaining aloof and passive, facing the terrorism
and anarchy of these peculiar people. The 'punks'
have created their own terroristic kingdom in which
the area residents are treated as outsiders, or
<are tolerated insofar as> they < =the punks> can
take money from them by strongly requesting it.
In the subsequent paragraphs of the text, emphasis is put on
the "antisocial behaviour" and appearance of "those peculiar
people". The list that follows, although it is far from being
exhaustive, is characteristic; "they annoy everybody, old
people, children", "they ask people for money", "they swear",
"they cause disturbances", "they fight", "they are closed in
their own society, and do not contact or communicate with us.
They live in their own world", "they light fires in the
square, break bottles, street lamps, they cause damage",
"they take their clothes off, they strip themselves", "they
are revolting and have awful appearances", "their appearance
annoys us, they are dirty, badly dressed, sickly".
From the abundant examples of selective overwordin g and
repetitions throughout the article, it is quite clear that
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the newspaper attempts to amplify characteristics of the
lifestyles, behaviour and appearance of the s marginals' which
contrast sharply with the socially acceptable. Thus, we can
detect the unfolding of processes of symbolic exclusion, of
creation of press stereotypes ranging from those in which the
'marinals' are	 represented as "strange" in terms of
appearance and behaviour, to stereotypes of which the
'otherness' of the 'marginals' is a prominent feature.
Throughout the text, emphasis is placed upon the lack of
interaction between them and the rest of the society ('they
are closed in their own society, and do not contact or
communicate with us', 'they live in their own world'), in an
apparent attempt to stress, not only the difference, but also
the 'otherness' of the 'marginals'. Viewed as anti-social and
extra-social, these 'foreign' elements are constructed and
situated in a relation of confrontation with society, its
laws, morality and work ethic.
By reinforcing the impressions of confrontation and
Imminent threat, and thereby mobilizing fears and generating
public disquiet, the article plays a significant part in the
creation of a generalized moral panic. This is further
. reinforced by the presentation of a series of interview
extracts from people with whom the average reader could
identify or sympathize, such as residents, shop-owners, or a
widow with two .children (in capital letters in the original
text). There are good reasons to question the authenticity
of these interviews and the ob j ectivity of the newspaper as
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most of the interviewees are not named, and only small parts
of the "actual" interviews find their way into the text.
It could therefore be argued that the Avriani article of
2 October 1984, which is not a mere account of events, but
appears in the form of an investigation on the problems of
the area of Exarcheia, and is therefore endowed with a
quasi-scientific authority, constitutes an attempt not only
to identify the problem(s) but also to construct the image of
an enemy which threatens society, its norms and values.
This effort is best illustrated in the references to the
successive "establishing of kingdoms" by "anarchists",
"drug-addicts" and, most recently, "the punks". The use of
the term "kingdom", in fact refers to the establishment of an
independent unit, with set boundaries, its own internal
organization and power, its own laws, its own identity. In
other words, the territorialization of the "problem", or the
"enemy", which appeared for the first time during the house
occupations of 1981-82 and became a persistent feature in
relevant news-reporting, gives to it a material dimension
which in fact makes the preservation of its image in public
consciousness more certain and durable. Further, it gives the
impression of an enemy which is not simply anti-social, but
also situated outside society, an extra-social enemy. The
emphasis on the "succession" of Kingdoms could be interpreted
as a suggestion of the existence of a long tradition of
"anti-social" or "extra-social" subjects with "terroristic"
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and "anarchistic" practices and deviant behaviour. Thus, a
mirth of Exarcheia as a "melting-pot" of counter cultures,
anti-social and extra-social cultures and elements emerges,
while, precisely because of this "syncretism" the identit y of
the perceived "danger" becomes blurred. This "confusion"
surrounding the actual identity of the "rulers" of the
kingdom(s) of Exarcheia is not restricted to this article
alone; it can be found throughout the coverage of the
incidents in the following days. That is exactly what the
headline of October 3 indicates ("The torment of the
shopkeepers and of the local residents by the Anarchists is
continued") and the adoption and endorsement of the statement
which the Athens Police director mr. M. Bosinakis made to
"Avriani" which refers to the continuation of "the
confrontation of the whole situation ... up to the point that
the area is cleaned up from the drug-addicts and the other
criminal elements". The use of terms such as "anarchists",
"drug-addicts" and "criminal elements" interchangeably in the
effort to identify the "problem" and to "define" the target
of the whole police operation, shows the extent to which the.	 .
"identity" of the "enemy" remains unspecified.
Avriani appears to be treating the events in Exarcheia
as pathological symptoms. , a social disease which must be
cured urgentl y. Suggestions for alternative remedies could
be traced in the selective presentation of parts of the
statement issued by the under-secretary for Youth and Sport
mr K. Laliotis which emphasize the need for the adoption of
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the policies of his ministry "policies of action and not of
words which .	 offers another . model of way of life"
(Avriani, 4-10-1984). The newspaper, 	 by referinpli to a
specific part, of mr. Laliotis's statement, in which the
"violence and terrorism not of all young people, but of small
and isolated groups" is denounced, is in fact indirectly
accepting the under-secretary's attempt to identify the
government and the mainstream political parties with the
majority of the society and to sanction the political and
cultural practices of the political party youth
organizations, and to reject completely the way of life of
those groups which are not integrated into the conventional,
party-controled political sphere. Thus, "Avriani" appears to
endorse the policies of the ministry and of the party youth
organizations as the "cure" for the problem. Another
suggestion finds its way into the newspaper and is endorsed
rather more strongly and dramatically on October 2, when part
of an interview given by an unnamed interviewee with the
initials "mr. G.	 11 . II. was published, along	 with the
reporters' conclusions:
" <G.M.:>'The ministry of Social Services should
send some social workers to talk with the kids.
Maybe the situation could be cured'.
<Reporters:> 'So those in charge should take
measures before the terrorism of the punks
worsens"
and a few lines below:
" 'Before we reach the point of no return a
solution must be found' "
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(Rep orters: S. Askeli, A. Lourandou)
In this passage, deviation from the social norms is
perceived as a social or even psychological illness which
should be urgently cured before it becomes uncontrollable. It
is very characteristic that the people who are seen as
suitable providers of the treatment are employees of the
ministry of Health and Social Services.i o It is apparent that
the paper's emphasis on terms related to pathology, which
evoke images of abnormalit y, and implicit references to the
healthy society being in danger from the 'marginals' who are
in need . of a cure, are . instances of strategies of
representation . of the 'marginals' as persons with reduced
social competence, and credibility, or as a 'problem' to be
solved through the recourse to some kind of 'treatment'
offered by psychologists and social workers. This attempt to
discredit the 'marginals' has among other things important
political consequences as far as the citizenship and the
civic competence of these and other dissenting minorities is
concerned.
The coverage of the incidents b y "Ethnos" bears several
similarities with that of "Avriani". As in the case of
AvTiani, Ethnos appears to be engaged in a complex process of
defining the source of the "problem" which led to the events
in Exarcheia. This is achieved by piecing together a
multitude of diverse elements which are traced in various
interviews, "authoritative" statements by Prominent police
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and government figures given Neditordal prominence b y the
papei- and several photographs appearing in its pages.
A prominent feature throughout the coverage of the
events is the use of terms such as "anarchists", "punks",
"criminal elements", "suspicious persons", and "drug-addicts",
almost interchangeably and in a . rather imprecise way. This
use of these	 terms by "Ethnos" instead	 of the term
i marginals . , or any other term for that matter, facilitates
processes of convergence between various themes and images
which occur throughout the coverage. Drug addiction and
criminal behaviour are introduced into the paper's inventory
for the description of the 'marginals'.
In this way, on October 2, we read:
"Brutal beating was exchanged yesterday night in
Exarcheia when strong police forces clashed with
anarchists and 'punks' "
The effect of putting two rather distinct groups,
anarchists and punks, as united in their opposition towards a
second actor, namely the police, brings closer the
possibility of a convergence, or of condensation of their
rather distinct identities.
A similar process seems to develop as the reporter tries,
to explain the target and the rationale of "Operation
Virtue":
It < =the area) will be cleaned UP
THE - TARGET is the 'punks' who gather and create
problems, and also the ... long-haired <persons> of
every kind. The statement made by the police
director mr. M. Bosinakis is characteristic: 'The
operations will continue. The area must be cleaned
of the criminals and the antisocial elements who
have invaded it and for that to be achieved there
is not any other way'
In this way the borderline between the "punks" and
"long-haired persons" becomes unclear; similarly, by adopting
the statement	 of police	 director M.	 Bosinakis, more
"qualifiers" become available for the definition of the
already existing actors. A final convergence takes place in
this passage when the reason for the police operations is
specified: the "invasion" of the area provides the catalyst
which bonds together punks, anarchists, long-haired,
criminals and antisocial elements as they now have something
in common; they are a foreign body infesting the area which
must be uprooted.
The stock of attributes which can be attached to this
"foreign body" . is enriched over the following days in more or
less the same way. More precisely, on October 3, specific
emphasis is put on the "strange character" of the
"characters" of the square which "terrorize" the local
residents as the headlines indicate:
TERROR IN Exarcheia FOR THE REPRISALS OF THE
'STRANGE' CHARACTERS IN THE SQUARE.
This "strange character" becomes enriched in the course of
-
the reportage that follows as the "characters" are described
as "idle persons and other characters" by the reporter
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herself, or as "drug addicts, burglars and other suspicious
persons", according to the minister of Public Order whose
statement seems to share many of the reporter's concern.
The appearance of the young people who frequent
Exarcheia Square becomes the object of scrutiny and provides
raw material for the construction of a ne gative image.
Crucial in this respect are the photographs and their ironic
captions which complement the text of the reportage of
October 3. In these photographs, various clothing accessories
or specific ways in which people are dressed, hairstyles, or
even a small pet are used as the basis for ironic and
disapproving comments which cast doubt to the integrity,
credibility and seriousness of the people featured in them.
For example, one of the photogra phs (Illustration 14)
features a young girl which accordin g to the reporter is
'sympathetic towards the marginals'. The caption underneath
does not contain any information related to the incidents of
the previous days; it rather contains a highly selective
'description' of the girl, apparently linking her appearance
with her ideas: "The girl with the jacket on her shoulder.
She did not tell us her name, she was sympathetic towards the
marginals". The paper attempts to discredit the girl by
drawing attention to her 'unacceptable' or 'undignified'
appearance, and by extention, the s marginals' in general.
It is therefore emphasized that the girl in the photograph
is carr ying her jacket on her shoulder, a 'deviance in dress'
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worthy of attention. This description serves as a visual and
verbal reminder of the unacceptability of breaking the dress
code, and possibly attempts to link the appearance of the
girl with the dress code of the 'manges', a sub-cultural
group of the past which was also excluded from mainstream
social life. 11 This symbolic isolation of the particular
individual from the rest of society is subsequently
generalized and applied to the I marginals' through the
connection between the former and the latter: "she was
sympathetic towards the marginals". Similar emphasis on the
deviance in 'appearance' is placed in the captions of three
other photographs.	 Under the first	 (Illustration 15),
featuring a young Punk, the caption focuses on his 'peculiar'
belt with studs,	 and his	 boots,	 under the second
(Illustration 16, featuring a young man with a cat on his
shoulder, the caption reads "The animal-lover of the
Square", while under the third (Illustration 17), featuring
another young man, the paper makes ironic comments on his
hairstyle: "Haircut	 indian-style". It is quite clear that
the "Ethnos" article of October 3, 1984, implicitly
contrasted the dress and hairstyles of the "marginals" with
the "normal" dress codes. The "marginals" were represented as
provocatively dressed as aspects of their dress and hairstyle
which did not conform to the middle and working class codes
(relatively plain clothes and short, combed hair) were
emphasized and commented upon. The paper's ironic comment on
these selected photographs has a potentially double effect:
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First,	 it creates	 and	 amplifies impressions	 of
. difference, of non-belonging to the rest of "respectable"
society, images of "abnormality" which are presented as both
unacceptable and hilarious and second, it facilitates the
severance of any possible channel of communication between
the 'marginals' and the rest of the society. Thus, boots and
belts with studs, haircut which the reporter describes as
"indian-style" are not only taken to be silly, strange,
unacceptable, abnormal, or different, but also discredit the
'marginals' and renders their opinions and voices (when
interviewed) insignificant and ineffective.
"Eleftherotypia", "Ta Nea" and "To Vima" a pproach the
events in a rather different mannner. While they, too,
exploit the themes of violence and chaos as their headlines
indicate "In quarantine for a fistful of punks"
("Eleftherotypia", 2-10-84), "Exarcheia are 'free*" ("Ta
Nea", 6-10-84), "The war of Exarcheia; 18 in handcufs and
grave charges" ("Eleftherot ypia, 3-10-84)- they do not do
BO to the extent of "Apogevmatini", "Avriani"and "Ethnos".
What is more, they seem to share a concern about the attitude
of the police,	 their	 "unacceptable"	 behaviour and
indiscriminate action against innocent people.
Thus, in an editorial appearing	on October 3, titled
"Antisocial police..." the editors of "Ta Nea", argue:
"If then, the police is not an instrument for the
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exercise of social policy, it is even more obvious
that the siege of a whole area, or the attacks
against innocent citizens do not constitute social
policy - even with the use of the police. ...."
and they conclude:
"And finally it would be difficult not to wonder
if, through the operations in Exarcheia, certain
police officers play another game with political
repercussions which exposes to public opinion not
only themselves but the government as well."
"Police brutality, the "siege" of a whole neighbourhood and
attacks against innocent citizens" are denounced and are
concidered as being unacceptable. What is more, these actions
could, in fact suggest - according to the newspaper - that
certain police officers might be conspiring to expose the
government to public criticism about its handling of the
situation. Similarly, throughout the previous day's coverage
of the events (October 2) the aggressive behaviour of
individual policemen is brought to attention while the
reportage of October 3 is fairl y negative as far as the
behaviour of the police is concerned, because special
emphasis is placed on victims of police brutality. "To Vima"
appears to have taken a similar position as its headline on
October 4 indicates: "The under-secretary of Youth and a
spokesman of Athens municipality, disapprove of the operation
'ENarcheia*". "Eleftherotypia" also exploits the theme of
police behaviour by focusing on incidents of police
aggression and attacks throughout its coverage of the events.
Throughout the period in which the police operation and the
Exarcheia incidents took place, its coverage included
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investigations on allegations about police brutality,
interviews from local people who had been critical of the
police methods, as well as confrontations with police and
government officials.
However, the similarities between these three papers
seem to end there, as 8 closer inspection reveals basic
differences between "Ta Nea" and "To Vima" on the one hand,
and "Eleftherotypia" on the other.
"Ta Nea", and its sister	 paper, "To Vima" while
denouncing the indiscriminate and violent actions of police
against "innocent citizens" accept the principle which
"necessitated" the police operation. In fact, one could argue
that the police operations in the area might have been
received with less unfavourable comment under certain
preconditions, as both newspapers seem to share the same
concern as far as the future of the area is concerned. More
precisely, throughout the coverage of the events a deep
concern seems to be expressed in both newspapers about the
problems which the residents and traders of the area are
facing: problems which are conceived as being grave and for
which a solution should indeed be found.
It is in this context that on October 4 "To Vima", under
the headline "Public dialogue on the problem of the Athens
borough which tends to become marginal ghetto" refers to
recent developments in the discussions on the future of
Exarcheia:
-297-
"On the basis of information which 'To Vima' has,
the ministry <of Public Order> intends to ask
organizations and representatives of the community
to propose specific solutions for the problem of
the Athens borough, which tends to become 'ghetto'
by-a group of people with marginal ideology"
while a little later we read that the same solution is
proposed "for other problematic areas of the capital and the
rest of Greece as well." Probably based on similar
information and from the same source in the ministry of
Public Order, "Ta Nea" make similar comments on the first
page of its October 4 edition in a text which focuses on
issues of "responsibility" of groups and individuals:
.... the aim of these meetings, which are going to
start from • the Exarcheia area, is to tackle the
problems faced by the residents as a result of the
unrestricted activities of drug-dealers, the
irresponsible actions of certain individuals, and
to point out the responsibilities of all political
and social organisations concerned, so that
solutions could be found concerning such important
social problems."
These passages illustrate the underlying preconceptions
of these newspapers re garding the nature of the problem(s) of
Exarcheia. First, it appears that Exarcheia is understood as
an isolated area, a ghetto, in which its residents are forced
to coexist with "groups with a marginal ideology" - however
unclear this description might be - or, with "drug dealers",
or "individuals acting irresponsibly". "Ta Nea" and "To Vima"
then, accept in principle the jurisdiction of the ministry of
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Public Order and, therefore, of the police, over the problem
and the area, provided that, responsibility would be shared
with representatives of the "community", so that there would
be a guarantee that the actions of the police would not be
"generalized" and, therefore would not affect "innocent
citizens". However, the concept of "community" as it is
viewed by both the ministry, and the newspapers seems to be
rather restricted as it includes only residents and traders
of the area, the local authorities and representatives of
only party political youth organizations, that is, it
excludes any groups or persons which have chosen to remain
outside the suffocating institutional framework of these
organizations. 12
A parallel line of thought seems to be pursued in the
rather extensive statement issued b y the under-secretary of
Youth and 'Sport, K. Laliotis, which is not only accepted by
"Ta Nea" as a welcome and major contribution in the
discussion, but also is incorporated in the text of the
reportage of October 4, and enriched with several
sub-headings which emphasize some of the points he makes:
We should not view the repent events as isolated
incidents <which took place> in one night. They are
rather the manifestation of a social phenomenon
with a long history among certain youth milieux. In
Exarcheia, which constitute a pole of reference and
attraction for young people from all over the whole
area of greater Athens, various models of
attitudes, behaviour and practice develop. Because
of this, it is natural and unavoidable that
frictions, dissent and tensions are formed among
young people themselves, but also among the local
residents.
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It is also known that sometimes very small groups
of young people develop agressive behaviour and
terrorist practices. This behaviour and actions
derive from a logic and inclination inherent to
these small groups which are characterized by
tendencies towards the imposition of themselves and
intense authoritarianism. It is not surprizing that
such rationalities and practices create problems
and contradiction not only to the local residents,
but also to these young persons who do not tolerate
violence in their own relationships, or their
relationships with people around them.
Besides, recently there have been confrontations in
Exarcheia square itself between young people who
wish to retain their freedom and self-respect and
small organized groups that seek to achieve the
imposition of their own views and models -if they
have any- by force in the surrounding area.
The presence of the police in Exarcheia followed
complaints by local residents who repeatedly
denounced the violence and terrorism, not of young
people but of small and isolated groups,....
However terrorism is not exercized only by the
state, and if we do not want the state to
intervene, we must all assume our responsibilities
regarding any form of terrorism which is exercized
around us, possibly not by the state - but also
actually existing.
The	 square must	 remain	 accessible ...	 <to
everybody>	 ... with	 absolutely	 no toll	 of
subjection to anybody. Which young person and which
citizen can accept the	 idea of the square
becoming ... a ghetto with 'god-fathers" and
"bosses" who seek to impose violently their own
law?
Who can tolerate "seasonal" and dubious
"anarchists" who aspire to transform the arbitrary
power of their gang into terror for the local
residents and to "protection ransom"' for the
traders of the area.
The under-secretariat for Youth and Sport with its
own policies in both words and action secures the
unrestricted expression of wiling People and creates
the' infrastructure and the possibility for an
alternative way of expression and model or life. We
adopt dialogue, pluralism, mutual respect,
criticism, but also responsibility, both individual
and collective as the only precondition and means
towards this direction. <We do> not <adopt> cheap
denunciation and infertile negativism 's which lead
to unavoidable impasses.
As in the previous passages, the statement of Mr.
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Laliotis offers a definition of the problem, though in a more
elaborate and extensive manner. He argues that the area of
Exarcheia has become a ghetto, and attributes this to small,
isolated groups which he characterizes as "agressive", "with
terrorist practices" and "tendencies towards .... intense
authoritarianism". He attempts to discredit them politically
and to achieve their criminalization by characterizing them
as	 "seasonal and dubious anarchists" 	 as "gangs"	 of
"godfathers" and "bosses". Mr. Laliotis proposes an
alternative "model" of life, which the policies of his
ministry promote, and which has much in common with the
proposals endorsed by "Ta Nea" and "To Vima" for shared
responsibility by the community, including youth political
organizations.
Although "Eleftherotypia" takes a similar stance against
the planning and execution of the police operation with that
of "Ta Nea" and "To Vima", it could be argued that it does
not share the fears expressed by other newspapers that the
area of Exarcheia is under threat, as "ordinary" life becomes
disrupted and disorganized; it rather recognizes that the
fact that the area is frequented by young people, some of
whom are expressing different or alternative views, is
exactly what gives Exarcheia its particular character.
"Eleftherotypia" does not seem to share the almost irrational
fear of other newspapers towards "marginal" groups and the
alleged transformation of the area into a "ghetto", or
"problematic area", it is rather sober in its attitude
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towards the area and the events that took place there.
The police operation, both in principle and in the way
it was realized was subjected to constant criticism by •
Eleftherotypia • firstly through frequent references to the
brutality of its execution, which becomes clear in a series
of interviews with those who experienced it, and secondly,
through its close scrutiny of statements and interviews by a
number of police and government officials.
Characteristic in this respect is the coverage of
October 2 which includes a series of interviews with victims
of police actions, and an interview with the police director
mr. M. Bosinakis in which the concern of the paper regarding
the extent and the character of the police operation are
expressed clearly through a series of questions which
challenge effectively the official position of the police. In
the coverage of "Eleftherotypia", the police assume the role
of the villain, as their actions are frequently characterized
as "raids", "brutal violence", "brutal beatings", "violence
and terrorism of the police".
But the possibly most important element which
distinguishes "Eleftherot ypia" from other newspapers is the
fact that it dedicates a considerable part of its coverage to
statements	 issued	 by	 various	 groups	 of	 the
extra-parliamentary left and youth organizations which
normally are not given access to the mass-media. In this way,
on October 1, just before "operation Virtue" reached its
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peak, it published a joint statement made by the "Initiative
of young people against police supression" and the "Left
Student Coalitions" (Aristeres Foititikes Syspeiroseis) who
denounced the daily conspicuous presence of the police in
Exarcheia and its terrorist practices. Again on October 4, it
published statements by the "Left Movement of Lawyers", the
"Left Students Coalition" and the "New Socialists".
On October 5, while other newspapers put special
emphasis on the initiative of the government to open dialogue
on the problems of Exarcheia, "Eleftherotypia" is again the
only paper which under the somewhat ironical headline
"Dialogue after the beatings" casts doubts on the motives
and the sincerity of the government and on the duration of
such an attempt:
"So, after yesterday's statement made by the
minister of Public Order G. Skoularikis (the
solution of the problem will be pursued through
dialogue ....), it seems probable that the tension
will decrease and that the Exarcheia 'front' is
going to close - at least temporarily."
while a little later, it refers to the contents of a
discussion between a committee representing young people from
the area and the police director mr Bosinakis which did not
manage to find its way to other papers:
... and they express the suspicion that 'there is
a plan to transform Exarcheia square into a square











it could therefore be argued that, as it is illustrated
in table 18 below, the newspapers reviewed - with the sole
exception of "Eleftherotypia" - in the coverage of 'Operation
Virtue' and of the events which followed it reproduce the
'definitions of the situation' produced by the government and
the mainstream political parties as they accept the
distinctions drawn by these 'primary definers' (Clarke et al
1976: 75-79), and therefore, they represent the situation in
Exarcheia as a continuous confrontation between the 'forces
of normality', expressed mainly by mainstream political
organizations, and the 'forces of disorder', that is 'small
and isolated organized groups which terrorise and bring
disruption to the life of the area.
TABLE 18
Presentation of "Operation Virtue" by the newspapers























It is obvious that what is missing from such
representations is the social-historical background of the
events which could possibly offer some justification for the
confrontation between the I marginals . and the police, and
might increase the levels of tolerance of both the local
community, but more importantly of the (national) readership
of the Athens press.
The Occupation of the bui1dina of the Department of 
Chemistry of the University of Athens (Chimeio); May 1985_ 
On 9 May 1985, less than a month before the general
elections of 1985, extra-parliamentary groups of the left
organized a rally in . Exarcheia square and a protest march in
order to demonstrate their opposition to the forthcoming
elections and to the alleged oppressive methods and
intensification of policing, especially in the area of
Exarcheia.
However, just before the rally, and as the participants
were already gathered in Exarcheia square, Athens police
director Mr. Hohtoulas, accompanied by a magistrate and
police forces arrived in the square and announced that the
rally and march had been banned. Mr Hohtoulas ordered the
crowds to disperse claiming that as the crowd "were not
Protected by the University asylum regulations", (referring
to past events, especially occupations of university
buildings, during which those involved claimed they were
Protected under the University asylum le gislation) they would
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be "arrested and smashed (sic)". These controversial
statements seem to have sparked off the events which
culminated in the occupation of the "Chimeio" and the
incidents that followed it.
The incidents became immediately an important news-item
which occupied several pages of the Athens dailies from May
10 to May 15. The following analysis is based on the texts of
the coverage of the events, which com prize mainly reportage
and some editorials. The newspapers selected for this part of
the study are "Apogevmatini", an evening paper of
conservative political affiliation, "Avriani", an evening
daily supporting PASOK, "Eleftherotypia" which aspired to
express a wide spectrum of views, from the left to the
centre, "Ethnos" which at the time supported PASOK but was
also sympathetic	 to	 KKE,	 "Kathimerini",	 a morning
conservative broadsheet, "Ta Nea", supporting . PASOK, its
sister morning daily "To Vima", with almost identical
political complexion and, finally, "Vradyni", a conservative
paper sympathetic to both the centre-right party of Nea
Dimocratia and the extreme right.
The reporting of the events in the various publications
presents striking similarities which range from the
vocabulary employed in them to the selective and imbalanced
presentation of the information they contain. In the majority
of the texts which have been analyzed, there are common, or
similar signifying and symbolic strategies, designed to
mobilize social anxieties and build upon collective memories
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relating to a spectrum of historical events, which in the
social imagination are closely linked to collective and
individual experiences of fear, pain, deprivation and
destruction.
More precisely, the "Chimeio" events were covered by the
majority of the newspapers under review in a way which could
very easily be applied to the coverage of actual situations
of war and disaster. In some cases, it is reminiscent of the
acccounts of the Greek civil war, a confrontation which
scarred post-war Greek society, and remained deeply rooted in
the collective memory.
Thus, the words and expressions which frame these events
in almost every newspaper come from a predominantly war and
disaster vocabulary. It is interesting to note that
throughout the texts there are frequent repetitions of words
and expressions denoting militar y operations. What is more,
the detail to which the reporters of the incidents enter in
order to give an elaborate description of the "weapons" and
"tactics" that were used throughout the confrontations
between the police and the "marginals" is striking. The
effect is to reinforce the "extra-ordinary" character of the
situation.
The coverage of "Apogevmatini" is quite characteristic
in this respect as on 10 May 1985, the paper covered the
Chimeio incidents under the headline "Battlefield the Centre
of Athens for 5 Houre with the Anarchists' while, during the
next three days in the sane paper, the incidents were
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reported in a similar way:
Bloody clashes with injured policemen
and civiliana(p. 1)
The Anarchists 'hold" the Centre of Athens for the
third day in succession, with barricades,
stone-throwing and bloody clashes. (p. 3)
The anarchists "seized" the centre of Athens for the
third day with barricades, stone-throwing, a march and
clashes with outraged citizens, they paralyzed the
traffic flow and then they fortified themselves in the
"Chimeio."
("Apogevmatini", 11 May 1985)
Battles in Athens. The anarchists attacked
with bombs in the night.
Fierce battles throughout the night between the
anarchists and the police upset the centre of Athens.
Youngsters covering their faces and shouting against the
police marched undisturbed in the central streets of the
capital and then attempted to enter the "Chimeio" where
their comrades are fortified for the fifth day in
succession.
("Apogevmatini", 13 May 1985)
In fact, throughout the coverage of the events, the
reporters of "Apogevmatini". in an obvious attempt to
"sensationalize" the events, used excessively words and
expressions which conveyed powerful images of destruction,
injury and anarchy. The frequent recourse to words and
expressions such as "blood", "bloody clashes", "injured
civilians", "fierce battles", "bombs", "war", "missiles",
"attacks", the extent of overwordin g and exaggeration of the
events were aimed at raising social anxiety and at
representing essentially local events taking place in the
vicinity of the "Chimeio" as a generalized threat.
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It should however be pointed out that it was not only
"Apogevmatini" which made extensive use of these techniques.
On 11 May, "Kathimerini" reported the day's events under an
identical headline with that of the same day's
"Apogevmatini": "Bloody clashes with injured policemen and
civilians", while To Vima, under a more extensive but
similar headline takes up the same themes on 10 May:
As a result of the clashes dozens of people
have been injured while dozens of shops and
cars have been destroyed. Stone-throwing war
between anarchists and policemen
The centre of Athens experienced the most damaging stone
throwing war of the last years as it was transformed
into a proper battlefield between the anarchists and the
police forces which rushed up to help dozens of
citizens.
(To Vima, 10 May 1985)
From these extracts it is quite clear that the coverage
of these papers is equally characterized by the frequent use
of words and expressions such as "fortify", "enforce
blockade", "battlefield", "zone of fire", "charge", "attack",
"trench war", "guerrilla warfare", "bombs", "battles",
"clashes", "bloodshed", "stone-throwing fights", "molotov
cocktails", "ammunition", "barricades", or "missiles".
The representation of the incidents of the period
between 10 and 16 May 1985 as either war operations or
criminal actions was reinforced by the style of the text,
especially the detailed, ste p-by-step presentation of the
marginals' "tactics" which resembled war communiques or
police reports and had a hi ghl y dramatic effect. To Vima, on
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10 May 1985 was characteristic in this respect:
"... The events started a little after 6.30 in the
afternoon, when a group of about 100 anarchists, who had
gathered in Exarcheia tried to make a "march in protest
of the presence of MAT < == riot police> in the area"
despite the relevant ban .... the anarchists ... saw a
small group of policemen against which they charged ...
From that moment the whole area resembled <an area>
under siege ... Just after 7 the anarchists ... went on
charging damaging cars and shop-windows ... This
situation continued until 7.45 when the anarchists
launched one more massive attack with a "rain" of stones
and pieces of wood which they were launching against the
MAT, but also against the citizens who were watching the
incidents, inflicting injuries to several of them ... At
7.55 another attack of the anarchists took place ... At
8.15 the anarchists dropped from the roof a smoke bomb
and the terrified people rushed to take cover ...
(To Vima, 10 May 1985)
The "sensationalization" of the events is enhanced as
the war vocabulary used by the papers is interwoven with a
further emphasis on the themes of vandalism, damage and
disruption. The special importance which has been attributed
by most newspapers to emphasizing material damages, injuries
and traffic chaos is clearly illustrated in texts such as
the following:
Occupation of the "Chimeio and stone-
throwing war. The anarchists caused new
extensive incidents. Damages to cars
and shop windows.
The most extensive incidents took place yesterday
afternoon, caused by the well known group of anarchists,
who after the occupation of "Chimeio", in Solonos
street, started throwing stones to passers-by, cars and
the police who intervened to disperse them. The
incidents on the one hand, and at the same time the
opening of the KKE polling centre in Omonoia Square on
the other, resulted to the development of a traffic
chaos in the centre of Athens. Dozens of injured from
both sides, huge material damage to shop-windows and
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cars which became the target of a ruthless
stone-throwing war and many arrests were the final
outcome of the incidents....
Protest March - Occupation
The incidents started at 7.00 p.m after a protest march
against the methods employed by the police, "planned" by
the anarchists several days before. Another group had,
from earlier on, occupied the "Chimeio" and had gathered
its ammunition (stones, construction planks, iron bars
and flammable materials. Without any obvious reason the
stone-throwing war started ....
When they run out of stones, the anarchists started
breaking the marble from the cornice of the "Chimeio",
while at the same time they were making molotov
cocktails and bombs of other kinds using caustic
materials found in the "Chimeio" and <started> throwing
them to the police.
Anarchists caused the incidents
As far as the injured are concerned, the police
stated that 9 policemen and one citizen have been
injured, but according to other sources, the injured
citizens are many, but they decided not to be
hospitalized."
("Kathimerini", 10 May 1985)
In the case of "Kathimerini", the reporter takes the
opportunity to establish an indirect connection between the
occupation of the Chimeio by the "well known group of
anarchists" and the opening of the electoral office of KKE
(Communist Party of Greece) in the centre of Athens. The
paper identifies both events as the cause of "traffic chaos",
combining in this way the paper's traditional anti-communist
stance with the condemnation of the incidents "caused" by the
"anarchists". However, the main emphasis of the reportage was
upon the disruption and destruction caused by the
"anarchists", as the paper confirmed the belief of its
conservative readershi p that the "anarchists" had undoubtedly
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provoked the incidents. It should also be noted that the
paper attempted to present the incidents not only as violent
and destructive, but also as premeditated and planned well in
advance. The use of "planned", in quotation marks in the
text, despite the fact that no evidence backs the paper's
allegation, denotes the certainty of the paper about the
pre-meditated character of the incidents which is taken for
granted later in the text.
"Apogevmatini" is equally engaged in an attempt to
emphasise the destructive and disruptive character of the
events which it attributes to the "marginals". Throughout its
coverage it emphasizes, and often exaggerates, the extent of
damage incurred during the incidents. Thus, on 10 May one
could read among its headlines
"They burned, they broke, they looted
and they spread horror."
("Apogevmatini", 10 May 1985)
or on 11 May, the headlines refer to "banks" bombed by the
"anarchists" in the previous night, while in reality, as it
is acknowledged in the text that follows, only one bank was
bombed by unknown persons.
Athens into the hands of the anarchists.
They blew up banks during the night.
"Athens in the hands of anarchists. After the Chimeio
the Law-School fell into the hands of the anarchists as
well, while yesterday night unknown persons blew up the
whole facade of Citibank ...."
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Despite the lack of any information implicating the
"marginals" in "bank bombings", the paper premises its
coverage on a single event, the bombing of one bank, and
attempts to represent it as one among more similar events -
"bank bombings", and to link it with the "marginals",
maximizing in this way the impression of disruption and
destruction caused by them.
"To Vima" and "Avriani" focus mostly on the material
damages inflicted on shops and cars and emphasize the extent
of vandalism:
"As a result of the clashes dozens of people
have been injured, while dozens of shops and
cars have been destroyed."
(To Vima, 10 May 1985)
"In the Chimeio the vandalism surpassed all expectation.
Graffiti on the walls, destroyed furniture, damage,
dirt, broken glass and objects were the toll of the
damages ... "
(Avriani, 14 May 1985)
However, the theme of disruption is further and more
effectively exploited by the papers as the majority of them
focus on the problems faced by the residents of the area of
the "Chimeio" during the occupation. "Kathimerini" emphasizes
the disruption of everyday life of local residents and
shop-keepers in the following text:
Area cut off.
Hundreds of shops remain cut off for a second
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24-hour-period in the area of the "Chimeio", resulting
to the infliction of huge <financial> damages to the
traders, whose representatives went to the Athens Police
Headquarters yesterday, and complained about the
situation which is prevailing. Meanwhile, the residents
of the blocks of flats who live in the "zone of fire",
as they complained yesterday, have the essential problem
of even going to work, and the housewives (two of whom
dared to go out of their homes yesterday, were subjected
to verbal abuse and stone-throwing) cannot supply their
households with the necessary food supplies. It is
characteristic that this morning they asked for the help
of the policemen, who ... supplied the blocks of flats
with food."
("Kathimerini", 12 May 1985, pp. 1 & 14)
In this text, disruption acquires a new dimension, as it
is no longer represented as general, abstract disruption of
activities, such as mere disruption of traffic or economic
life but, rather as a threat to the survival of individuals
and families. More precisely, although "Kathimerini" refers
to the disruption of the economic life of the area of the
"Chimeio" by pointing out that "hundreds of shops" in the
area remained closed for the second day, it also lays
particular emphasis on the problemo faced by local residents
who, according to the reporter, are "cut off", and are unable
to venture out of their homes to go to work, or to buy the
bare essentials for the survival of their households.
The report is characterized by exaggeration and
selective information, as its estimation that "hundreds of
shops" had to remain closed was greatly exaggerated, while it
failed to make clear that an area extending far beyond the
vicinity of the occupied building had been cut off by the
police, allegedly for reasons of security, and not by the
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marginals, as is apparently implied. The effect is to
misinform readers about both the extent of economic
disruption and the extent of the "marginals'" responsibility
for it. What is more, the area referred to as "zone-of-fire",
and the area cut off by the police for "security reasons",
were in fact two distinct areas, although the paper attempted
to represent them as one. The first, where disruption of
everyday life because of the verbal abuse and physical threat
by the "marginals" might have actually occurred, comprised
the buildings facing the "Chimeio", while the second, the
limits of which were determined by the police and where loss
of trade occurred due to police restrictions on public
access, extended far beyond the vicinity of the "Chimeio".
However, in an attempt to sensationalize the impact of the
occupation, "Kathimerini" did not make clear any distinction.
Its readers were thus misled into believing that it was the
"marginals" who totally isolated the area and brought
everyday activities to a virtual halt.
The "sensational" imagery of war, violence, destruction
and disruption conveyed by the vocabulary selected for the
description of the events has multiple effects. As suggested,
the "dramatization" of the events was aimed at evoking
feelings of insecurity, extreme danger, and threat. Thus, the
Use of relevant metaphors can mobilize these feelings and
Prompt a unified stance by the public towards the danger.
What is more, the fact that the recourse to metaphors of this
sort has as its major effect the sensationalization of the
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incidents, it could be argued that the coverage of the events
along these lines shifts the emphasis from an effort to
reflect upon the causes of the situation and to provide an
analysis of the story's complexities, to the terrifying and,
at the same time, "spectacular" confrontation.
In some cases, newspa pers mobilized elements of
collective memory by attempting to compare the Chimeio
incidents with events of the past which had been emotionally
charged and were possible to evoke painful feelings coming
from deeply rooted memories or, in other cases, to draw upon
quite recent events tightly connected with images of
destruction and pain.
Thus, in the first page of "Kathimerini" of 12 May 1985,
a text with a separate quite distinct headline of its own
appeared as the caption of a photograph (Illustration 19):
Here "ends" the Greek state ---
"For the third day yesterday, the "Solonos street area"
was presenting an image of "a short-December 44, without
arms" - as an old Athenian said very characteristically.
The photograph above was taken yesterday morning, at the
level of the junction between Omirou and Solonos streets
- at the background on the left, the Law-School, which
was also occupied after the "Chimeio", by ... anarchists
who managed to penetrate the police enclosure. The
traffic warden and his motorcycle mark the ... border of
the prohibited area for citizens and their vehicles."
("Kathimerini", 12 May 1985)
In that text, the situation is compared with the events
of December 1944, known as "Dekemvriana", that led to the
beginning of the civil war. The caption, as well as its
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Illustration 19
E CO KT EÄEICOV EID TO E AnviKo Kperroc...
ria	 pipa reic,	 cTrz.ptoxn Likcavoc» Trapouaia<t Tijv titc.Onva ccvOc ptKpoti taxLp6piou '44, xca-
P is j rTAa.15 — &mac (iTrt, xapaKTnplaTtKa, TraXatOc Aanvaioc. H avwriaca Otarro.)patpia, Tpa6nxinKt xeic
TO Kpoi, alTO Tó inuoc Opivou Kai 14:34>voc — aTO 6a8oc aoicrrEoPa, q NopwcIxoM, 1TOU mrranfPen
uttic TO Xnueio Kai avrn,	 biaauyaliTcc 01:i 0CrT0V01.111(00- xXotoi, avapxtx , c. 0 TporyvOpoc Ka i n
loTocruKACTa ou, oploevrolli v 7E1— ativopcc Tic anaraazvilivnc, yitEt TroXilEc icci poxo.apa, Trtpioxii0
Niva Ta licanpif x9iic — 6Xi1Tt K a i Katt.)7 ip ptiooth4 — 01 	 V0.XO CrIrCal:Vencrav, yta v' (AM-
aovv atireton Tnv aTtoxeiplan Terv KaTcx)intptc:ri trITO TO Xnrio Kai	 FxoM — titv, 6i6ata.
,	 -; •
(OurroypaOt Kit Y1114401 a KAOHMEPINHZ — B, KaPauavf:Ais)
ME f1PCITOBOYAIA TOY Yf1HPEIIAKOY Y110910Y AHMOIIAI TAZEQE
thaxoppairimi avtipet6inion
tdni avapxirabv T01,1 Xnpsio.0
AllOKAEITMENH AMA... HPEMH H ilEPIOXH TOY XHME1OY KAI THI NOMIKH1
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headline implies that Athens has been divided into two zones
in a way reminiscent of the division of the city in December
1944, when the communist-led "Popular Army" controlled most
of Athens, with the exception of a small area of the city
centre held by the British and Greek National Government
forces. This metaphor appeals to the memories of that
period, of a society divided by fear and suspicion, although,
in contrast to "Dekemvriana" when the then "enemy" - the
"communists" - had control over most of the city, now the
"enemies", "the marginals" are in fact the ones under siege
and at a disadvantage.
In this context, the traffic warden becomes not only the
symbol of the boundaries between the free zone in which
people are described as citizens (outraged or not) and the
forbidden zone which is dominated by outlaws and
non-citizens. In that second zone, as the headline reveals,
no state exists. It should also be noted that this
representation of territorial division constitutes a symbolic
strategy - which I am going to refer to more extensively
later - of "territorialization" of the "threat" represented
by the "marginals", as a "territory" of lawlessness and
destruction beyond state and social control is imagined.
Comparisons of this sort can also be found in Ethnos of
14 May 1985 where images of pain and destruction are
mobilized through the equation of the Chimeio area to
"destroyed neighbourhoods of Beirut". This comparison has the
double effect of making the "Chimeio" incidents relevant, on
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the one hand to the civil war of Lebanon and the sufferin g it
inflicted, and on the other, to the deep scars associated
with the experience of the Greek civil war.
Despite minor differences among the newspapers in the
coverage of the events, there is an underlying unanimit y as
far as the representation of the anarchists and their actions
is concerned. In fact the various themes which are employed -
with different degrees of emphasis - by the newspapers seem
to be more or less complementary to each other as they
converge around the various "threats" to law and order
which, according to the press, the anarchists represent.
This emphasis on the need to preserve law and order is
present in the majority of the texts. "Vradyni", with the
headline "State within the State", on 10 May 1985 as well
as on 13 May 1985 emphasizes the abolition of the state and
of law and order and, implicitly, expresses its concern. In
the same paper, on 13 May we can easily find the
identification between the actions of the anarchists and the
destruction of law and order:
"The anarchists having created "a state
within the State" continue to terrorize and
upset Athens"
Similarly, in "Apogevmatini", on 10 May, the anarchists




"The Anarchists abolished every notion of State in the
centre of Athens yesterday night."
("Apogevmatini", 10 May 1985; p. 1)
What is interesting in this text is that the impression
of the forceful abolition of the state and of law and order
is emphasized by the comparison of the incidents of Exarcheia
with the Vietnam war, and its connotations of massive
destruction. On 11 May the same position continues to be
supported:
"Athens in the hands of the anarchists. They
blew up banks during the night"
"Athens in the hands of anarchists. After the Chimeio
the Law-School fell into the hands of the anarchists as
well, while yesterday night unknown persons blew up the
whole facade of Citibank ...."
("Apogevmatini", 11 May 1985)
Ethnos, taking up the same issues refers on 15 Ma y under
the headline "The anarchists disrupt Athens again" to the
establishment of "the state of the occupants" of Chimeio and
emphasizes the lack of law and order within its boundaries as
the property of local shopkeepers was seriously damaged.
The subject of the threat posed to law and order and
even the issue of the abolition of the state is eagerly dealt
with by "Kathimerini", which on 12 May, under the headline
"Here 'ends' the Greek state" refers to "anarchists who
managed to penetrate the police enclosure" and to the
existence of "the ... border of the prohibited area to
citizens and their vehicles" which had been occupied. As
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mentioned earlier (pp . 271-72), in this report, "Kathimerini"
achieves the "territorialization" of the "threat" which the
"marginals" represent. While the "marginals" are normally,
though with some resentment, reported to frequent, or even
occupy Exarcheia Square, "Kathimerini", by using the metaphor
of "border" gives an additional "territorial" dimension to
the perceived threat they pose, and appears to imply that the
territory held by the "marginals" may quite possibly be
expanded if they are not dealt with soon . While the notion
of "border" could be interpreted as "containing" the threat,
nevertheless, in this particular case it is rather used to
emphasize the establishment of uncontrollable and
inaccessible pockets in a territory where previously law and
order prevailed and "normal" life was going on. The
representation of the police line as "border" supports the
ideology of "reclamation and defence of urban space" 13 which
permeated the discourse and the imagination of urban planners
and law-and-order experts alike in the 1980s. In the same
context, on 14 May, Ethnos, refers briefly to the
intervention of members of the academic staff of the
University which secured "'unimpeded passage' <of the last
anarchists to evacuate the Chimeio> to ... free Athens". The
reference to "free Athens" introduces a dichotomy between two
"territorial units", free and occupied Athens, and therefore
underlines the paper's interpretation of the occupation of
'Chimeio' as an occupation of part of the city. This in fact
misrepresents the extent of the "marginals'" control over the
"city",	 as	 a	 single	 building	 occupied	 by the
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"marginals" could hardly be described as "occupied Athens" as
the paper appears to imply.
Finally, a similar process of "territorialization" also
occurs in Avriani of 14 May, when it refers to the "territory
of the anarchists". It was reported that the area had been
sealed "by the police, as they had orders not to let even a
'mosquito' pass through". In this case the newspaper being
sympathetic to the government, emphasizes the success of the
operation aimed at the isolation of this "territory" and the
containment of the danger it represents.
The "territorialization" of the "threat" of the
"marginals" was also used by the majority of the monitored
newspapers in order to support measures which would lead to
an escalation of control culture and lead to the restoration
of "law-and-order". Expressions such as "abolition of the
state" ("Apogevmatini", 10 May and Avriani, 15 May), "the
seizure of the centre of Athens" ("Apogevmatini", 11 May),
"state within the State" ("Vradymi", 10 and 13 May) or "the
boundaries of the prohibited zone" ("Kathimerini", 12 May)
are exaggerations which serve to reinforce the impression
that law and order are under threat. These exaggerated
descriptions of the situation are, indirectl y, criticisms
against the weakness and inefficiency of the government and
the police and can be interpreted as an appeal for the
restoration of the authority of the state. It is in this
context that the majority of the newspapers cover the actions
of alleged members of the local community, or "the outraged
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citizens" as they became widely known, in an approvin g and
sympathetic way. It is worth pointing out that while in some
newspapers such as "Eleftherot ypia" (11 and 13 May 1985), Ta
Nea (11 and 13 May) and Ethnos (11 May) the possibility that
people seen to chase the "marginals" were policemen in plain
clothes or fascist elements is not dismissed, other papers
are persistently ignoring relevant allegations and prefer to
refer to actions of outraged citizens who chose to oppose the
"marginals" themselves.
Thus, according to "Apogevmatini" on 10 May:
"Together with the police the y <the
anarchists> were chased by the residents"
"Many residents of Exarcheia watching their property
being destroyed by menacing youngsters reacted
dynamically. They grasped hunting guns and started
shooting to frighten them, while in many cases they
chased them."
Similarly, on 10 May, "To Vima" emphasizes the demand of
the local residents for the restoration of "order" in their
area by stating that "...the citizens who were watching the
events become angry and demand the cleaning up of the area",
or "Avriani", on 14 and 15 of May refers to "citizens enraged
by the situation" and "outraged citizens" demanding "the
cleaning up <of the city> from the anarchists".
One interesting point in coverage of this type is the
use of the term "citizen" when shopkeepers, "heads of family"
or by-standers are described, as opposed to the "marginals"
who are	 implicitly, although 	 clearly, represented as
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non-citizens and who in this way become even more
marginalized.
Of course, while metaphors representing the events in
the centre of Athens in terms of war, destruction or
criminality seem to be dominant in the press, other ways of
symbolically isolating the anarchists are used as well,
depending on the assumed worldviews, social and political
background of the readership of each paper. Very
characteristic in this respect is the development of the
particular "public language" developed by "Avriani", which
has drawn upon rather different conceptualisations of
"threat" in order to add some extra "sensation" in its
coverage of the event and to isolate the anarchists in its
own way. The following report which appeared on 14 May 1985
is characteristic of the paper's approach to the events:
"Son of a Jew is the alleged provocator and
leader. Pre-planned provocation the anarchists'
incidents in the "Chimeio". His father is a Hilton
Hotel manager."
"Andreas Kanellidis, Jew, the son of the Hilton
ex-manager is thought to be provocateur of the Chimeio
incidents and leader of the barricaded anarchists. The
above mentioned information which has been verified
beyond doubt unveils the provocative role some persons
played against public order as well as against the true
anarchists of the Exarcheia area during the Chimeio
incidents. It is certain that this information will
upset and create feelings of discontent among the
leftist "sympathizers"	 who - in a protest march
Yesterday night - ... demonstrated for their comrades.
(Avriani, 14 May 1985)
In this report, the paper introduces "ethnic" and
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"economic" criteria by which it attempts to establish the
"forei gn", and "anti-popular" character of the anarchists,
and thereby, to question their motives and practices.
Although the paper's allegations concernin g both the ethnic
and economic background of the alleged leader of the
occupation are questionable and unsubstantiated, what should
be pointed out, is the paper's decision to introduce these
criteria, regardless of their validity, in order to discredit
the "marginals". By identifying the alleged leader of the
occupation of the Chimeio as a "Jew" the reporter attempts
to exploit the possible antisemitic sentiments of the paper's
readership. Drawing upon popular antisemitic stereotypes,14
Avriani attempts to construct an image of "otherness" and
threat which might appeal to its readers, in quite a similar
way to the way other dailies did by drawing upon themes of
war, crime, or destruction. Being a "Jew", the alleged
leader of the "marginals" belongs to an ethnic and cultural
minority which, in the popular imagination has been
represented as separate, and often hostile to 'mainstream'
societ y. Further, in popular stereotypes of Jewish people,
the theme of Jewishness is closely associated with that of
affluence and power, a theme which is also exploited by the
newspaper. The disclosure of the occupation of the alleged
leader's father might be interpreted as an attempt to
discredit him on the grounds of his financial situation and
his possession of power. Drawing upon "oppositional" elements
of the "petty-bourgeois", or "popular" culture, notably, the
Popular disapproval of the unequal distribution of wealth and
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opportunities, the paper attempts to mobilize them against
the "marginals". Complementary to the themes of
affluence/power and ethnic difference exploited by Avriani
appears to be the indirect, yet almost certainly intentional,
association of Andreas Kanellidis with a foreign
multinational, Hilton International, via his father's alleged
past employment with the firm. Although this detail is
irrelevant as far as the events or the character of the
alleged "marginal" leader are concerned, the paper appears
very keen to include it in the coverage of the events.
Indeed, it could be argued that "Hilton International" is
introduced into the text because of its symbolic value, that
is, its connotations of affluence, and more importantly, its
association with the American economic and cultural influence
in Greece, a very sensitive issue for the majority of the
Greek population as has already been noted. i s In this way,
the alien character of the "marginals" is reconfirmed,
through the association of their alle ged leader with the
American presence in Greece, against a background of popular
anti-americanism.
Thus, Avriani introduces a threefold scheme of
difference/ confrontation by articulating aspects of popular
culture in its exclusivist discourse. This scheme is premised
upon the themes of "Jewishness", a powerful symbol of the
"alien" character of the "marginals", of "affluence/power",
an equally powerful symbol of the non-popular or
anti-popular character of the "marginals", consistent with
-327-
paper attempts to represent the sympathisers and supporters
of the "marginals" who occupied the "Chimeio" as deceived and
bound to "repent"; in this way "Avriani" appears to be ruling
out any possibility of political motives or motives of social
solidarity existing behind the occupation of the "Chimeio",
and to be attributing the expressions of solidarity and
support by other "marginals" for the "occupiers" to the
deception of the former by the latter.
Differing considerably from that of the other newspapers
monitored, the coverage of Eleftherotypia could be considered
to have been more "balanced". Although some of the paper's
reports are characterized by a considerable degree of
sensationalization of • the events, and abound in the use of
war metaphors, imagery of chaos,	 and evocations	 of
destruction, the responsibility is not attributed to the
"marginals" alone, but also to the police. Thus, emphasis is
also laid on the "irrationality" and "brutality" of police
action throughout the events, as on 14 May the police
operation is represented as "occupation of the area by the
police". On 15 May statements issued by minor political
parties and	 the "marginal" "Initiative	 against State
Repression" denouncing police brutality appear in the paper.
an interesting observation can be made
concerning the selective use by the Athens newspapers of the
sources of the "definitions of the situation" which were
available to them. With the sole exception of
"EleftherotYPia", the Athens dailies proved to be extremely
-328-
selective and used information about the incidents almost
exclusively from individuals and organizations hostile to the
anarchists. Typically, they gave a prominent position to
statements issued by the police and state ministries, and
"adopted" the statement released by the Ministry of Public
Order calling for the reinforcement of Law and Order. This is
illustrated by the conclusion of their coverage of the
incidents on 10 May:
"<The Government> is determined"
"From the ministry of public order the following
statement was released yesterday night:
"The ministry of public	 order considers today's
incidents caused by a group of anarchists in the area of
the "Chimeio" as unacceptable. The government is
determined to crush any action violating the law;
especially, during the pre-electoral period, the party
rallies, the peace and safety of the citizens and their
property are going to be safeguarded with increased
vigilance - exactly in the way this was done by the
police today.
-It must be realized that the law will be enforced
relentlessly"
Furthermore, all of the newspapers reviewed, publicized
on several occasions the statements of mainstream party
political youth organizations, party spokesmen and leaders,
and the Greek Union of Students - dominated by the mainstream
political parties - which condemned the "provocative" actions
of the "marginals" and called for their isolation. The
majority of the Athens papers monitored paid little or no
attention to	 alternative sources	 of	 information or
•
"definitions of the situation", and attempted to play down
the political aspects of the occupation and the actions of
the "marginals" that followed it. As noted above the sole
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exception was that of "Eleftherot ypia". "Eleftherotypia", in
contrast to the other papers, consistently publicized the
views of the "marginals" and their sympathizers as well as
the "official" (government or mainstream party) views in its
pages. Probably, as a result of the paper's policy, the
relative autonomy of its reporters and commentators from
editorial control enabled the coexistence of different lines
of interpretation and representation of the events. Thus, in
the paper's pages can be found statements by mainstream
political parties and party leaders condemning the
occupation, or urging for a united party respows.e to the
events (14 Mal' 1985), or the Greek Union of Students (EFEE)
emphasizing the unity of the "student movement" against the
"provocators" who occupied the "Chimeio" (11 May 1985) as
well as statements issued by minor parties and "marginal"
groups denouncing police violence (11 May 1985), a press
release by the "occupiers of Chimeio" (13 May 1985), a joint
statement issued by the editorial committees of prominent
periodicals of the left and the "marginal milieu" denouncing
police violence (13 May 1985). It could be argued that this
more "pluralistic" coverage by "Eleftherotypia" is an
indication of the paper's recognition of the existence of a
spectrum of political, or politically relevant forces, which
encompasses more agents than the mainstream political parties
and organizations, although minor parties and "marginal"
groups were not	 considered to be of equal political
significance to their mainstream counterparts.
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Anti-nuclear Demonstrations; May 1986 
The events of May 1986 were triggered by the prohibition
by the Athens police of two demonstrations against the use of
nuclear power, organized by leftist, ecological and anarchist
groups and ad hoc committees following the Chernobyl nuclear
accident on the 26th of April 1986.
On the 9th of May 1986 the Athens police prohibited a
demonstration and a rally against the use of nuclear energy
which had been organized by the "Anarchist Initiative for
Rally against Nuclear Power" (Anarhiki Protovoulia gia ti
syngentrosi enantia sta pyrinika), an ad hoc committee of
anarchist groups, created for the organization of
anti-nuclear power events. Despite the police ban, the
decision of some people to ignore the prohibition and to go
to the place where the banned rally had been arranged to take
place, resulted in 11 arrests on the grounds of civil
disobedience. On the 12th of May, a demonstration of
motorcyclists, organized by the "Antinuclear Initiative"
(Antipyriniki Protovoulia), another ad hoc committee formed
by ecologists and groups of the extra-parliamentary left, was
also banned as it was going to start. As leading members of
the "Antinuclear Initiative" approached the officers in
charge of the strong police forces which had encircled the
area in order to complain about the ban, they were beaten and
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arrested. In the meantime, assembled motorcyclists were also
attacked and arrested by the police, while traffic police
confiscated virtually any motorcycle that was moving or
parked in the centre of Athens and in the area of Exarcheia.
As police patrols made several arrests of "suspects" in these
areas, a group of people, probably anarchists, attacked a
stationary police van in Exarcheia. Just after that, the
police encircled the square, used smoke and tear gas grenades
and made over 100 arrests.
Following the ban on its demonstration, the "Antinuclear
Initiative" announced they were going to participate in the
next day's demonstration organized by the "Non-aligned Peace
Movement" (Adesmefti Kinisi Eirinis: AKE), an organization
affiliated to	 the Communist	 Party of	 Greece-interior
(KKE-es). Indeed, on May 13, the demonstration organized by
the "Non-aligned Peace Movement" was attended by supporters
and sympathizers of KKE-es and AKE, as well as by anarchist,
ecological-green groups and supporters of the
extra-parliamentary left. During the demonstration, a group
of anarchists threw a molotov cocktail at a traffic police
officer's motorcycle triggering minor incidents in the area,
and a series of arrests by the police.
The events of the period between Ma y 9 and 13 and their
aftermath (Magistrate's hearings, trials, government
statements) occupied several pages of the Athens press over
the next fortnight. In fact the events proved to be the
starting point of extended press coverage which quickly
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reached a second phase in which the incidents were
transformed into just an isolated expression of a wider
"social problem" of lawlessness and anarchy; the so called
problem of Exarcheia. This, second, aspect of media coverage
found its extreme expression in the public "discussion" of
the problem of the "state of the anarchists in Exarcheia"
that was initiated.
The newspapers used for this case study are
"Apogevmatini", an evening paper of conservative political
affiliation, "Avriani", a popular evening daily supporting
PASOK and representing itself as the "voice" of the moral
majority, "Eleftherotypia" which aspired to express a wide
spectrum of views, from the left to the centre, "Ethnos", a
popular paper which represented itself as a progressive
socialist popular paper, and the pro-government "Ta Nea".
Analyzing the texts that have been reviewed it could be
argued that all newspapers appear to employ more or less
similar techniques in their coverage of the incidents. More
precisely, one common element which can be traced in all five
newspapers is the "sensationalization" of the incidents as
particular emphasis is put on the presentation of the
incidents as similar, in the worst case, to war, or, in the
best case, to a violent, irrational outburst of extremist
elements.
The words, metaphors and expressions used give a
dramatic tone to the confrontation between the police and
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the demonstrators, exaggerate the gravity and the seriousness
of the incidents and, at the same time, suggest the unfolding
of a situation in which the rule of law had, at least
temporarily, been lost. The impression of a city plunged into
chaos, violence and disorder comes through clearly in the
coverage of every newspaper with the extensive use of images
of fire, blood and destruction.
Another equally prominent feature in the coverage seems
to have been the effort to represent the incidents as
instances or manifestations of an all-out confrontation,
which, in some cases is even equated to war. In any case, the
effect of both these options is that by reinforcing the
symbolic marginalization of a part of the population and by
investing	 it	 with	 connotations	 of	 destructiveness,
irrationality or lawlessness, it contributes to the
maintenance and reproduction of already established social
anxieties and stereotypes within Greek society.
Characteristic in this respect is the case of "Ethnos"
which, exploiting the image of the destruction of a police
motorcycle by a molotov cocktail, attempts to sensationalize
the incidents by regular use of the imager y of fire and
explosion (illustr. 21); thus the headlines of May 14, in
page 12 read "Explosion in Athens - Fierce clashes - Street
fights and 56 Arrests yesterday night in Exarcheia' and
°The clubs were on fire Alongside the police mot°
<abbr. for motorcycle>", while, similarly, references to





are abundant throughout the text. What is more, the use of a
"dramatic" vocabulary - phrases such as "fierce clashes",
"street fights", "merciless manhunt", "the truncheons were on
'fire'" contributes to the creation of an emotionally
charged atmosphere and reinforces the impression that
violent and destructive confrontations plunged the heart of
Athens into	 chaos, that an extraordinary and unacceptable
situation was unfolding.
"Ta Nea" similarly, draw upon the image of the burning
police motorcycle and extend it into further exaggerated
imagery of fire and destruction; on May 14 two photographs
taken during the incidents occupied most of the first page
while the only text accompanying and explaining them was a
prominent headline which read 	 THE ANARCHISTS BURNT
EVERYTHING; with	 molotov <bombs>	 in Athens	 and
Thessaloniki'.
The first photograph focused on men of the special
anti-riot units of the police (MAT) in full gear running
among small objects on fire, scattered on the street
(Illustration 22). The second, larger photograph, focused on
a small group of people armed with wooden sticks next to a
fire lit on a pavement, while in the background policemen
and some people in plain clothes were giving the impression
of retreating hastily (Illustration 23).
The main feature of the photographs seeme to be an image
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uncertainty emerging from the combination of the feelin g of
continuous movement captured by the camera, with other
elements such as the fires scattered on the streets, the men
armed with sticks, people retreating in haste, and even
details such as a policeman's cap abandoned on the
pavement.
In both photographs, fire is a prominent element and is
the theme taken up in the headline. The fire in the
photographs is but the visual raw material which allows the
imaginary reconstruction of what might have happened. At this
point the headline plays a key role for the interpretation of
the photographs as it transcends their visual meaning and
extends their signification. The limited visual evidence of
fire that is contained in the photographs is transformed into
an imagery of deliberate destruction by fire as the headline
informs the readers that the "anarchists" burned "everything"
in Athens and Thessaloniki. It is important to point out that
as no other text is provided in the first page that could be
related to the photographs, the headline remains a
significant source of information and certainly, alongside
the photographs, shapes the first impressions of the reader
as far as the incidents were concerned.
"Apogevmatini" appears to have adopted a similar line
of presentation using imagery of blood, fire and destruction
in its own coverage of the incidents. Thus, in an attempt to
report the incidents in a highly dramatic way the reporter(s)
use emotional vocabulary and metaphors; on May 14, the
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anarchists are alleged to have "tried to cause a bloodbath in
the two demonstrations" (pp. 1 and 3), to have "left nothing
standing", and to have "attempted to set him < = a police
officer> on fire", while his "motorcycle <was> in flames" (P-
1), or "became prey to fire" (p. 3). Going even further,
"Apogevmatini", in which the theme of war is a familiar one
when it comes to the coverage of public disorder, once more
took the opportunity to represent the incidents in terms of
war, as references to "battles", "battlefields", "attacks" or
"guerrilla war" were abundant in the text.
It therefore comes as no surprise that on May 13,
under the headline "All-night-long clashes between police
and anarchists" we read
"All-night-long guerrilla-war between policemen and
anarchists took place once more, yesterday in
Exarcheia..."
("Apogevmatini", 13 May 1886)
Along the sane lines is the coverage of the incidents on
pages 1 and 16, as frequent references to "battles",
"clashes", "fights with molotov <bombs>", "launching of
molotov bombs" or the variety of "arms" used by both sides
can be found. Similarly, as new incidents between police and
demonstrators take place on May 13, "Apogevmatini" continues
to find the theme of war a valuable source of vocabulary,
metaphors and imagery for its coverage as on May 14, under
its page 3 heading "Battlefield the centre of Athens' the
war imagery is revived through a repetition of the metaphors
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and vocabulary which was employed in the previous day's
coverage
"Once more, the centre of Athens was transformed into a
battlefield as a result of the violent confrontations
between the anarchists and the police yesterday night.
Using molotov bombs, stones, chains and truncheons, the
anarchists attempted to transform the two anti-nuclear
demonstrations which took place in Propylaia, into a
bloodbath..."
("Apogevmatini", 14 May 1986)
It should be noted that, according to the newspaper, the
centre of Athens became a war zone "once more". What is in
fact implied at this point is that this kind of fierce
confrontation, amounting to war between the police and the
"marginals" is a repetitive and endemic "abnormality". The
paper adopts a stance both hostile toward the "anarchists"
and critical of the "inability" of the police to act and
contain the incidents.
"Avriani" follows the sane line of coverage as, on May
14, a series of metaphors and exaggerations add a dramatic
flavour to its report of the incidents. Thus, the metaphor
"the surrounding streets were turned into an arena",
referring to the clashes between the police and the
demonstrators in Omonoia square, has the effect of linking
the events that would normally take place in an arena with
the incidents. In this way the clashes could be viewed as a
confrontation to the end, both- violent and spectacular.
Throughout the text, images of explosion and fire are
combined with images of blood and violence in an effort to
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stress the dramatic and spectacular nature of the events:
... a molotov bomb which exploded on the motorcycle.
Immediately the motorcycle was wrapped in flames ... A
few minutes later the petrol tank exploded, spreading
panic to everyone <in the area5. ... <the police>
launched a merciless hunt against the anarchists a
process which was accompanied by merciless beating as
'the blood was on fire'".
("Avriani" 14 May 1986)
Even in the case of situations that could not be
characterized as "incidents", "Avriani" proves to be quite
inventive when it comes to 	 port S. them. Yor example,
"Avriani", adopted a mixture of factual and distorted
reporting of the events of May 14, when the police moved
suddenly to the courtyard of the Athens magistrate's court
and made several unprovoked "pre-emptive" arrests of people -
mostl y relatives, friends and supporters of those arrested
during the incidents of the previous days- who had gathered
there to hear about the magistrate's decision, on its May 15
issue. The account transforms the violent arrests by the
police into violent incidents attributed to the anarchists
through the distortion and reversal of the roles of the
participants. Thus, according to the heading of that day's
reportage
"They were led to the Magistrate and their hearing
continues. The anarchists are charged with criminal
offences. They face ten charges. - They caused incidents
in the court"
("Avriani", 15 May 1896)
The headline is based on factual information insofar as
those who were arrested during the incidents of May 13 were
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charged with ten offences each, though only three of them
were criminal offences. It is equally true that certain
events took place outside the Magistrates court, that is, the
"pre-emptive" arrests by the MAT forces of people waitin g for
the magistrate's decision. The first distortion can also be
found in the same headline and it is realised through the
"blurring" of the acting subject. In this way, placing the
sentence "They caused incidents in the courts" without
specifying the acting subject, just after "The anarchists
are charged with criminal offences. They face ten charges" in
which the acting subject is clearly "the anarchists",
"Avriani" allows the confusion over the subjects of the
sentences to take place and, therefore, the first distortion
to happen. Thus, while the acting subject in "They caused
incidents in the courts" is in fact the police, in the
newspaper the reader can only assume that it was "the
anarchists" who caused incidents in the court.
In the text that follows the headline, the paper
attempts to represent the events which took place outside the
court as incidents, during which two parts were interacting,
in an effort to both sensationalize and justify what happened
by insinuating that the provoking actor was, once more, none
other than the anarchists.
In this way, under the subheading 'INCIDENTS we read
Four Police vans carrying the anarchists who had been
arrested appear in the court area at around 6.30 in the
afternoon.
MAT forces which have already been there occupy specific
positions around the Magistrate's court where the
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accused are to be brought.
Groups of anarchists are in the court yard of the court,
scattered, waiting for "the results" < = the decision> of
the Magistrate.
7.30 and the disquieting ... quiet in the court area,
interrupts a sudden attack of the MAT forces against the
scattered anarchists.
For over half an hour, the area resembles anything else
but courts. The <men of the> MAT chasing, the anarchists
running, parents, who had gathered to see their
children, shouting, while those who couldn't run fast
were dragged to the police vans despite their protests.
(Avriani 15 May 1986: 8)
While a careful reading of this text, would suggest that
the only acting part in the court area was "the police", as
it was "the police" who "occupied specific positions",
"attacked", "chased" and "dragged" "the anarchists" and that
"the anarchists" were in fact either inactive, "waiting", or
passive, were "attacked", "chased", "running" and "dragged",
"Avriani", presents the events as taking place in a span of
time, during which a continuous interaction between the
police and the anarchists reached its climax at 7.30 with the
"disquieting ... quiet" of the courts, apparently blamed on
the anarchists, being interrupted as the police attacked.
Expressions such as "groups of anarchists ... scattered"
and "disquieting ... quiet" suggest that the actions, or
rather, the inactivity of the anarchists was pre-planned,
purposeful and probably dangerous. This interpretation is
based by the paper's taken-for-granted association of the
"marginals" with violence and cunning. Thus, in the first
case the anarchists appear to be in groups, therefore
•
possibly organized, or even scattered, possibly having
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occupied "strategic" positions in the court area, while in
the second case, even the lawful "quiet" becomes
"disquieting" as it is in contradiction with the stereotype
of "the anarchist". In this way, therefore, the paper
justifies the action of the police by reversing the blame and
transforming inactivity into provocation.
The coverage of the incidents by "Eleftherotypia" has
similarities with that of the other newspapers in so far as
it draws considerably upon "sensational" themes and exploits
imageries of confrontation and violence (Illustration 24).
Thus, during the days of the incidents, dramatic headlines
appear such as
"Battlefield <the are of> Propylaia -
Exnrcheia" (May 13: 14)
"Attack in Exarcheia. Battles after the
demonstration" (May 14: 1)
"VIOLENT OUTBURST"
"* Anarchists burn police moto <-abbr_ for
motorcycle> * Molotov in police van * Beatings
by MAT and 60 arrests TM , "Tremendous charge and
sweep in the night" (May 14: 19)
"Drossogiannis threatens the 'state of
anarchists'_ Harsh statements on
Exarcheia" (May 21: 1)
"Merciless with Exarcheia- Drossogiannis
determined to 'clean up' • (May 21: 40)
vocabulary and metaphors emphasizing the
violent character of the incidents are used throughout the
coverage of the incidents. However, in contrast to the other
newspapers "Eleftherotypia" doesoot appear to attribute the
lion's share of responsibility for the incidents to the
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anarchists, as it adopts a more balanced approach to the
events or even appears to be rather cautious about the role
of the police in triggering the incidents, and in some cases
highly critical about the tactics of violence and arrests
exhibited by the police.
Characteristic in this respect is the editorial of
"Eleftherotypia" which appeared on May 13, which comprized
ironic comments and caustic criticisms addressed to the
police and the leadership of the ministry of public order
"Chernobyl here!
"Not even as	 ... side-effect of the nuclear cloud can
be explained yesterday's over-functioning of the
thirioid 18 of Mr Arkoudeaa <ie, the police officer in
charge of the police operations in the area of Greater
Athens>, who transformed a peaceful demonstration
against nuclear power, into a police explosion in the
heart of Athens. And certainly the question is, did all
this happen due to excessive zeal displayed by mr
Arkoudeas and his men, or because of "a new spirit" in
the ministry of public order.
Of course the new political leadership of the ministry
of Public Order understands what the developments after
yesterday's incidents is going to be. New marches, new
rallies, not anymore against Chernobyl but with a
totally domestic content. And this is one more of our
"successes". That is, we . managed to transform Chernobyl
into a domestic political'problem.
Or is it that the non-aligned and autonomist <citizens>
are used for releasing the tension of the policemen so
that they could not lose ... their temper in front of
those who are mainstream party supporters?
(Eleftherotypia, 13 May 1986: 8)
In this ironic editorial "Eleftherotypia", taking the
opportunity of the unprovoked escalation of police violence
of the previous day, expressed its concern about the
"confrontational" policies of the ministry of public order.
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It could be argued that what is expressed in this editorial
are fears that this confrontational attitude of the
government might be the prelude to and cause of the
escalation of protest. It should be pointed out that the
anti-police stance and the adoption of a critical line
vis-a-vis confrontational and suppressive governmental
practices by "Eleftherotypia" do not reflect a "pro-marginal"
stance of the newspaper but a more general commitment to
political Practices oriented towards consensus and
negotiation rather than confrontation, consistent with its
effort to represent itself as a newspaper of the "democratic
left", committed to pluralism and tolerance. It is in this
context that contrary to the attitude of the other
newspapers, "Eleftherotypia" expresses rather different
fears, that is fears for the marginalization of the area of
Exarcheia, not so much because of the presence of "marginal
groups" there, but because of the constant police presence,
the continuous police operations and police violence.
Characteristic in this respect is the reportage which
appeared on May 17 under the heading 'EXARCHEIA, the
residents and shopkeepers disturbed because of police
occupation' which contained a series of interviews with
residents, shopkeepers and people working in the area, in
which the interviewees accused the police of disrupting
everyday life, causing loss of trade for the shopkeepers of
the area, terrorizing the residents and frequently resorting
to violence and exhibition of power, and a further reportage
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under the heading "The other Exarcheia. Operation 'Virtue'
and the operation for profit from propert y <speculation>" in
which the reporter argued that the area was treated as an
experimental subject for testing new methods of police
practices, that the issue of "Exarcheia" was being used as a
means of distraction of the public from important issues, and
linked the police operations in the area with the project of
the ministry of environment and planning for a radical
reconsideration of the planning of the area and its
land-uses, and with alleged extensive speculation over land
and property.
Therefore, while other newspapers express fears for the
escalation of disorder, "Eleftherotypia" expresses its own
fears for the disappearance of the character of the area,
the deterioration of the quality of life of the residents
as the state intervenes in the area with both its planning
and policing apparatuses and opens the way for private
property speculators to step in. 17
The coverage of the incidents during this period proved
to be the prelude to a shift in the interest of the press
from the incidents themselves to issue of lawlessness and
anarchy in the area of "Exarcheia" which was effectively
identified as the source of the problem. In the context of
this renewed preoccupation of the press with the "problem of
Exarcheia", the term "state of the anarchists in Exarcheia"
re-emerged once more in political discourse, and was taken up
by an eager press and subsequentl y entered the domain of
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public debate.
So, on May 14, extensive publicity was given in the
Athens press to the statements made by the minister of Public
Order Antonis Drossogiannis on the incidents of the previous
day, during his routine weekly meeting with representatives
of the media in which a wide range of subjects related to the
activities of the ministry were normally discussed. In a
remarkable uniformity, all of the newspapers monitored
introduced selected parts of the press conference under
similar headings:
"Final solution will be given to the problem,
Drossogiannis pointed out- Decisive measures
for the cleaning up of Exnrcheia from the
anarchists" (Avriani)
"Drossogiannis: The problem has gone too far.
This is how I shall clean up Exarcheia"
(Ethnos)
"Drossogiannis: I shall clean up Emarcheia"
(Eleftherotypia)
"Cleaning up of Eacnrchaia is planned by the
police" (Apogevmatini)
"Droasogiannis: 'No (anarchist> state in
Exsrheia l " (Ts Nea).
All of the reports share an underl ying common concern
over the existence of a problem in the area of Exarcheia.
That concern is most easily traced through the reporters'
questions to the minister. Their main preoccupation was the
"problem" of Exarcheia and more precisely the measures that
the government had or planned to take in order to tackle it.
Notwithsanding the - sometimes substantial - discrepancies
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between the accounts of the ministr y briefing in each
newspaper. They all considered as important the parts of the
conversation between the minister and the reporters
concerning the existence of a "state within the state" in
Exarcheia and the possible course of remedy to the problem.
Al]. with some variations, drew upon the points made by the
minister on these issues.	 In "Ethnos" and "Ta Nea" the
coverage of the press conference began with an almost
identical - possibly verbatim from the press conference
combination of some of these points:
"The state is one. I cannot recognize in any area the
status of a state within a state. You shall see that in
time Exarcheia will become similar to all the other
boroughs of Athens."
(Ethnos, 14 May 1986: 9)
"The state is one and I cannot recognize in any area the
status of a state within a state. You shall see that in
time Exarcheia will become similar to the other boroughs
of Athens."
(Ta Nea, 14 May 1986: 11)
while "Avriani", after reporting that "drastic measures are
going to be taken in order to eliminate completely the daily
problem caused by the anarchists in the area" continued its
coverage quoting the same points:
"I cannot accept in any case that the anarchists have
established a "state" in Exarcheia. There is not any
other state but the Greek. Soon, we are going to take a
series of drastic measures so that in a while, Exarcheia
will become similar to the rest of the areas of Athens."
(Avriani, 14 May 1986: 5)
"Apogevmatini" focused on these points as well; however
probably because of its political support of the opposition
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"Nea Dimokratia" party, its own account of the discussion
between the minister and the reporters concentrated mostly on
the issue of the government's inabilit y to act and the lack
of political will for decisive action, as a series of
questions and answers which had not appeared in other papers
were quoted.
- MINISTER: "There is no such issue. And concerning what
you call 'state of Exarheia' there are no special
privileges"
- REPORTER: "But the fact <state of Exarcheia> exists?"
- MINISTER: "You are going to see soon, that after the
<new> measures are going to be implemented, the area
will become similar to all other areas of Athens."
- REPORTER: "What are these measures?"
- MINISTER: "You are going to see them."
- REPORTER: "So the situation will be perpetuated, or
are you going to adopt a harder line? What is your
political will?
- MINISTER: "What do you think. You are going to be
persuaded soon."
(Apogevmatini, 14 Ma y 1986: 2)
Concentrating on this part of the press conference, the
newspapers appear to attempt to bring to the foreground of
public debate the "problem" of Exarcheia. By publishing parts
of the press conference referring to the "existence of a
state within the state" in Exarcheia, despite their reporting
of the categorical denial of the minister of public order on
that matter, the newspapers have in fact re-introduced the
issue into the universe of public discourse.
As the issue had, once more, been introduced into the
universe of public discourse, the conditions for the renewal
of public concern and, possibly, the mobilization of fears
emerged. The reference to the existence of a "state" other
than the "legitimate" one, although metaphorical, and its
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placement in a specific territory, Exarcheia, gives a
"material" or "objective" quality to the problem, and a sense
of immediacy to the danger it is supposed to represent.
In this context, public disquiet and fears are generated
by and can be channelled toward a more tangible threat
which is defying the "legitimate" state and its rightful
jurisdiction over a part of its territory. As the problem has
been therefore identified, and "objectified", the newspapers
accept at face value (Ethnos, Ta Nea, Eleftherotypia) or
appear to anticipate (AvTiani), or even to ask for harder
measures doubting the political will and the resolve of the
government to support sincerely the surgical-removal-type
remedy assigned to the police (Apogevmatini).
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CHAPTER 8
THE PRESS, MORAL PANICS AND THE REPRODUCTION
OF AUTHORITARIAN POLITICAL CULTURE
The analysis of the case studies in the previous chapter
shows that the patterns of the coverage by the Athens daily
press of forms of collective action by 'marginal' groupings
and their confrontations with the authorities througheztat ttle
period 1981-86 share similarities with the phenomenon which
Stanley Cohen has termed 'moral panic', that is, a process
whereby
"A condition, episode, person or group of persons
emerges to become defined as a threat to societal
values and interests; its nature is presented in a
stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass
media; the moral barricades are manned by editors,
bishops, politicians and other right-thinking
people; socially accredited experts pronounce
diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved
or (more often) resorted to; the condition then
disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes
more visible. Sometimes the object of panic is
quite novel and at other times it is something
which has been in existence long enough, but
suddenly it appears in the limelight. Sometimes the
panic passes over and is forgotten, except in
folklore and collective memory; at other times it
has more serious and long-lasting repercussions and
might produce such changes as those in legal and
social policy or even in a way society conceives
itself." (S. Cohen, 1980: 9)
The case studies show that the Athens press played an
important part in the creation, and the convergence of a
series of moral panics during the 1980s by publicizing
-353-
essentially localized events, 	 involving mainly the
"marginals", presenting them in stylized and stereotypical
fashion, and redefining them as a threat to societ y, morality
and democratic stability. During the periods of the perceived
"crisis", definitions, diagnoses and solutions were sought by
the Athens dailies from authoritative experts. Among them,
state functionaries, the police, and representatives of the
local communities which were affected were invited to give
their opinions and thus helped in the shaping public opinion.
However, the most crucial role was played by the mainstream
political organizations, their leaders and spokesmen, who
offered ritualistic definitions of the situation, defining
simultaneously the boundaries of "deviance" and of the
"political" and denying the "marginals" a political voice.
The impact of the panics was not negligible; they not only
remained in collective memory, but also had significant
repercussions as far as aspects of legal and social policy
were concerned. But more importantly, they had a significant
impact in the reproduction of . aspects of the Greek
political culture, that is, in the ways the political is
defined and instituted in Greek society.
Through the press coverage of the events, the uneven
confrontation between the state, the mainstream political
parties and the police on the one hand, and the 'marginals'
on the other, or, at a higher level of abstraction, the
competition between the hegemonic political culture and the
alternative discourses and action of the 'marginal' milieu
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were represented - and experienced by parts of the public -
as a confrontation between helpless communities of 'ordinary'
citizens and organized gangs of deviants, and eventually as a
confrontation between society and an anti-social enemy. To be
sure, these remarks are not intended to suggest that the
"marginals" were arbitrarily labelled "deviant" or
"criminals". What is important however is the fact that
instances of politically meaningful action were
misrecognized, or rather transformed into instances of
deviant behaviour, and their anti-state and anti-partocratic
discourses were represented as anti-social discourses,
threatening the fabric of society.
Press representations of the "marginals" and of the
events included in the case studies of the previous chapter,
as well as of a series of similar events which took place
throughout the 1980s such as the protests against the visit
of Jean Marie Lepen to Greece (December 1984), the killing of
a 15-year-old youth by a policeman and the Polytechnic School
occupation which followed it (November 1985), or the protest
marches against the incarceration of anarchist and leftist
citizens (November 1988) has been crucial in several
respects. First, it provided a body of information on the
basis of which social representations of the "marginals" were
built. This information was not derived from the public's
experience of direct contact with the "marginals"; rather, it
was information processed by the press and therefore
structured b y the particular constraints under which the
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Athens press had to operate. Indeed, throughout the coverage
of these events, a multitude of commercial and political
considerations, as well as cultural constraints - to which I
referred earlier - were at play and influenced considerably
press performance, and therefore the information diffused in
the form of "news stories".
Second, it influenced, if not determined, later stages
of societal reaction towards the "marginals" and, at the
political level in particular, it played a major role in
"undermining" their discourse, and divesting their actions
of any rational or moral basis, or political motivation. What
is more, it played a major role in the maintenance of the
relations of political domination because by drawing on the
definitions of the situation of the official discourse it
re-affirmed the central 	 position of the established
participants in the sphere of political debate. Insofar as it
provided information regarding the acceptable 	 (or not
acceptable) participants in the political process, the
legitimate (or not legitimate) methods and modes of political
action, the political or non-political character of issues,
press coverage of the events constituted an important medium
for the diffusion and publicizing of specific definitions of
the situation, especially definitions of the "political". By
effectively participatin g in the processes of the social
construction of the political sphere, especially at a time
when its boundaries were challenged by a social and political
minority - the "marginals", the Athens press played a
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significant role in the reproduction of elements of the
political culture.
The remainder of this chapter explores the relationship
between news production by the Athens press, and the
reproduction of aspects of the Greek political culture,
through the further development and interpretation of the
assessment of press performance which I attempted in the
previous chapter, paying particular . attention to those
aspects of the press response and societal reaction to the
events, which are pertinent to the reproduction of the Greek
political culture.
For the purposes of the analysis which will follow I
shall distinguish three main processes of press response to
the events which have been included in the case studies, and
three corresponding sets of potential effects, or potential
societal reaction (Table 16). As far as the press response to
the events is concerned, we could distinguish the processes
of	 (i)	 inventory formation 	 and	 sensitization,	 (ii).	 -
undermining the discourse and action of the "marginals", and
(iii) reproduction of the official discourse and definitions
of the situation. These processes of press response had three
sets of corresponding potential effects as far as the
societal reaction towards the events was concerned, notably,
(i) increased public awareness of the events and
activatioo of processes ' of societal reinterpretation and
redefinition of the actors and the events,
(ii) elimination of the symbolic and political capital
end symbolic isolation and exclusion of the "marginals",
and
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(iii) confirmation of the position and authority of the
"legitimate participants" in political debate.
TABLE 25
Processes of press response and corresponding
potential effects.









































It should however be emphasized that the processes of
press response, as well as their effects, are not in practice
clearly distinct; nor is the order in which they are
presented here intended to suggest the existence of a
-358-
temporal sequence of actually distinct stages of press
response or societal reaction to the events. In fact, the
processes of press response, and their potential effects,
should be regarded as overlapping and interdependent, as one
complements and reinforces the other. Thus, the process of
the reproduction of the official definitions of the situation
and the process of undermining the discourse of the
"marginals" cannot be clearly distinguished from that of the
formation of the inventory as they are all synchronous in
their emergence and interdependent in their unfolding.
Following the occurence of the initial event, the press
responded through the formation of the inventory, that is,
the initial interpretation and presentation of the event, of
its background and impact, and of the main actors involved in
it. 18 The importance of the inventory lies in the fact that
it was this body of processed and organized information that
constituted the basis of the public - mediated - experience
of the events, and of the public reaction to them. What is
more, the inventory provided the raw material for the
construction of culturally identifiable symbols which further
reinforced social perceptions of the "marginals" as
different and peculiar, and set in motion processes of
reinterpretation and redefinition of the events and the
actors involved in them. More precisely, these processes of
sensitization were in fact processes whereby events or
situations which would have previously been regarded as
neutral or ambiguous, were linked and reinterpreted as
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potentiall y or actually threatening. 19 In this way, events
which would not normally have been the focus of public
attention or, at least, not perceived as a threat to society,
were reinterpreted, and the "marginals" involved in these
events "redefined" as different, dangerous and threatening.
It is already obvious that the processes of inventory
formation and of sensitization contained elements which
prepared the ground for what could be called undermining of
the discourse and of the moral or rational basis of the
collective action of the "marginals". Despite the fact that
the reported irrational behaviour of the "marginals" was not
always, or entirely, a product of the imagination of
journalists, it should be stressed that whenever the former
attempted to criticize or challenge aspects of social and
political life on the grounds of their "immoral" or
"irrational" character, the press either disregarded, or
attempted to refute their arguments. Thus, as it has been
shown in the case studies, strategies undermining the
credibility of the "marginals" were repeatedly employed. One
of the most characteristic examples was the press coverage of
the building occupations of November 1981, when all efforts
of the "marginals" to get their message across were met with
strategies of undermining the message's validity and the
"marginals'" credibility (for example pp. 256-262). As far as
the "political motivation" of the "marginals" is concerned,
although their actions were not always primarily, or
exclusively	 'political' in character, it is equally true
that during the coverage of the events, the s ymbols of
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difference, peculiarity, and threat contained in the
inventory were exaggerated and mobilized in such a way so as
to diminish or eliminate the political aspects of the
discourse and collective action of the "marginals". As far as
the potential effect of this modality of press reaction is
concerned, it could be argued that such processes led to the
symbolic isolation and exclusion of the "marginals" from the
domain of political and, more generally, public debate.
The third feature of press response to the events was
the adoption, publicizing and reproduction of the "official"
at the expense of alternative definitions of the situation".
In this stage, the coverage of the events, confirmed the
status quo as far as the relations of political domination
were concerned. The emphasis of the press on the
"peculiarity", and "strangeness" of the "marginals" and the
virtual elimination of their capacity to participate in
political discourse, or in any other form of public debate
for that matter, left the field free for the state and the
established, mainstream political organizations. Newspapers
turned to government ministers, or to these organizations for
interpretations of the situation, ritualistic condemnations
of the "marginals" and affirmations of the hold of mainstream
political organizations over social life. But more
importantly, the recourse of the press to these "socially
accredited" political actors for "authoritative comment" or
information, was tantamount to their recognition, and
representation, as the sole legitimate actors in the
political sphere, the only acceptable mediators between
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citizens and the state.
Primary Definitions and Press Languages 
During the confrontations between the authorities and
the "marginals", given the asymnetrical relations of power
among the competing groups and definitions of the situation
derived from their practices and discourses, the press relied
and publicized those definitions of the situation offered by
the socially accredited authorities, that is, the definitions
which constituted the core of the statements made primarily
by representatives of the government and the mainstream
political parties and their subsidiary social and political
organizations, opinions of spokespersons of the 'community' -
local and national - and information and statements made by
the police and their political superiors at the Ministry of
Public Order.
Whereas it is obvious that these primary definitions
constituted the 'raw material' which underlay the media
coverage of the events, as the majority of the Athens press
appear to have relied on, and been influenced by official
accounts of the situation, it is also clear that newspapers
'translated' them in particular public languages. 20 It is in
this context that we can make sense of the divergence in the
language, narrative styles and imager y employed, and of the
different positions adopted by each newspaper, without, at
the same time, disregarding the significant underlying
similarities in press performance.
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These "languages" employed by newspapers are dependent
upon two major factors: the particular paper's political
party affiliation or s ympathies, and on assumptions about its
readership and their "language". Newspaper "languages"
therefore are not simply distinct because of their particular
grammatical, syntactic or stylistic aspects; they are also
informed by the - assumed - collective social and political
experiences, memories, traditions and practices of each
newspaper's readership. Thus, whereas most dailies emphasize
the anti-social character of the "marginals", each of them
interprets this character in ways influenced by its political
affiliation and its assumptions about the ways in which
anti-social behaviour is 'understood' and 'defined' by its
readers. The conservative papers analyzed in the case studies
tended to operate within the cultural and linguistic
boundaries set by the discourses of right-wing political
organizations, thus emphasizing their opposition to the PASOK
government, and criticizing its inability to restore order.
At the same time, they employed the language and rhetoric
derived from the assumed collective experiences, memory and
ideology of their predominantly politically and socially
conservative public;	 the ideology and practice of
anticommunism, memories of the Civil War, and fears of
left-wing insurrection, chaos and anarchy. Conversely, papers
of the cente-left operated within different cultural and
linguistic contexts set by the political parties of the
centre-left, and the papers' 	 assumptions about their
readership and their 'language'.
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However, these 'languages' were often overlapping to
such an extent that the above remarks should not be construed
as implying a polarization between watertight 'right' and
'left-wing' cultural	 contexts. On	 the contrary,	 most
'Popular' - or even 'serious' - newspapers across the
political spectrum have adopted a more or less populist
'language' and rhetoric derived from 'popular',
'common-sense' schemes of cognition, perception and practice
and mobilized a sense of collective disquiet, and
consequently a sense of community. This populist 'language'
and rhetoric mobilized aspects of the 'popular imagination',
that is, themes which the 'average' citizen could identify
with regardless of political conviction. The roots of this
populist 'language' and rhetoric in 'common-sense' combined
with its articulation to the official discourse made
imperative the support or even protection of the existing
political arrangements and social order. Thus, populist
'language' and rhetoric brought to the fore shared
experiences and memories of 'ordinary citizens', 'family
people', 'working persons', 'small shop-owners', 'widows' and
'elderly people' as it has been seen in the analysis of the
case studies, and constituted the raw material with which the
press representations of the marginals were constructed. What
is more, it was this popular language and rhetoric which
provided fertile ground for the construction of - mainly
imagined, in the sense of Anderson's use of the word
(Anderson,	 1983)	 - experiences	 of	 'fellowship'	 and
'community' among the press readership and, more generally,
the public.
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Media Representations of the "Marginals" 
If we examine how the particular events and, more
generally, the issue of the "marginals" were interpreted and
presented by the mass media we find convincing evidence of
common, or at least similar, and repeated signifying and
symbolic strategies.
First, it could be argued that the coverage of the
events, or in some cases "non-events", by the majority of the
Athens dailies was characterized by a considerable degree of
over-reporting.	 Sensationalization,	 distortion	 and
exaggeration appear to have been universal and newspapers
were highly selective in their representation of the events,
mostly focusing on particular, 'alarming' aspects of the
collective action of the "marginals". The selective
presentation, and the emphasis on "irrational" or "offensive"
and "alien" aspects of the events were crucial in the
creation of a series of stereotypes of the "marginalia." which,
in turn, were frequently employed in further press coverage.
In this way, themes which amplified the sense of danger,
impending disaster, or of disorder, lawlessness and chaos
were routinely employed in order to convey to the public a
sense of profound social crisis, of a continuous threat to
the moral and political order.
Among the most important elements of the press inventory
were the themes of violence, vandalism and disruption. It
should be noted that a common emphasis on these themes could
be detected in media representations of youth subcultures
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such as the case of the British 'Mods and Rockers' in the
1960s, in which the British media focused on distressing
images of blood and violence, or on exaggerated and rather
distorted accounts of the disruption and damage caused by
them (Cohen, 1980).
Throughout the coverage of the events particular
emphasis was laid on the use of presentation techniques which
amplified the impression of violence as newspapers attempted
to attract and shock readers with stories of violence,
destruction and disruption, by dwelling on the most
"incomprehensible" feature of the behaviour of the
"marginals". The theme of violence, complemented by those of
destruction and disruption was central in the inventory of
the events because of its capacity to capture the attention
of the public and to sensitize it. Images of violence,
destruction and disruption conveyed by detailed - and
occasionally exaggerated - press descriptions of the
confrontations between the "marginals" on the one hand, and
the police, or outraged residents, on the other, of injuries
inflicted, or of destroyed property were intended to increase
public interest, and at the same time to reinforce the
feeling of threat and the assumed "abnormal", antisocial
character of the "marginals" and to increase the sense of
distance between them and "ordinary people".
In this context, single events involving some form of
violence, damage or disruption, were represented as a series
of occurrences, as a generalized state of chaos. Similarly,
incidents not apparently linked with the "marginals", such as
-366-
the bombing of Citibank in 1985 - a not very unusual event in
Athens in the 1980s	 were readily attributed to the
"marginals" despite the lack of any evidence or concrete
information. So one incident between the police and the
"marginals" came to be routinely referred to as "incidents",
or even as "all-out confrontation". One bombing by unknown
persons would be reported under the headline "They blew up
banks" - where "they" would refer to the "marginals". Even
the lack of incidents or of violence was, on occasion,
transformed into news stories linked with the theme of
violence, or imminent violence at least. Characteristic of
this, is the coverage of the court hearings of those arrested
during the events which followed the anti-nuclear
demonstrations of 1986 in which Avriani emphasized the danger
which, it alleged, was inherent in the quiet outside the
courts (Avriani 15 May 1986). In such instances, behaviour
which did not appear to conform to the press stereotype of
violence and threat, was interpreted in such a way so as not
to contradict it while, conversely, any kind of behaviour
that corresponded to the press stereotypes was immediately
attributed to the "marginals" even when no evidence could
justify such allegations.
Another reccurrent theme in press representations of the
"marginals" was that of conspiracy or of organized threat.
The majority of the papers monitored shared conspiracy-
centered interpretations of the events, as on several
occasions press reports implied or explicitly stated that the
"marginals" were in fact organized conspirators, following
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plans of action and aiming to create maximum disruption.
In other reports, a theme closel y related to that of
premeditation was predominant, as the "marginals" were
represented as "agitators" or "agents provocateurs" serving
unknown interests, or seeking to "destabilize democracy".
This emphasis on alleged premeditation, on the deliberate
intent of the "marginals", or on the existence of secret
plans of political destabilization, has no factual basis, as
the groups of "marginals" were in fact loose and unstable
collectivities, sometimes formed "on the spur of the moment".
No evidence has been produced to back press allegations
regarding the presence of structured groups, or of
premeditated action, although some semblance of organization
- albeit loose, fragile and spontaneous - appeared to emerge
in the course of some of the events, for example the empty
building occupations of 1981-82, or the occupation of the
building of the Athens University Chemistry Department
("Chimeio"). In any case, the press allegations regarding the
premeditated character of the events seem to be the product
of distortion and exaggeration.
Another central element in press representations of the
"marginals" is the theme of affluence, a theme which was also
prevalent in mass media representations of youth subcultures
and counter-cultures in other European societies during the
1960s. Indeed, apart from the case of the Greek "marginals",
"affluence" appears to have been an important part of the
signifying and symbolic strategies employed by the press.
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More precisely, Cohen, in his analysis of the content of
the mass media inventory of the "Mods and Rockers"
phenomenon in Britain, included affluence in the ten main
elements of the media inventory (Cohen, 1980: 35). Similarly,
Lumle y (1990: 74), in his study of the Italian social
movements in the late 1960s, among other negative
representations of the student movement which appeared in the
Italian press, quotes a statement made by Pier Paolo
Pasolini, a PCI sympathizer, which appeared in "L'Espresso"
(16 June 1968):
"You have the faces of spoilt brats, and I hate
you, like I hate your fathers .... When yesterday
at Valle Giulia you beat up the police, I
sympathized with the police because they are the
sons of the poor." (quoted in Lumley-. 74)
Although there is no express reference to affluence in this
text, the contrast between the police (sons of the poor) and
the "spoilt brats" (therefore sons of the affluent middle
class) is a quite powerful one, linking the theme of
affluence to the student revolt.
It could be argued that in all three cases, the emphasis
on "affluence" played a very important role in the
mobilization of specific elements of the 'common', 'popular'
culture against the political or social "deviants". More
precisely, the theme of "affluence" brings to the fore of
public attention elements of popular culture through which
the disapproval of the existing distribution of wealth and
opportunities, and of the relations of exploitation within
society by the subaltern classes and groups manifests itself.
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The theme of "affluence" carries connotations of inequality,
exploitation, or corruption, and is certainly linked with
popular resentment.
In all three cases, the inclusion of the theme of
"affluence" in the mass media inventories opened the way for
the construction of symbols, which further reinforced social
perceptions of difference: the "deviants", be they the
British "Mods and Rockers", or the Italian students, or the
Greek "marginals", were definitely "not of the people" as
they were rich kids, or spoilt children of middle-class
parents. Eventually, the possible ambiguity as far as the
"status" of these groups was concerned, gave its place to
certainty as the linkage of the theme of "affluence" to the
particular groups which appeared to be socially or
politically deviant, had as a result the re-orientation of
popular disapproval from the abstract category of "the rich"
towards them in all three cases.
To return to the case of the 'marginals' in Greece, it
could be argued that the allegations, especially in the
'popular' press, that the leaders or the members of marginal
groups were rich, or came from 'good families', were
intended to stress the impression of "difference" of the
"marginals" from the "people", and eventually to discredit
and isolate them. This was achieved by the articulation
within the "official" discourse of elements of the 'popular'
culture through which was expressed the popular disapproval
of existing inequalities in wealth and opportunities. Thus,
in press representations, the alleged "affluence" of the
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"margins's" became a symbol of difference on the basis of
which the allegedly affluent marginals became the object of
popular resentment. The negative connotations of exploitation
and corruption, carried by "affluence" made the sense of
difference more profound and eventually provided the ground
for the second stage of press reaction to the "marginals",
that is, the undermining of their discourse and actions.
Through this emphasis on the non-popular character of the
"marginals", the latter were discredited, their discourse was
undermined, their actions lost any moral or rational basis
they might have had, and consequently, they were set in
opposition to "ordinary people".
Thus, the actual or potential political meaning of the
actions of the marginals was effectively dissimulated and
neutralized; most papers attributed the events to irrational
behaviour of 'spoilt' children of bourgeois families (in a
way reminiscent of Pasolini's ironic redefinition of the
Italian students as "figli di papa"), and emphasized the
disruption they caused to "ordinary" people, whereas they
paid little or no attention to the predominant anti-status-
quo discourses and action of the 'marginals'.
The antithesis between the s marginals' and the "people"
seems to have been enhanced by the representation of the
former as "lazy" or "idle". Here again, in the alleged
contempt for work of the "marginals", one can detect the
mobilization of elements of the ' popular' culture, in which
'work' is a central everyday activity, a symbol of social
status and respectability.
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Premised upon this recognition, the press attempted to
establish the difference between the "people" and the
"marginals" by vindicating the value of hard-work identified
with the "common people" and by denouncing the "marginals'"
contempt for work. Thus, the contempt of the "marginals" for
"paid work" on the grounds of it being a form of economic
exploitation, was generalized by the press as it was
represented as contempt for any kind of work, as a
predisposition to laziness and idleness and proof of the
"marginals'" irresponsibility, and was therefore construed as
contempt for societal norms and popular values. This was
achieved through the distortion, dissimulation and selective
presentation of aspects of the discourse and action of the
"marginals".	 For example,	 in order	 to justify the
representation of the "marginals" as idle, lazy and
irresponsible, most of the newspapers monitored had to play
down or ignore the collective work of "marginals" for the
repair of the empty buildings occupied during 1981-82 as it
would undermine the assumptions built in the inventory.
Closely related to the theme of contempt for work
appears to be the emphasis laid by the press on the
centrality of "pleasure" in the slogans and the ideolo gy of
the "marginals". This theme also, was exploited by the
newspapers in the context of the relationship of pleasure
with "work" in the popular imagination. More precisel y, as in
the popular imagination, "pleasure" was assumed to be a
reward for hard work, while, in the countercultural millieux
of the "marginals", pleasure and spare time were thought to
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have a value of their own, it was apparent that the
"marginals" appeared to challenge the "natural" sequence. The
Athens press was keen to take up this issue and to transform
a cultural difference, a different evaluation of "pleasure"
and of its relationship with "work", into an incomprehensible
perversion, a threatening deviation, into contempt for social
norms and popular values.
Another prominent theme in the press representations of
the "marginals" was that of their foreigness as the majority
of the Athens press laid particular emphasis on the "foreign"
character of the "marginals" and their practices. From the
implicitly xenophobic emphasis on the 'foreign' character of
the occupations, to the overtl y racist identification of the
alleged leader of the Chimeio occupation as 'Jewish', there
seems to be an underlying rejection of any links between the
marginals and the 'people' or the 'nation'. For example, the
majority of the newspapers monitored, treated the occupations
of empty houses of 1981-82 as an imitative response to
similar actions which had taken place in other European
countries; they condemned the action as "alien" to Greek
society and politics, refusing in this way to examine its
political significance. Similarly, the alleged leader of the
occupation of Chimeio in 1985, 1.1813 "denounced" by "Avriani"
as a "Jew", a member of an ethnic or religious minority, and
thus an "alien" to the Greek, predominantly monoethnic/
religious culture, apparently not entitled to protest.
The theme of foreigness, in any of its variations, was
introduced for the mobilization of elements of "common sense"
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xenophobia and prejudice incorporated in popular culture, and
was employed by the Athens press in order to isolate the
"marginal:3" by "symbolically" ostracizing them from the
national - and political - community and, at the same time,
to convey the sense of exaggerated threat to its readership
as the element of "foreigness" in the representations of the
"marginals" was interpreted as a threat against popular unity
and identity.
However, the emphasis on the themes that have been
outlined in the preceding pages, appears to be characteristic
of the articulation of the broader populist rhetoric of the
majority of the newspapers monitored with the official
discourse. Thus, press discourses are characterized by the
expression of suspicion of the existence of "parasitic" or
"corrupting" entities "within", which are characterized by
their generally anti-social behaviour on the one hand, and
the creation of a "popular" community, the existence and
interests of which were in need of defence, on the other.
The theme of anti-social behaviour underlay most
elements of the press representations of the "marginals", but
it was also introduced into public debate in an explicit way
on several occasions through the identification of the milieu
of the "marginals" with the criminal underworld.
Criminalization of political opposition has been a persistent
feature of Greek history, especially after the civil war, and
the outlawing of the Communist Party and its allies. Under
the shadow of this "tradition", the "marginals", refusing to
become integrated into the political system, were therefore
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associated with crime and their protest acquired connotations
of violence and irrationality. By identifyin g the "marginals"
with criminal gangs, drug-traffickers or terrorists, and
their leaders with gang bosses and "godfathers", the press
attempted to increase the tension that had already been
created between "ordinary people" and the "marginals", who,
according to the press coverage, not only failed to become
integrated within "popular" norms and customs, but also were
a "corrupting" agent and constituted a serious threat for
law and order and the moral fabric of society.
In addition to their systematic representation as social
outsiders, the "marginals" were also represented as outsiders
in terms of spatial exteriority. This was achieved through
the "territorialization" of the alleged threat of the
"marginals" through which the division between "them" and
"society" became sharper. As I have argued in my discussion
of the case studies, press references to a "state" other than
the "legitimate" one, and its association with a specific
territory "objectified" the "problem" of the marginals and
provided the	 basis for social	 distinction between
insiders/outsiders.
Finally, the forms of collective action taken by the
marginals in a variety of occasions, were de-historicized and
thereby effectively rendered meaningless. The possible
political significance of the marginals' collective action
and expressive " behaviour was effectively neutralized and
symbolically repressed as their actions were represented as
irrational, lacking any historical background, and therefore
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as meaningless. While common sense operates on the basis of a
"cause-effect" se quence of events, throughout the coverage of
the events the Athens press, with the occasional exception of
"Eleftherotypia", separated cause and effect. Thus, the
"marginals" appeared to act unprovoked, and their action was
rendered unintelligible for the newspaper readers. What is
more, even when they were offered access to the mass media,
the minimization, if not the virtual elimination of the
symbolic capital of the marginals was the price they had to
pay for this, as the Athens dailies in fact constituted an
arena of discursive struggle where the relations of power
were asymmetrical. Whenever views of marginals were carried,
under the guise of 'impartial', 'objective' and 'pluralistic'
information, their credibility, was eliminated through
complex strategies including cynicism, or irony.
In this way, press coverage of the events provided the
basis for representations of the "people", an idealized
community, virtually identified with its political
"expression" (i.e. the state, the political parties and
democracy) being under threat by the "marginals". Indeed,
despite the existence of serious party-political divisions
among the established political parties, it could be argued
that news-reporting played the role of "political ritual",
asserting the unity of the "people", or of other similar
"idealized" communities such as "youth", or the "student
movement" over and beyond party lines. The Athens newspapers
frequently employed a rhetoric of community, 	 whereby
"diversit y", especially the perceived deviance of the
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"marginals" was treated as a threat to its survival. What is
particularl y important at this point is the conver gence of
"community" and its legitimate organized political expression
- that is, the political parties - in most of the texts
analyzed. More precisely, the mainstream political parties,
party youth or student organizations were treated as the
legitimate and sole representatives of the "people", the
"youth movement", or the "student movement". We can thus
detect the unfolding of strategies of fusion between the
"political" (as defined by the mainstream political parties)
and the "social" in the coverage of the events. According to
the press coverage, it would seem that society is represented
or expressed through the mainstream political parties; other
social or political identities which are potentially
antagonistic to the former do not appear to be able to
compete in terms of access to the mass media and therefore to
public debate. This appears to be one of the reasons why the
"marginals" were virtually excluded from public debate and
could not express their political views. The under-secretary
for youth was treated as the sole authority on youth
problems, and his opinion was given the necessary authority
to contradict "hard facts", notably youth dissatisfaction and
alienation in the streets of Athens.
However, it would be misleading to suggest that press
coverage was not characterized by some degree of diversity.
As it has already been seen, apart from the case of
"Eleftherotypia" which differed considerably from the rest of
the press by allowing alongside more "orthodox" views, some
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space to "heretical" statements from "marginals" or parts of
the far left concerned about the intensification of state
control , the coverage of the other Athens dailies varied
only in terms of style and "press languages".
What is more, the "exception" of Eleftherotypia to the
general pattern of press coverage could be explained by the
fact that the paper recognized the need to balance its
coverage in order to accommodate both the diverse views and
backgrounds of its readership and the reproduction of some
elements of the official discourse. Although the paper had to
cater for a substantial part of its readership which was
critically disposed towards official definitions of the
situation, Eleftherotypia also had interests related to the
reproduction of aspects of the Greek political system and
therefore of aspects of the official definitions of the
situation. This is why the imagery and linguistic/visual
material used in the coverage of the events often resembled
that of other newspapers (see for example illustration 24, p.
344) or the same socially accredited authorities recruited by
other papers were also invited to offer their definitions of
the situation in the pages of Eleftherotypia (see for
instance the paper's coverage of the building occupations
(pp. 263-64)).
According to the evidence presented here, the press
played an important role in the reproduction and maintenance
of the hegemonic political culture, including its internal
contradictions. Thus, while it played a significant role in
the maintenance of the boundaries of the "political", it also
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reproduced the range of views which are acceptable within
the latter. Important as it may be to reflect inter-party
conflict in news coverage, this is not by itself a sufficient
indication of a democratic political culture.
On the contrary, the analysis of press coverage of the
"marginals" indicates that the Athens press contributed to
the reproduction of a closed universe of political discourse,
deterring the formation of new, alternative social and
Political identities and setting obstacles to the
articulation of new political discourses. Throughout the
coverage of the events, the Athens newspapers very often
resorted to distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate
political actors, ideologies and forms of political action.
This application of what Agnoli termed "democratic
distinction" was premised on an unconditional acceptance of
the monopoly of the established political parties over the
sphere of politics, and at the same time the rejection of
attempts to create alternative political spaces, and to
challenge the traditional clientelistic mode of political and
social "representation". Thus, the phenomenon of the
occupations which took place in 1981, or of the formation of
an anti-nuclear umbrella organization were either treated
with indifference, or, more often, denounced and dismissed as
they constituted alternative forms of political and social
action, albeit of limited popularity.
The Athens press, far from constituting a public space
for independent debate and representation and negotiation,
constituted a restrictive factor in the universe of political
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discourse. Operating within the context of an authoritarian
political culture where the answer to political deviance is
exclusion, symbolic segregation and containment of political




In this discussion a case was presented for examining
the relationship between mass communication and political
culture. If we link the concept of political culture to
post-Parsonian social theory, political culture can be
interpreted as the product of the interplay between action
and structure, and can be understood as the sets of
cognitive, perceptual and practical schemata through which
the "political" is constructed, understood and experienced by
the members of a group or a society. I further argued that
political culture should be seen as the outcome of continuous
negotiation and social struggle for the definition of the
Political.
On the other hand, mass communication can be considered
to constitute a domain of action, negotiation and social
struggle with increasing	 importance	 in contemporary
societies. It is through the mass media that our
understanding of the political is mediated: the definitions
of the political which determine which issues will enter the
sphere of public awareness, discussion and collective action;
the terms in which these issues are discussed; the criteria
for legitimate participation in the public debate; and the
parameters of the ensuing debates and discussions. It is
therefore important to examine the role of the mass media in
this process of construction and reproduction of the
"political" in contemporary societies. In particular, this
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examination of media representations of the "political"
provides a means to assess the degree of openness or closure
of the universe of political discourse and action in a
society.
I have shown that the theories which emphasize the need
for a "public sphere" (Habermas 1989, Curran 1991, Keane
1991), or of	 "public spaces" (Melucci 1989) 	 for the
democratization of developed societies, Place great
importance on the institutions or public spaces that define
and constitute a public realm in these societies. Among these
institutions are the mass media, as well as self-managed and
voluntary associations, within which political debate can
take place freely, unhindered by the state or organized
economic interests.
This clearly makes the reconceptualization of political
culture a very important task; the concept of the "public
sphere" as a normative standard in contemporary political
Processes, and therefore as a normative dimension of this
process of reconceptualization of political culture, is a
significant element of the study of the "political" in
contemporary societies. The study of political culture should
focus on collective action and everyday practices and examine
the ways they contribute to, or impede, rational or critical
Participation of social actors in the universe of political
discourse or political action, that is, in the formation and
Preservation of a genuine public sphere in contemporary
societies.
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In this thesis' it has been a pgued that a democratic
political culture would comprize schemes of cognition,
perception and practices which actualize a political domain
characterized by a high degree of openness, publicity,
plurality and solidarity, and which enable citizens to attain
a high level of autonomy and self-determination, that is, to
engage in political debate and action in a rational and
critical manner. A democratic political culture therefore is
characterized by its capacity to maintain an open universe of
public and political discourse, the boundaries of which would
be continuously redefined through collective action.
Following Melucci (1989), who argues that political
democrac y is characterized by its ability to "hear" and by
the existence of public spaces for representation and
negotiation in which conflicts and demands emerging in civil
society could be expressed, it could be argued that a
democratic political culture would promote the formation and
maintenance of such spaces of independent debate and
collective action. The existence of such spaces is crucial
for the democratization of modern societies, as the
expression of collective action through them renders power
visible and negotiable. Through these spaces social actors
should be able to express demands and achieve the
politicization of issues raised by collective action. Access
to these public spaces should be open to social actors while
their individual or collective identities would not be
compromized by their participation in processes of
self-expression and collective action. The openness and
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flexibility of these public spaces is inexorably linked with
the existence and reproduction of a democratic political
culture.
As it has been argued both here and elsewhere (Melucci
1988, Curran 1992), the mass media have the potential of
being one of these spaces. I have argued that there exists an
interrelationship between mass communications and political
culture; mass communications are crucial in the reproduction
and publicizing of the definitions of the "political" which
are in turn informed by the political culture of a society
and the power relations which shape it. An open-democratic
political culture should therefore contribute to the
development of a diversity of mass media with an active,
representational and expressive role. It would enable them to
help collectivities (political parties, trade unions,
voluntary associations, minorities) to register protests and
develop alternative definitions of the "political". This
representational role of the mass media includes helping to
create and maintain the conditions in which alternative
viewpoints and perspectives can be effectively articulated
and introduced into public debate. In this way, diverse
social groups should be able to express alternative
viewpoints, and participate actively in the setting of the
parameters of political debate and action.
The arena of public debate which, the public media
constitute should be open to the diversity of values and
perspectives existing in contemporary societies. By being
open to and promoting a plurality of definitions and
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interpretations, and accessible not only to the established
or conventional political actors (political parties and
pressure groups), but also to sub-cultures (including ethnic,
political minorities), and different social strata whose
distinctive interests and social experiences are only partly
organized and articulated, the media should encourage and
enable social actors to critically review their political
experience, and to question the assumptions, ideas and
practices which inform it.
By contrast, an authoritarian political culture tends to
maintain or promote asymmetrical relations of power in
society and therefore a closed universe of discourse, a
restricted public	 sphere. It	 therefore restricts 	 the
viewpoints,	 definitions and	 interpretations	 publicized
through mass media of communication. Under such conditions
the mass media primarily reproduce a closed universe of
political discourse, and enable only a limited number of
social and political actors to register their views and
protests and develop definitions of the "political". In this
way, media representations of the "political" primarily
conform to hegemonic definitions, whereas representations of
social groups, discourses and practices which potentially or
actually challenge the hegemonic discourse are negative and
exclusivist.
This linkage between accessibility, openness and.
flexibility of the mass media and the democratization of
contemporary societies raises two sets of issues: the first
relates to the mass media as institutions or organizations,
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and refers to the ability of diverse social groups to have
access and a say in their operation. It is therefore related
to the democratization of the media institutions, and of the
socio-political context in which these operate. The second
relates to the politics of signification, or to the role of
the media in cultural reproduction, and refers to the
ideology inscribed in cultural products. In this, second
sense, openness in mass communication refers to the
preservation of the "multivocality" or "polysemy" of cultural
products. Systems of representation are the means of
ideological struggle through which competing groups advance
their interests, and thus different ways of mobilizing
meaning or different versions of common sense sustain
relations of power and promote the interests of some social
groups at the expense of others. A democratic political
culture would be reflected in and reinforced by creating
conditions which would facilitate alternative or even
oppositional readings of the same cultural product by its
diverse audiences. However, it is important to emphasize that
cultural	 products,	 despite	 their	 'multivocality 	 or
:polysemy', may also incorporate cultural 	 codes which
facilitate a "preferred", restricted "reading". It is
precisely this aspect of the politics of signification which
would characterize an authoritarian political culture.
Mass - or rather public - communications are a very
important parameter in the study of political culture.
Analysis of them has to transcend mere content analysis and
focus on the reproduction of Particular cultural codes which
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encourage and facilitate a preferred reading of the texts and
other messages of mass communication. This attempt would also
entail a broader social-historical analysis of the structural
and institutional context in which the mass media operate and
an identification of the relations of power and the elements
of the hegemonic or alternative political cultures which are
being reproduced in the cultural products under examination.
In this thesis	 I have attempted to specify the
interrelation between mass communication and political
culture by examining the representation strategies deployed
in operations of journalistic story-telling. Concentrating in
the case of the subcultural milieu of the 'marginals' in
Greece, and their representations in the Athens press, I
have focused upon the perspectives, themes and propositions
which have been advanced by journalistic accounts of
confrontations between the state and the legitimate political
actors on the one hand and the "marginals" on the other. This
was done by isolating and examining key elements employed in
the construction of these themes and in their organization
into apparently "adequate" and - "coherent" explanations of the
situation. In addition, attempts were made to align the
explanations offered by the press with the "lived experience"
and political culture(s) of press readers, in order to
examine the interrelationship between mass communication and
political culture.
The main hypothesis underlying this thesis was that the
examination of systems of representation, especially of
subcultures or minorities is very important in the study of
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political culture. First, because they provide a clear
indication of the degree of tolerance/intolerance of a
society and second because they include definitions of the
political and its limits, and set the boundaries of the
universe of political disctiurse and action. In the case of
the 'marginals' I tried to test this hypothesis and concluded
that the Athens press played an important role in the
rep roduction and maintenance of the hegemonic political
culture, including its internal contradictions. Thus, while
it played a significant role in the maintenance of. the
'official' boundaries of the 'political', it also reproduced
the range of views which are acceptable within the latter.
Important as it may be to reflect inter-party conflict in
news coverage, I emphasized that this is not by itself a
sufficient indication of a democratic political culture.
On the contrary, the analysis of the press coverage of
collective action of the 'marginals' indicates that the
Athens press contributed to the reproduction of a closed
universe of political discourse. It did so by privileging
certain actors who possessed the political and cultural
resources which allowed them to gain access to the universe
of political discourse, excluding or undermining dissenting
voices, deterring the formation of new, alternative social
and political identities and setting obstacles to the
articulation of new political discourses. The Athens press
very often resorted to distinctions between legitimate and
illegitimate political actors, ideologies and forms of
political action. This application of what Agnoli termed
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democratic distinction" was premised on an unconditional
acceptance of the monopoly of the established political
parties over the sphere of politics, and at the same time the
rejection of attempts to create alternative political spaces,
and to challenge the traditional clientelistic mode of
political and social 'representation'.
The Athens press constituted a restrictive factor in the
universe of political discourse. Operating within the context
of an authoritarian political culture where the answer to
political deviance is exclusion, symbolic segregation and
containment, it maintained cultural closure by reproducing
the hegemonic political culture. These conclusions have been
reinforced by more recent research which shows that the
systematic exclusion of political dissent and of ethnic and
religious minorities from the universe of political discourse
in Greece - to which both broadcast and print media have
contributed - has maintained and enhanced the authoritarian
aspects of the hegemonic political culture (Sofos and
Tsagarousianou 1993).
My study of press performance and political culture in
Greece indicates the importance of further research of the
interrelationship between the press and its political and
economic context, and in particular the relationship between
the mass media and democracy or authoritarianism. Indeed, the
relationship between the media and authoritarianism appears
to be returning to the political and media studies agendas:
there is an increasing theoretical debate on the relationship
between the media and democracy, the public sphere and civil
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societ y, including N. Chomsky's more empirical critique of
authoritarian aspects of modern politics and the media in the
West (Chomsky 1989, 1992) and on the authoritarian
transformation of both mass media and political cultures in
Eastern European post-communist societies (Splichal 1993)
Tsagarousianou 1992). There is no doubt that much further
research and theoretical elaboration is needed in order to
throw more light on the interrelationship between mass
communications and political culture and to develop new and
innovative approaches to its study.
NOTES
Part I
1. See R. Looker (1978). Looker, referring to the "movement"
of comparative politics, in which Almond and Verba could be
included, pointed out that the US political system has been
considered to be "the prescriptive standard of representative
democracy". In the case of the "Civic Culture", one could
legitimately extend his arguments to include the political
process in the UK.
2. See below, pp. 30-44.
3. While in "advanced" societies these tasks have been assumed
mainly within the framework of the "welfare state", in
"peripheral" or "semi-peripheral" societies other forms- of
often informal and "extra-institutional" distribution might
be more relevant as I shall try to show later in this thesis.
4. See the analyses of Gramsci (1971), also the more
contemporary problematics in Offe (1984); Habermas (1989);
Keane (1988a, 1988b), Melucci (1989: 171-4).
S. Cf. Epstein (1967); Kirchheimer (1966).
6. Cf. of Frankfurt school origin Marcuse (1969); Kirkheimer
(1966), also	 Agnoli (1972);	 Ferrajoli (1985a;	 1985b);
Ferrajoli and	 Zolo (1978). Also	 see the	 analyses of
corporatist politics cf. Schmitter (1974); Panitch (1976).
7. For a more detailed exposition of Carl Schmitt's critique
of liberal democracy see Schmitt (1988), also Kenned y (1987).
For Schmitts influence in the German Left, see the special
section in Telos, no 71, Spring 1987. Also, see Lavrancu,
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"Introduction" in	 C. Schmitt (1988) and	 Keane (198a:
153-183). .
8. It is	 in this context of	 symbolic and repressive
discrimination and exclusion that the persecutions which took
place during the 1970s against "terrorists" and their
"s ympathizers" in the civil service, the legal profession, the
university, literary circles and the mass-media in the Federal
Republic of Germany can be explained. The most repressive
campaign of exclusion and discrimination was the outcome of
the laws of 1972 (Berufsverbote) and 1975 which forebode the
occupation of public office to anyone who could be considered
OS "enemy of the constitution. These laws targeted mainly
members and sympathisers of extra-parlimentary groups of
alternative, communist, or socialist character, and led to the
persecutions of even liberal intellectuals, as Heinrich Boll,
who opposed the repressive and regressive character of West
German politics. The "openness" and the unwillingness of the
social-democracy to represent specific collective interests is
also pointed out by J. Agnoli (1972: 40-43). However, Agnoli
argues that these characteristics cannot be attributed to the
SPD alone but to the "political party of the constitutional
state" in general (p. 42). It should be pointed out that
"criminalization" is just one of the methods of repressive
exclusion. One could also mention the "psychic separation of
'gifted' and 'ungifted' children in different types of
schools" (Gransow and Offe 1982: 80) which has and is being
used in the case of immigrant minorities.
9. Although Ferrajoli has been using the term "political
culture" frequentl y, he has done BO without attempting to
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specify or qualify it sufficientl y (Ferrajoli 1985a: 11, 18,
95, 105; 1985b: 21, 34, 50, 54, 59, 62). It appears that onlY
Marcuse's analysis of "one-dimensional society and thought"
(1991) constitutes a cultural analysis of modern western
societies.
10. See for example the bibliography in Gibbins (1989: 8-11).
Also Inglehart (1981: 880).
11. Although the book title refers to "political action", as
Rootes has pointed out, the writers have been studying
"attitudes" towards political action (Rootes, 1981).
12. J. Cohen (1982); Offe (1984); Keane (1988a; 1988b);
Melucci (1989).
13. Pakulski (1991) observed that mass movements, especially
those with ecological and peace orientations should in fact be
viewed as "bifurcated movements", that is, as having two main
orientations. Apart from the first, essentially democratic
orientation, he distinguishes a second, anti-bureaucratic
trend which he considers to be compatible with centralism and
statism.
14. Although Almond and Verba (1980) was intended to provide a
critical re-evaluation of the "civic culture" paradigm, it
constituted an internal critique of a rather limited scope.
15. As it has been argued (Eagleton 1978: 33; Turner 1990:
57-8) the notion of the "structure of feeling" suffers from
lack of clarity. Williams (1980c), refering to the concept,
stresses the similarities between the "structure of feeling"
and L. Goldmann's "genetic structuralism" (Goldmann 1975)
without however elaborating upon this convergence. Eagleton
points out that the notion of "structure of feeling" is in a
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way reminiscent of a definition of ideology (Eagleton 1878--
33), while in an attempt to offer a more coherent description,
-
Bennett argues that "structure of feeling" refers to "a shared
set of ways of thinking and feeling which, displaying a
pattern of regularity, form and are formed by the "whole way
of life" which comprises the "lived culture" of a particular
epoch, class or group" (Bennett 1981: 26). Finally Barnett's
claim that the structure of feeling is "designed exactly to
restore the category of experience to the world, as part of
its mutable and various social history" (Barnett 1976: 62)
might suggest the possibility that "the structure of feeling"
could occupy the same space that E. P. Thompson reserves for
his concept of "experience", that is, a level of consciousness
that lies between the 'non-cultural" actual conditions of
existence and "culture". It should also be pointed out that
the notion of "structure of feeling" has been used as the
basis for approaches to political culture. Cf. Reimer (1989).
16. It should however be pointed out that the Gramscian notion
of totality has been the subject of considerable debate; see
Jay (1984: 150-174).
17. It is worth pointing out that even within the hegemonic
culture, the processes of selection and reinterpretation are
not "total", that is, elements antagonistic to the hegemonic
culture that have been reinterpreted and incorporated in it
are retaining a degree of their antagonistic character
(Williams 1980b: 39).
18. This point has been carried even further by Laclau and
Mouffe (1985) as they deny an y sort of determination at all.
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19. See especiall y the work of staff and students of the
Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies.
20. Cf. Cohen and Young (1973); Glasgow Media Group (1976;
1980); Hall et al. (1978).
21. Habermas (1987) introduces a distinction between
emancipatory and protest potential of social movements which
has been considered to be similar to the oppositional and
alternative culture schema (Demertzis, 1985: 168, 265).
However, it should be pointed out that while the latter
distinction could be applied in the case of both "regressive"
and "progressive"	 alternative or	 oppositional political
cultures,	 Habermas's	 distinction	 cannot,	 as	 the
"emancipatory" Potential implies an additional criterion
refering to the "progressive", "emancipatory" character of an
oppositional, or even an alternative culture.
22. A more systematic approach along these lines has been
attempted by Demertzis (1985 and 1989).
23. Melucci seems to envisage the possibility of such
"post-industrial" democratic politics (1989: 165-179).
24. Of course the work of sociologists and political
scientists in the field of Communist Studies, on the political
culture od communist societies was based in mostly historical,
structural and institutional analyses of these societies,
although this was the result of any quantitative data for
their analyses.
25. In an attempt to avoid the shortcomings of the "civic
culture" paradigm Mainwaring and Viola (1984) proposed the
development of an alternative notion and typology of political
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culture that would be free from the constraints of its
original	 association with the	 liberal democratic	 and
developmental paradigm. In an effort to link political culture
with behaviour, they suggested that political culture is not
merely informing political behaviour, as Almond and Verba
claimed; political culture and behaviour should rather be
considered as mutually interacting. What is more, Mainwarning
and	 Viola,	 in	 contrast to	 the	 "psychological"	 and
"individualist" premises	 of the	 civic culture	 thesis,
emphasized the social-historical dimension of political
culture by stressing the fact that political cultures are
"configurations of values which are formed historically" (p.
18). Rejecting the linear evolutionary principle upon which
the civic culture thesis had been premised, they emphasized
the possibility of regressive as well as progressive change of
a political culture.
As far as their typology of political culture is
concerned, they have proposed a classification of types of
political culture in accordance to two main parametres: the
first and principal parametre refers to political values which
could range from authoritarian to democratic, while the second
refers to social values ranging from elitist to egalitarian.
Thus, five main types of political culture are derived from
the particular combinations of these parametres: right and




1. See Keyder (1987), Mouzelis (1978). The y both argue that
peasants in the	 Ottoman Empire remained more	 or less
independent, cultivating the land and paying an annual
proportional tax to the Porte. Although in periods of crisis
of the central government the local functionaries managed to
become more powerful, appropriate the surplus and, in the last
years of the Empire, claim the land and limit the rights of
the peasantry, the overall structure of the society did not
change considerably, either because these phenomena were
restricted to relatively small areas, or because soon the
Sultan's authority was restored, and the rights of the
peasants reasserted.
2. Keyder uses the term to describe the practice of hiring
the right to collect taxes in the Ottoman Empire.
3. See Kondogiorgis (1985: 93) especially on the issue of the
dependence of the reproduction of the Greek notables as a
social category on the fiscal system of the Ottoman Empire.
4. This type of property i.e. large inheritable estates mainly
owned by muslims was called chiflik.
5. Attica and Euboea where chiflik-type ownership was pre-
dominant, were exceptions. See Mouzelis (34-35).
6. Indeed, one of the most important problems the owners of -
the ciftliks had to overcome was securing a permanent or
regular workforce. See Petropulos (1968: 28) and Tsoukalas
(1986: 268).
7. Between 1861-70 the landless peasants were under than 10%
of the peasant population. See Tsoukalas (p. 267).
B. It has been argued that the introduction of Roman law in
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Greece institutionalized the external control of the local
societies and introduced an "administrative" version of
community, while the Ottoman state safeguarded the cultural
autonomy of the communities as well (Papataxiarhis 1990;
Pantazopoulos 1990).
9. Fotopoulos (1975) emphasizes the role of remittances from
migrants and of tourism in reducing the deficit in the balance
of payments (94-99). He also points out that the massive
migration to industrialized countries reduced considerably the
level of unemployment, without however leading to full
employment as he estimates that in 1961 approximately 24% of
the economicall y active population were unemployed or
underemployed (129-131). Negreponti-Delivani reaches similar
conclusions as, according to her own estimates, the average
rate of unemplo yment was 13.6% in the 1960s and 6.5% in the
1970s, although, if there had been no mass migration to
industrialized	 countries, average	 unemployment	 between
1960-76 would have been 17.4% 	 (Negreponti-Delivani 1979:
90).
10. Greece is the only Southern European country in which the
majority of	 economically active population consists of
self-employed and their family members (OECD, Labour
Statistics, 1960-1983, Paris 1985, quoted in Vergopoulos 1986:
185). Haralambis commenting on this circumvention of the
process of proletarianization of part of the population points
out that it had resulted to the economic integration of the
emerging petty-bourgeois strata without serious social
tensions,	 which,	 different	 circumstances,	 i.e.	 of
industrialization through large scale capital accumulation and
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concentration mi ght have given rise to (Haralambis, 1889:
188-89).
11. It should be pointed out that the post-war transformation
of disposessed, or poor peasant urban and rural populations
into petty-bourgeois strata constituted in fact a form of
social mobility. See Tsoukalas (1981), Haralambis (1989: 196).
However, the possibility of upward social mobility beyond the
petty-bourgeois strata was extremely difficult, as it has
already been pointed out.
12. Karapostolis	 uses the	 term "consumption	 mobility"
("katanalotiki kinitikotita") in order to describe the
relationship between limited social mobility opportunities and
consumption as a means of mobility at the "symbolic" level. He
thus argues that the consumption of specific products is
intended to be noticed, conspicuous. It is therefore an
activity which, apart from satisfying (material) needs,
"asserts" the social status of the consumer, or - and this
mainly is the case - "announces" the intention, or the
persistent aim to occupy a prominent position, in this sense
being a form of social hypostatization (Karapostolis 1984:
250-269). A similar argument concerning primarily Greek
society in the 19th century has been developed in
Dedoussopoulos (1985).
13. The modes of the army's involvement in post-war political
life underwent considerable transformation as immediately
after the German occupation and the civil war the inability of
the new regime to operate in Greece made it almost entirely
dependent upon the English and American military missions and
the reorganization of Greek army under their auspices. As
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social integration progressed however, foreign intervention
and influence became increasingly mediated by internal social
and political institutions. Thus, the army became the
guarantor of the maintenance of the post-war balance of
political power, as new centres of power developed within it
for this reason. For a more detailed analysis of the role of
the army see Haralambis (1985; 1989).
14. The most significant attempt to modernize the political
system was made by the right-wing leader K. Karamanlis in 1961
when he presented his constitutional reform proposals, which
led to his resignation (Haralambis 1985; 89). It should also
be pointed out that the popular mobilizations in support of
the Centre Union during the 1960s were characterized by
demands for constitutional reform. It was the potential of
mobilizations of this kind, demanding the activation of the
existing , albeit defunct constitution, which led to the coup
d' etat staged by the army in 1967.
15. On "partitocrazia" see Spotts and Wieser (1986: 4-6) or
Sassoon (1986: 221-24). On the particularities of the Greek..	 .
case, especially the transformations of the political sphere
after the dictatorship see Karabelias (1989: 167-179), also
Haralambis (1989: 293-302).
16. On the incompatibility of "populism" and the liberal
notion of representation of interests see Sofos (1992).
17. On the conditions of formation, and the meaning of civil
society see Keane (19880. esp. PP. 62-66).
18. The Second National Assembl y in Astros, in March-April
1823, established the freedom of the press, under certain
restrictions regarding the protection of Christian faith,
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morality and the prevention of libel, as one of the political
rights of the Greeks. However, D. Ypsilantis, a leading figure
in the then revolutionary government attempted to implement a
broad interpretation of those restrictions and to impose
preventive censorship to the existing newspapers. See P.
Karykopoulos, pp. 37-39, also D. L. Kyriazis-Gouvelis (1977:
31-45).
19. On the "public sphere" in Western European societies see
Habermas (1989).
20. Governor Capodistria with the Decree of the 26th of April
1831 extended the limitations of the freedom of the press
which had been established in the constitutions of Astros and
Troizina. In addition to the restrictions safeguarding the
Christian-Orthodox religion, the established morality and
preventing libel, new limitations are introduced prohibiting
the publication of "any printed material insulting the
beneficient to the Greek nation Powers and the foreign Royal
Courts or defame their ambassadors and agents" or "incite
towards the overthrowing of the temporary status quo as it has
been established by the Argos National Assembly decisions or
incite towards disobedience to the Laws" (article 2, para.
c). The legislation which was introduced by the
Administrations of King Otto (Law about the Crimes commited
through the Abuse of the Press, 6(18)19/1833 and Law for the
Policing of the Press, 11(23)/9/1833, Libel and Press Law,
23/11(5/12)1837 extended the limitations imposed to the press
to a frightening degree which intimidated publishers and
journalists and discouraged public debate and any attempt to
criticize public personalities, governmental policies or even
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the decisions and actions of local authorities. Even more,
this legislation covered, apart from the press, the
publication of books.
21. It has been estimated that between 1836 and 1342, there
were 56 trials for press-related offences before the Athens
courts alone. See "ion", no 419/1843.
22. Mayer states that comment constituted the cornerstone of
Greek newspapers of the period. See Mayer (1957, A': 60).
23. On the complex relation between clientelist networks and
parliamentarism in 19th century see Kontogiorgis (1985: 126).
also Mouzelis (1978 and 1986).
24. In fact, as there was no appropriate infrastructure, and
due to the fact that newspapers were mostly personal or family
(small-scale) ventures, the "news" featured in the newspapers
throughout most of the 19th century reached the newspapers
rather late as they were taken from the pages of foreign
newspapers, or from letters sent by Greeks who were living
abroad, in the case of foreign news. Az far as domestic news
coverage was concerned, the main sources were information
provided by the administration, or, again, letters, or, in the
best case, re ports from local correspondents which because of
the lack of transportations and communications infrastructure,
more than often failed to reach the newspaper in time. In this
sense, the publication of Vlassis Gavriilidis's Akropolis
constitutes an innovation in the Greek press.
25. 11 we accept the detailed lists compiled b y Mayer (1957)
between 1835 and 1862, 157 newspapers were published, of which
115 in Athens alone, while between 1863 and the end of the
century they had reached the astonishing number of 789, of
-402-
which 402 were published in Athens. it should be added that,
according to Mayer, during the latter period 195 periodicals
had been published.
26. Six of the journalists of the "Efimeris" became prime
ministers and 11 became ministers. See Karykopoulos (p. 94).
27. The fact that the need for more qualified journalists
became more important could be illustrated by the wish of
Gavriilidis - expressed in his will - to dedicate a part of
his pro perty to the funding of scholarships for young
journalists.
28. Amongst the numerous writers and caricaturists of the
period, Emm. Roidis, G. Souris and Th. Anninos have been the
most influential. Emm. Roidis's satirical prose and G.
Souris's caustic verse constituted outstanding examples of
critical approach to Political events through satire
(Kondogiorg is 1985; also Karykopoulos 1984: 88-9; Peponis
1983: 112). On the other hand, Th. Aninos's work has been a
turning point for political caricature in the sense that he
has been the first to develop caricature into an influential
Hind of political and social satire of equal importance with
political commentary. In contrast to the coarse and unrefined
techniques employed in caricatures before him, T. Anninos by
introducing refined techniques, clarity of expression and by
paying attention to detail, managed to render caricature more
.	 .
accessible and interesting to a wider public which, because of
the low literacy rate of the period, might have been excluded
from other, printed channels of political debate.
23. The first reference to the problems of the press, and the
demands of the directors of the Athens press for their
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resolution has been recorded on the 15-1-1889, when a
committee of the Union of Greek Journalists met with the prime
minister Trikoupis at the ministry of economic affairs. One of
the issues raised was that of the reduction of the price of
printing paper, mail and cable tarrifs. Trikoupis promised he
would implement any necessary change in the tarrifs (Genovelis
n.d.: 34).
30. "Rizospastis" had initially been published as a
"progressive-democratic" newspaper in 1908 by G. Philaretos,
while in 1917 it had been published for a second time under
the editorship of the socialist journalist N. Giannios. At
that time it supported vaguely socialist principles. Finally,
in July 1921 it became the official newspaper of SEKE.
31. G. Koskotas founded the publishing corporation "Grammi
EPE" which published several weekly magazines and eventually
launched one evening newspaper (24 Ores) and bought the
morning paper "I Kathimerini".
32. The names of the Kouris brothers curiously do not appear
in any official document of ownership of mass-media
enterprizes.
33. My estimations from statistical data provided by N.
Kyriazidis in Anti, nos 306, 320, 334 and 402.
34. At the end of 1983, 14 daily political papers were
published, in 1984, 15 and in 1986 there were 16.
35. The "Lambrakis Press Organization" had to discontinue the
Publication of its morning daily "To Vima" and continued to
Publish only its Sunday edition "To Vima tie Kyriakis". Ch.
Tegopoulos was also forced to discontinue his morning daily "I
Proini EleftherotYPia", while the advocate of the colonel's
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regime "Eleftheros Kosmos", a morning paper too, closed down
in the early 1980s. Finaly, more recently "Eleftheros", a new
morning paper, had to be relaunched as an evening daily in
order to increase its average daily circulation from just
under 2,500 to approximately 16,000 readers.
36. Industrial disputes had followed the dismissal of several
union members from the newspapers "Avriani" (1982), "Ethnos"
(January 1983) and "Ta Nea" (January 1983). In the case of
"Ethnos" police cars were used to carry the master copy of the
paper to the printing plan, as picket lines had made access to
it virtually impossible.
37. In 1987, the "Lambrakis Press Organization" bought the
"Theofanidis Publications Co" which publishes 3 popular
magazines, while in 1988, it launched the Greek edition of
Marie Claire.
38. The "Lambrakis Press Organization" established its own
radio station, TOP FM (1987), "Grammi AE", in addition to its
3 papers and 5 magazines, launched its radio station, "Sky 104
FM Radio". "T ypoekdotiki AE" followed with its "902 FM" and
the Kouris brothers with their "Radio Athina". According to my
estimates regarding the condition of the broadcasting industry
in Greece, in 1992 there were over 1000 municipal, state and
private local radio stations and over 30 TV stations without
licences; some have near national coverage by means of
networking.
39. The Greek political system is essentially bi-polar,
despite the apparent existence of three poles (Right,
Centre-Left, and Left) as centre-left PASOK managed to
articulate elements of the discources of the communist
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parties, and to become the main opponent of the conservative
New Democracy. An a result, communist parties retained a
meagre combined electoral support of approximatel y 12%, and
more importantly, accepted the hegemonic role of PASOK over
the left, and became its minor partners and satelites. See
also Mavrogordatos's interesting argument that the Greek
political system is "a tripolar system with bipolar
competition" (1983: 82), that is, a system where the third
pole (the communist Left) has been either excluded or
neutralized. In this wa y the contest for government power is
restricted to the two main contenders.
Part III
1. Fezmazoglou's article lacks completely methodological and
theoretical premises while his analysis includes a very
limited number of texts. Both Pezmazoglou and Komninou fail to
address issues of interpretation, or of the relation of text
with its particular social context at the social and (media)
institutional level. What is more, they take texts virtually
at face value and do not attempt to "decode" or "deconstruct"
it.
2. Examples of this exclusive character of Greek political
culture are the total cultural isolation of ethnic and
religious minorities from the rest of the population. Similar
conclusions could be drawn in the cases of social minorities
such as the gay and lesbian communities, radical feminist
groups which refused to be incorporated in the relevant
organizations of the main political parties.
3. For a discussion on the issues raised by the use of the
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terms 'culture(s)', 	 'subcultures',	 'counter-culture'	 and
cultural 'milieu' see John Clarke et al. (1978).
4. Information on beliefs, focal concerns etc of these groups
taken from several "marginal" and "alternative" publications
and brochures as well as "To Vima", 19-5-85.
5. For the emergence and characteristics of moral panics see
CCCS Mugging Group 1976; Hall et al. 1978; also Cohen 1987.
6. The headline is refering to the record of the previous,
conservative government on the area of housing, and denounces
tho neglect and, sometimes, police harassment and legal
prosecution of homeless people who built their houses without
planning permission in impoverished areas of Athens.
7. PASOK, the governing party had fought the electoral
campaign and won the 1981 election on an anti-American and
anti-EEC platform, as far as foreign and defence policies were
concerned. Similar anti-Western positions had been taken by
the Communist, and to a lesser extent, the Eurocommunist
parties. Even the president of the Republic, ex-leader of main
opposition party, conservative and pro-Western New Democracy,
had decided the withdrawal of Greece from NATO's military wing
seven years earlier because of the powerful anti-western
feeling in post-dictatorship Greece.
8. See letter which the director of Athens Police Mr.
Bosinakis claimed that he had received from shop-owners of
the area. See "Ta Nea", 6 October 1984.
9. It seems that "Apogevmatini" as well as the rest of what
one could call traditional conservative newspapers, despite
the competitive environment they have to operate in, seem
unwilling to try to expand their readership beyond their
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conservative camp. In fact, their stock of symbols and themes
seems to be appealing more to their traditional clientele than
to a wider readership.
10. Ministry of Health and Social Services. The recognition of
its jurisdiction over the area of Exarcheia could be seen as
an attempt to "medicalize" the problem of the area.
11. For the lifestyle of the "Manges" see Petropoulos (1990:
20 22).
12. Despite frequent references in political discourse to the
"Youth Movement" and the "Student Movement", party political
organizations in Greece function as mere branches of political
parties. In fact, they rarely have any autonomy as they
reflect the views of party leadershi ps and are normally unable
to influence political decisions.
13. For a presentation of these discourses, see Stanley Cohen
1985: 197-235.
14. See the brief but extremely interesting discussion of
notions of social space in the context of demonic symbolism in
Greek folk culture in Stewart (1991: 164-172). Stewart argues
that foreigners and members of other ethnic or religious
groups are "strangers par excellence", and demonstrates the
association of stereotypes of these groups with demonic
symbolism. Thus, he draws attention to the various
representations of Jews as demons, or the Devil himself.
Although the importance of demonic symbolism_ as a coherent
formal discourse has declined, these images have persisted and
are still part of the popular imaginary, although possibly in
different contexts.
15. See p. 404 above, endnote no 7.
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16. In the Greek text the (non-existent) word "thirioeidis"
< = monster-like from "thirio" = monster> is used instead of the
expected "thyreoeidis" <=thyroid">. The expression
"hyper-functioning of the thyroid" was used widely at the time
as a result of the concern for the possible effects of the
nuclear fallout of Chernobyl (cancer of the thyroid was one of
the prominent dangers mentioned in various reportages,
interviews and statements issued by health authorities). I
here use the term "thirioid" as an equivalent to the Greek
"thirioeidis".
17. The same	 concern over the activities	 of property
speculators in Exarcheia was first expressed by
"Eleftherotypia" on its October 4, 19 $14 reporte%e oo. the
police "Operation Virtue".
18. For more details on the "inventory" see Cohen (1987).
19. On "sensitization" see Cohen (1987).
20. On "public languages" see CCCS Mugging Group (1976: 75).
Public languages are used by the media in order to "adapt"
primary definitions of the situation to the culture/language
of their audience. They are therefore based on assumptions of
media professionals about the language and cultural background
of their audiences.
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